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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays centered around labor incentives that arise
in relative compensation contracts. Chapter 1 poses the question: if devotion to
a core competence were truly optimal, why would firms do otherwise? We argue
that the behavior of drifting from the core may be motivated by the competitive
incentives faced by managers who seek to rise within a firm. We find competition
creates an incentive for a manager to look for less correlated opportunities that pull
the firm in a new direction. In a symmetric equilibrium all managers behave this
way, leading to lower expected output for the firm. A “stick” that punishes the
lowest performing manager in conjunction with a prize to the top performer can
deter such behavior. Chapter 2 investigates how common shocks affect the behavior
of heterogeneous agents in contracts designed to achieve both equity and efficiency.
We show that when a procedurally fair and efficient tournament is desirable and
compensates for heterogeneity, common shocks can bias the probability of winning
of the agents. Also, the principal is found to have a commitment problem, favoring
low risk agents to win, when fair and efficient tournaments are held between agents
with different uncertainty distributions. Chapter 3 uses an experiment to examine
issues of fairness and efficiency in rank-order tournaments with agents heterogeneous
in abilities and random shock distributions. To study these issues, we observe agent
effort, contract choice, and role choice from participating in three contracts that
iii
vary in perceptions of equal opportunity: equal access, equal expected earnings, and
equal changes of winning. The primary result is that equal pay in the form of equal
expected outcomes promotes efficiency and greater perceptions of fairness than does
equal access to common contracts.
iv
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Chapter 1
Competition and Core
Competency: Risk Independence
as a Strategy
1.1 Introduction
Adherence to a strong core competency has been argued to be a common trait of
successful corporations. Proponents argue that a firm’s sustained success is engen-
dered by the discipline of its managers to adhere to a core strength from which the
firm derives competitive advantage. But when firms perform poorly, the decline is of-
ten associated with a fragmented market strategy and investments into business areas
where they take on new risks, are less productive, and do not compete effectively. This
argument begs the question of why executives would engage in such behavior. That
is, if devotion to a core competence is truly optimal, why would firms do otherwise?
Of course it is not necessarily the case that adhering to core strengths is optimal
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for any particular firm. Concluding from the observation that firms in decline often
exhibit “drift” from their core competence suffers an obvious problem of selection
bias. For example, shifting to new markets may be the least-bad alternative when
disruptive innovation or market changes erode a firm’s competitive position in its
traditional markets. Nevertheless, the observation that drift by a firm from its core is
often associated with decline raises a very interesting question: might such behavior
be the result of a systematic agency problem that exists between firms and their
managers under common incentive structures?
We argue that this behavior may be motivated by the competitive incentives faced
by managers who seek to rise within a firm. It is well documented in the literature
that competition among managers for promotion, bonuses, or other rewards can be
efficiently employed to motivate productive effort. Much recent work on competitive
incentives has focused on how competition influences other strategic choices, such as
risk-taking and cheating. Distinct in the model we develop, a competing manager has
discretion that enables him to choose his effort and how to allocate his effort between
projects that are inside versus outside the core activities of the firm.
We assume that a manager’s expected output is maximized for any level of effort
if he adheres to the core of the firm, but by doing so the randomness affecting his
output is most correlated with that of the other managers. Conversely, if he shifts
his activities away from the core of the firm into other ventures his expected output
for a given level of effort declines and his random shocks become less correlated with
his competitors. We find competition creates an incentive for a manager to look for
less correlated opportunities that pull the firm in a new direction, away from its core
activities. In a symmetric equilibrium, all managers behave this way which leads to
lower expected output for the firm.
2
Prahalad and Hamel (1990) observed fragmented market strategies when they
originated the concept of core competency. They describe how NEC Corporation
successfully employed a strategic advantage in semiconductors and manufacturing to
dominate the computing and communication industry in the 1980’s; while their rival
GTE Corporation, having a comparable starting point, faltered. A key difference was
that divisions within GTE were managed as autonomous business units while NEC
was organized to develop and leverage their core competencies across all divisions.1
Business managers at GTE were given the authority to make independent risk and
market decisions while contemporaneously competing for internal resources and com-
pensation, an environment which ultimately led to strategies that included business
divestitures and collaboration with outsiders — all in leu of investments in the core
competency.
We model how competitive compensation schemes used to motivate performance
may also motivate inefficient drift behavior in firms like GTE. A manager’s autonomy
represents the notion that he has control over a division, has discretion over some
activities, or can enter new markets on behalf of the firm. To capture this notion, our
premise is that autonomy gives managers discretion to pursue independent non-core
related ventures that subsequently reduce the common exposure to shocks they share
with the other managers within the organization.
We develop a tournament model to represent the incentives that autonomous
managers may face as they compete for rewards within a firm (or possibly even across
firms in the broader labor market context). The model is based on a Lazear and
1The sustainability of NEC’s advantage came from investing in the culture and innovative tech-
nologies that fostered the next generation competencies of the whole organization—all virtues of the
original concept. The advice from Prahalad and Hamel (1990) to a modern corporation is obvious:
“Focusing on core competencies creates unique, integrated systems that reinforce fit among your
firm’s diverse production and technology skills—a systemic advantage your competitors can’t copy.”
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Rosen (1981) winner-take-all rank-order tournament which in this context motivates
managers by ranking their observable output and rewarding only the top manager. As
is standard in tournament models, we assume each manager’s output is determined by
a combination of his unverifiable effort and random shocks. A random shock can be
common (experienced by all agents within the firm) or idiosyncratic (independently
impacting each agent).
Our innovation is to assume that each manager has some discretion regarding
how exposed he is to the two types of shocks while simultaneously choosing effort.
A key result from this model is that when three or more managers compete, at any
symmetric point a single manager can increase his probability of winning by increasing
his independence. He does this by increasing his exposure to an idiosyncratic random
shock rather than a common shock.
To capture the assumption that firms do best when managers stay close to the
firm’s core competency, we assume that as a manager becomes more independent he
becomes less productive; that is, he increasingly forfeits the benefits that come from
the firm’s core competency. Hence, as a manager increases his independence, he also
increases the cost of effort required to achieve any given level of output. This describes
a manager who runs an independent venture and takes on greater burdens as a result
of being independent such as reduced production efficiencies and economies of scale
or increased costs of information and administration. We also assume that the loss in
productivity from core drift is relatively more costly as the core strength of the firm
increases.
Within this context, the intuition for our key finding is straightforward. When
multiple managers compete in a winner-take-all contest, competition creates an in-
centive for independence-seeking behavior despite the fact that it reduces managers’
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productivity. By diverging from the firm’s core activities a manager makes his output
less correlated with others by separating his source of stochastic risk from the pool of
competitors. Holding the behavior of others constant, up to some point this increases
his chance of ranking first. By increasing his non-core activities, he makes it less
likely he will win if the common shock is positive, but this is more than offset by his
increased probability of winning if the common shock is negative.
This leads to a symmetric equilibrium where all managers choose some positive
level of independence. We show that all managers wastefully engage in independence-
seeking behavior in a symmetric equilibrium despite the fact that this reduces equilib-
rium expected output. The firm may be hurt by decisions of competing managers who
pull the firm in conflicting directions—at odds with its core activity—even though
every manager is aware that this drift is costly.
Core drift behavior is also wasteful in the sense that in equilibrium, no agent
is better off than before (i.e. his chance of winning is still the same). Core drift
can be reduced or eliminated by offering a penalty as a third payoff level. This is
akin to the management style of promoting the top managers and firing the bottom
managers, a technique made popular by Jack Welch during his tenure as CEO of
General Electric between 1981 and 2001. By balancing the first-place prize with an
equivalent last-place penalty, the incentive to be independent is eliminated.
A somewhat related problem that has been studied is one of managers choosing
between risky assets in financial settings. Kempf and Ruenzi (2008) look at the intra-
firm competition for promotions of fund managers and find empirical evidence that
“common shock matching” is used as a strategic behavior.2 A manager who wants
2Although not directly modeled in the article, the Kempf and Ruenzi identification presumes a
manager who finds himself behind at midyear (a losing manager) in a small competitive firm will
increase his risk to improve his chances of winning. Then, as a counter strategy, a winning manager
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to preserve his lead may select assets correlated with the pool of other managers.
Alternatively, a manager who wants to increase his chance of winning may choose
assets that are uncorrelated with the pool. Viewing our model in this context, fund
managers can choose the“house”assets that are popular in the firm and share common
risk or choose unique assets where risk is less correlated.
Kempf and Ruenzi (2008) also find that managers in large firms who have higher
returns by midyear will reduce portfolio risk compared to managers with low returns,
as is predicted by Bronars (1987); yet, the opposite behavior occurs in small firms.
Kempf et al. (2009) look at how employment risk influences the choice of risk taking for
mutual fund managers and find that when employment risk is high, managers reduce
the portfolio risk. This supports the conclusions of Gilpatric (2009) who shows that
a stick (e.g. being fired) can reduce risk-seeking behavior in agents and motivates the
inclusion of penalties for the last place agent in this model.
Lazear and Rosen (1981) introduced the theory of rank-order competition based
on the ability of organizers to only observe the ordinal-rank of agents as a function
of hidden effort and uncertainty. Since then, a body of literature on risk taking in
tournaments has focused on what happens when homogeneous agents can choose their
level of idiosyncratic variance in different settings ( Bronars (1987); Gaba et al. (2004);
Tsetlin et al. (2004); Nieken and Sliwka (2010)). The general finding is that risk
taking increases an agent’s chances of winning in a one-shot contest among multiple
players. However, there are also strategic reasons to act risk-averse to preserve a lead.
Bronars (1987) showed how followers in a sequential tournament are risk seeking and
will mimic the choices of the losing manager (i.e. increase risk) to synchronize his common shock
and lock in his win. Then, as a counter action, the losing manager will react to lower his risk to
differentiate himself even further. These dynamic reactions raises the concern that this is not an
equilibrium since the winning managers could react yet again to lower their risk, and so on..
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leaders are risk-averse. This strategic behavior was verified empirically by Knoeber
and Thurman (1994) in broiler tournaments.
Our analysis is related to Gaba et al. (2004) who model winner-take-all contests
where agents can modify their own distributions and correlations with other contes-
tants. They find that reducing correlation with competitors increases the probability
of winning for a single agent. However, their focus is very different insofar as they do
not identify an equilibrium of a game in which there is a cost of decreasing correlation
(they instead argue contestants’ dominant strategy is to choose the least correlated
distribution available). Additionally, we add the simultaneous choice of effort and
correlation. In an innovation type tournament, Levitt (1995) finds that an organizer
can benefit from reducing the correlation between agents in a contest of two agents
when he is interested in only the top performers’ output. In his model, agents are
unaware of the source of their shocks and pay a fixed cost of bearing risk.
The study of risk taking in tournaments has also branched out to model the
two-variable choice of effort and the variance of idiosyncratic risk ( Hvide (2002);
Gilpatric (2009)). The general findings are that when risk taking is costless, agents
will wastefully take larger risks and produce less effort. Nieken et al. (2010) conducts
a two stage experiment based on the model originally developed by Hvide (2002)
where a subject first chooses between two distributions of risk, then chooses effort
in a two-player contest. She finds that contrary to two-stage theory, subjects are
not strategically risk-seeking to reduce effort in the second stage. She does, however,
confirm that when the high risk option is selected, less effort is observed in the second
stage. Also contrary to theory, she finds that subjects only take personal risk into
account when making strategic decisions, ignoring the strategy the other player may
have over risk.
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The simultaneous setting proposed by Gilpatric (2009) is close to the model con-
sidered here. This model assumes that an agent can simultaneously choose his level of
effort and own level of risk at a cost in a winner-take-all tournament. In comparison,
we assume instead that an agent can choose his level of effort and his independence
from the common shock of the core competency of the firm at a cost. Gilpatric showed
that an agent has an incentive to increase his idiosyncratic variation in output as a
strategy to increase his chances of winning for 3 or more players, but that he has no
incentive to do so for a two player tournament. Gilpatric shows further how a penalty
that is symmetric but opposite the prize to the lowest ranked agent eliminates the
incentive for agents to pursue risky and more costly strategies when the penalty is
of identical magnitude to the winner payout. Although the underlying mechanism is
different, we show that using a stick can eliminate incentives to be independent in
this model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 1.2describes the model
and develops the results to the principal-agent problem. Section 1.3 provides con-
cluding remarks followed by the References. All proofs are in the Appendix.
1.2 Model
Consider a contest among n homogeneous risk-neutral agents who work within a firm
where λ ∈ [0,∞) is an increasing measure of the strength of the core competency of the
organization. Unverifiable to a third party, agent i chooses his level of independence
αi ∈ [0, 1] simultaneously while choosing effort µi ≥ 0. He can align fully with the
core competency by choosing αi = 0 or work completely independently from the core
and all other agents by choosing αi = 1, or select partial independence by choosing
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αi between 0 and 1.
By selecting the focus of his work, an agent has two sources of uncertainty that
affect output. Let εi ∼ i.i.d. (0, σ2ε) be agent i’s draw of an idiosyncratic shock
realized after choices are made where f is the probability density function and F
is the cumulative distribution function of ε. Let x ∼ (0, σ2x) be a common shock
experienced to some extent by all agents who work at least partially within the firm’s
core competence where g is the probability density function and G is the cumulative
distribution function of x. The draws from ε and x are uncorrelated and both f and
g are unimodal and symmetric. An agent can choose his level of exposure to x and εi
by shifting αi between 0 and 1. Increasing αi will decrease the effect of x on output
while simultaneously increasing the effect of εi on output. Therefore, agent i produces
output
qi = µi + (1 + αi) εi + (1− αi)x. (1.2.1)
Total output uncertainty for an agent, then, is a function of independence where
the total variance is (1 + αi)
2 σ2ε + (1− αi)2 σ2x. An increase in independence shifts
the source of uncertainty away from the common shock and increases the influence
of the idiosyncratic shock. Only an agent who works within the core in some way
(i.e. αi < 1) will experience the core shock x as a factor in his output along with
all the other agents who also chose αj < 1 where j 6= i for all i, j. Some level of
idiosyncratic risk is present for an agent regardless of αi which captures his innate
level of uncertainty in output; but, the exposure to εi increases as αi increases to
represent the greater uncertainty associated with increasingly independent ventures
relative to the core.
In the agent’s output equation (1.2.1), µi increases output linearly and is not
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directly influenced by αi; instead, we model the burden of operating independently
as impacting effort costs. Agent i has increasing costs from effort described by the
function c (µi) where c
′
, c
′′
> 0 and c (0) , c
′
(0) = 0. The total costs from effort and in-
dependence are captured by the interactive expression(1 + λz (αi)) c (µi) where z (αi)
increases with independence and z
′
, z
′′
> 0 and z (0) , z
′
(0) = 0. The cross derivative
of the total cost function is positive for positive values of effort and independence,
λz
′
(αi) c
′
(µi) > 0. The total cost term represents the notion that achieving a given
expected output ( i.e. µi) entails greater effort as i works more independently or as
the strength of the core competency of the organization increases. The core com-
petency parameter λ increases the marginal cost of effort as a result of increasing
independence. When there is no core competency in the firm, λ = 0, there is no
distinction made between how costly different levels of independent effort are over
the range αi ∈ [0, 1] and therefore total costs reduce to c (µi).
The winner-take-all contest of n agents has two prize levels, payoff W1 to the agent
ranked highest and W2 to all other agents where W1 > W2. Let S = W1 −W2 be the
spread between the two prizes. Using the agent output equation (1.2.1), agent i is
ranked higher than all other agents when qi > qj for all agents i 6= j. Let Pi be the
probability agent i wins the larger prize W1. Agent i maximizes his expected earnings
Ei by choosing independence and effort simultaneously according to
max
µi,αi
Ei = PiS +W2 − (1 + λz (αi)) c (µi) . (1.2.2)
The social optimum is found where αi = 0 by construction of the model; an agent
can produce any level of output at the least cost when he leverages the full core
competency of the principal.3
3When αi = 0 for all i, the model collapses to the standard first-best model by Lazear and Rosen
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From equation (1.2.1), the probability that i ranks ahead of j given the choices of
effort and independence for both agents is
prob ((1 + αj) εj < µi − µj + (1 + αi) εi + (1− αi)x− (1− αj)x)
for all agents j 6= i. This probability can be expressed in terms of F , the distribution
of εj.
4 Suppose all agents j 6= i choose a common µj and αj then integrating over
the densities of εi and x, agent i
′s probability of winning the tournament by being
ranked higher than all other agents is
Pi =
¨
g (x) f (εi)F
(
µi − µj
1 + αj
+
1 + αi
1 + αj
εi +
αj − αi
1 + αj
x
)n−1
dεi dx. (1.2.3)
We now look at the marginal effects of effort and independence on Pi. Let
κ =
(
µi−µj
1+αj
+ 1+αi
1+αj
εi +
αj−αi
1+αj
x
)
represent the expression in F (κ) in equation (1.2.3).
Agent i′s marginal effect of own effort on the probability of winning then becomes
∂Pi
∂µi
=
n− 1
1 + αj
¨
f (εi) f (κ)F (κ)
n−2 dεi g (x) dx > 0, (1.2.4)
where the integral portion is everywhere positive; hence, the probability of winning is
strictly increasing in effort. We also want to know how αi will influence the probability
of winning. Hence, agent i′s marginal effect of independence on the probability of
winning is
∂Pi
∂αi
=
n− 1
1 + αj
¨
(εi − x) f (εi) f (κ)F (κ)n−2 dεi g (x) dx. (1.2.5)
(1981) where qi = µi + εi + x and the costs are c (µi), regardless of the value of λ.
4Agent j′s uncertainty εj can be isolated on the left hand side of the inequality by dividing both
sides by (1 + αi).
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In this model, we will identify the symmetric Nash Equilibrium of this game. Let
µs = µi be a point of symmetric effort and let α
s = αi be a point of symmetric inde-
pendence for all i. When behavior is symmetric (µs, αs), the probability of winning in
equation (1.2.3) is of course the same for all agents, Pi =
1
n
. Agent i′s marginal effect
of independence on the probability of winning at any point of symmetry reduces to
the integral
∂Pi
∂αi
=
(n− 1)
1 + αs
ˆ
εif (εi)
2 F (εi)
n−2 dεi. (1.2.6)
This leads to the following result from choosing independence as a strategy.5 (All
proofs are given in the Appendix)
Proposition 1.1. When agents make symmetric choices (µs, αs), the following results
hold:
(i) For n = 2, each agent’s probability of winning is unaffected by increasing his
independence, ∂Pi
∂αi
= 0;
(ii) For n > 2, each agent’s probability of winning is increasing in his indepen-
dence, ∂Pi
∂αi
> 0.
When it is in the firm’s best interest to have everyone working in the core ac-
tivities, the existence of intra-firm competition for n > 2 agents may be detrimental
because it inherently drives agents toward non-core activities. If all agents are fully
engaged in the core activities of the principal where αs = 0, an agent can increase his
likelihood of winning the contest by choosing a positive level of independence αi > 0.
Notice the incentive to be independent exists regardless of the value of λ in equation
5The derivation of equation (1.2.6) is part of the proof of Proposition 1.1.
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(1.2.6); however, increasing λ will make his chosen level of independence more costly
in equation (1.2.2). The result that the probability of winning does not change when
an agent increases his independence when n = 2 is a consequence of the symmetry of
the distribution of ε.
An agent’s incentive to increase αi from any point of symmetry does not originate
from reducing his exposure to the common shock at the margin; rather, it comes
from the advantage he gets from increasing his idiosyncratic uncertainty. This is
easily verified since equation (1.2.6) is strictly a function of εi, but is not a function
of x.
Although the common shock has a symmetric effect at the point of symmetry,
it does not, however, rule out any advantage that might be gained when an agent
increases his exposure to the common shock at a discrete level of independence away
from a point of symmetry. At a point out of symmetry, exposure to the common
shock is no longer experienced equally by all agents and does not cancel out in F and
therefore it does influence the marginal effect of independence on the probability of
winning.
Even so, an agent will only move off-symmetry if his expected earnings increases
from doing so. To insure the symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium holds, we
specify a global constraint in the next subsection that, if met, is sufficient to rule
out such discrete advantages. The next two subsections address the principal-agent
problem and identify the strategic behavior of the agents in a Nash equilibrium.
1.2.1 The Agent’s Problem
Solving the agent’s optimization problem, the first order conditions for agent i from
equation (1.2.2) are
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∂Ei
∂µi
=
∂Pi
∂µi
S − (1 + λz (αi)) c′ (µi) = 0 (1.2.7)
∂Ei
∂αi
=
∂Pi
∂αi
S − λz′ (αi) c (µi) = 0 (1.2.8)
We impose symmetry (µs, αs) to find the solutions to the response functions of ef-
fort and independence. Substitute equations (1.2.4) and (1.2.5) into equations (1.2.7)
and (1.2.8) and note that in symmetry the integral terms in equations (1.2.4) and
(1.2.5) reduce to the single integral constants h = (n− 1) ´ f (ε)2 F (ε)n−2 dε and
k = (n− 1) ´ εif (εi)2 F (εi)n−2 dεi respectively. Both h and k are constants and
greater than zero at any point of symmetry and do not depend on µs and αs or x.
The best response functions that implicitly describe the Nash equilibrium are
(1 + λz (α∗i )) c
′
(µ∗i ) =
Sh
1 + α∗j
(1.2.9)
λz
′
(α∗i ) c (µ
∗
i ) =
Sk
1 + α∗j
. (1.2.10)
We assume the objective function is concave. To satisfy the second order condi-
tions, the determinant of the hessian matrix is negative semidefinite and the diagonal
terms are negative ∂
2Pi
∂µ2i
S − (1 + λz (αi)) c′′ (µi) ≤ 0 and ∂2Pi∂α2i S − λz
′′
(αi) c (µi) ≤ 0 to
guarantee a maximum.
Tournaments solve the moral hazard problem when the principal is not able to
monitor agent actions directly. However, to avoid shirking (no or little effort) and
climbing (too much effort), it must also be the case that a discrete change in choice
of µi and αi cannot increase utility when all other agents are choosing µ
∗
j and α
∗
j for
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all j—that is, the inequality Ei
(
µi, αi, µ
∗
−i, α
∗
−i
)
< Ei (µ
∗
i , α
∗
i ) is satisfied over the full
support of αi. From equation (1.2.2), the global incentive condition is
Pi
(
µi, αi, µ
∗
−i, α
∗
−i
)
S − (1 + λz (αi)) c (µi) < 1
n
S − (1 + λz (α∗i )) c (µ∗i ) . (1.2.11)
This condition will not hold if the variance of the common shock is sufficiently large
compared to variance of the idiosyncratic shock.6 A large σ2x relative to σ
2
ε can induce
a larger expected earnings for an agent who leverages the full core competency of the
firm compared to the expected earnings at the candidate Nash—violating the global
constraint in (1.2.11). To prevent this, σ2x must be small enough to insure an agent’s
probability of winning drops off fast enough to offset the gains in efficiency he incurs
from working in the core of the firm. Therefore, for a Nash equilibrium to exist when
an agent can choose his relative exposure to the common and idiosyncratic shocks, not
only must the variance of the idiosyncratic shock be sufficiently large (as is standard
in tournaments), but also the variance of the common shock must be sufficiently small
relative to the variance of the idiosyncratic shock.
This is an important finding. Standard tournament models show common shocks
are rendered irrelevant, and it has been argued that tournament mechanisms may be
desirable for insulating players from these shocks (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Green and
Stokey, 1983). But we find that when common shocks are large, the existence of a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium breaks down if players can control their exposure to
these shocks. We now look at the agent’s strategy at the symmetric Nash.
6A discussion of this Relative Variance Condition can be found in the Appendix.
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Proposition 1.2. For n > 2 and some level of core competency λ > 0 in a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium, agents increase their exposure to the idiosyncratic shock
α∗ > 0 with µ∗ > 0 despite the increased effort costs associated with drifting from the
organization’s core competence.
To see why this holds, note that the right hand side of equations (1.2.9) and
(1.2.10) are both greater than zero; hence the left hand sides are greater than zero
too. As a consequence, the agents do not fully leverage the firm’s core advantage
and first-best effort will not be achieved. Independence-seeking behavior is therefore
entirely wasteful to a risk-neutral organizer because it increases the cost of achieving
any level of expected output. The principal must anticipate this effect in determining
a second-best level of effort from the agents.
We now turn to the principal’s problem and identify the conditions for an optimal
contract when independence-seeking behavior is present. Henceforth, we assume the
global constraint in equation (1.2.11) is satisfied for a Nash Equilibrium to exist. We
then look at how adding another prize can control independence-seeking behavior in
Subsection 1.2.3.
1.2.2 The Principal’s Problem
The principal’s problem is to maximize profits resulting from the agents’ behavior.
Let V be the marginal product of output. The principal has a profit function of
Π = nV µ∗ − S − nW and can choose the spread and losing payoff as a contract to
the agents. Assume the principal holds the agents to their participation constraint
1
n
S+W2− (1 + λz (α∗i )) c (µ∗i ) = u where u is opportunity cost common to all agents.
This expression can be rearranged to describe a binding constraint on the losing payoff.
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From equations (1.2.9) and (1.2.10), effort and independence are implicit functions of
the spread. Therefore, the principal chooses S to maximize
max
S
Π = nV µ∗i (S)− n (u+ (1 + λz (α∗i (S))) c (µ∗i (S))) (1.2.12)
The first order condition is found to be
∂Π
∂S
= V
∂µ∗
∂S
− λz′ (α∗i ) c (µ∗i )
∂α∗
∂S
− (1 + λz (α∗i )) c
′
(µ∗i )
∂µ∗
∂S
= 0. (1.2.13)
The above expression from equation (1.2.13) can be analyzed in the following form
V − c′ (µ∗i ) = λ
(
z
′
(α∗i ) c (µ
∗
i )
∂α∗
∂S
∂µ∗
∂S
+ z (α∗i ) c
′
(µ∗i )
)
. (1.2.14)
When the principal seeks to maximize profits, the first-best outcome is achieved when
α = 0 and effort is defined by V = c
′
(µ). However, when λ > 0, equation (1.2.14)
implies that V 6= c′ (µ∗) at the second best solution which is found where
S∗ =
V
h
 1 + α∗
1 + k
h
∂α∗
∂S
∂µ∗
∂S
 .
As a result of Proposition 1.2, the principal experiences wasteful costs of nλz (α∗) c (µ∗i )
because he cannot eliminate a positive α∗ by motivating agents with simply S∗. This
can be resolved by adding another degree of freedom to the principal’s optimization
problem.
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1.2.3 Carrots and Sticks
When independence seeking behavior is undesirable, as is the case when the principal
values expected aggregate output nµ∗, such behavior can be controlled by offering
more than two prize levels. Including a penalty for finishing last has been shown
to be sufficient to reduce or eliminate risk-seeking behavior separately from effort
in contests when costs of effort and increased output variance are linearly separable
(Gilpatric, 2009). The cost functions in this model are not linearly separable, however
an analog finding still obtains.
Consider a contest with three or more agents and three payoffs: W1 > W2 > W3.
Let S1 = W1 −W2 represent the winning spread and S2 = W2 −W3 represent the
penalty spread. Let Pi represent the probability of ranking first and receiving prize
W1 and let Ri represent the probability of ranking last and receiving the penalty W3.
The expected earnings of the agent is now
Ei = PiS1 −RiS2 +W2 − (1 + λz (αi)) c (µi) (1.2.15)
Agents again choose µi and αi to maximize their expected earnings, but this time
with a separate probability to be either first or last. The probability of winning W1
is as before Pi =
˜
f (εi)F (κ)
n−1 dεi g (x) dx, and the probability of being last is
Ri =
˜
f (εi) [1− F (κ)]n−1 dεi g (x) dx. The probability of finishing last can be
shown to be decreasing in effort ∂Ri
∂µi
< 0. Increasing the mean of effort increases
the probability of being first while simultaneously reduces the chance of being last.
In a manner similar to the proof of Proposition 1.1, it can also be shown that the
probability of finishing last is increasing in independence from any point of symmetry
∂Ri
∂αi
> 0. Increasing αi behaves differently than increasing µi. Increasing independence
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increases the probability of being both first and last.
At a Nash equilibrium, symmetry leads to the following properties Pi = Ri,
∂Ri
∂µi
=
−∂Pi
∂µi
and ∂Ri
∂αi
= ∂Pi
∂αi
.7 The first order conditions are now a function of the two spreads.
The equations that implicitly describe the Nash Equilibrium are
(1 + λz (α∗)) c
′
(µ∗) =
(S1 + S2)h
1 + α∗
(1.2.16)
λz
′
(α∗) c (µ∗i ) =
(S1 − S2) k
1 + α∗
. (1.2.17)
Define the parameter µˆ > 0 to be the desired level of effort and αˆ ∈ [0, 1] to be
the desired level of independence in the firm sought by the principal at the Nash
equilibrium. Holding agents indifferent to outside opportunities u, let m = u +
(1 + λz (αˆ)) c (µ∗) be the expected payoff. The payoffs that lead to the desired level
of effort and independence are
W1 (µˆ, αˆ) = m+
(n− 2)λ
2nk
(1 + αˆ) z
′
(αˆ) c (µˆ) +
c
′
(µˆ)
2h
(1 + αˆ) (1 + λz (αˆ)) (1.2.18)
W2 (µˆ, αˆ) = m− λ
nk
(1 + αˆ) z
′
(αˆ) c (µˆ)
W3 (µˆ, αˆ) = m+
(n− 2)λ
2nk
(1 + αˆ) z
′
(αˆ) c (µˆ)− c
′
(µˆ)
2h
(1 + αˆ) (1 + λz (αˆ)) .
7The proofs of these properties can be easily developed from the equations of Pi and Ri.
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The highest ranked agent wins W1, the lowest ranked agent receives W3, and all
other n− 2 agents get the middle payoff W2. The first-best optimum can be realized
with a three-payoff mechanism. When strict loyalty to the core is desired αˆ = 0,
all agents except those with the highest and lowest outputs are paid their expected
payoff W2 = m. However, when a positive level of independence is desired of all the
agents αˆ > 0, the middle prize drops W2 < m. The difference − λnk (1 + αˆ) z
′
(αˆ) c (µˆ)
serves to discourage shirking and make mediocre performance more costly.
The least costly way for the principal to achieve any given level of aggregate output
nµ∗is to have αˆ = 0. By adding a penalty, the principal is now able to adjust two
separate levels of prizes and control the incentive to be independent and the incentive
to be loyal to the firm. When an agent increases σεi by increasing his independence
from a point of symmetry, more density shift to the tails of his output distribution
relative to competitors which increases his probability of being both first and last. The
probability of being first and winning a prize creates the incentive to be independent;
and the probability of being last and suffering a loss creates the incentive to be loyal.
When these incentives are balanced in the contract, the benefit to be independent
cancels out the loss to be independent.
Proposition 1.3. At a Nash equilibrium, the principal can induce any desired level
of effort and any desired level of independence with payoffs W1 (µˆ, αˆ), W2 (µˆ, αˆ), and
W3 (µˆ, αˆ); where first-best efficiency is achieved when αˆ = 0.
To reach first-best efficiency and eliminate wasteful independence-seeking, the
principal can set µˆ = µ∗ and αˆ = 0 in the payoff functions and offer the contract W1 =
u+c (µ∗)+ V
2h
, W2 = u+c (µ
∗), and W3 = u+c (µ∗)− V2h . The difference of the spreads
is S1 − S2 = 0 which eliminates the marginal incentive to increase independence in
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equation (1.2.17). Agents no longer gain any advantage in winning the contest by
being independent from the firm or from each other. Since independence-seeking is
costly to effort, the best action for all agents to take is to stay loyal to the core
competency of the firm and compete solely on effort. With α∗ = 0, equation (1.2.16)
and the sum of the spreads S1 + S2 =
V
h
delivers the first-best solution V = c
′
(µ∗).
Firms may indeed find market conditions drive the need for managers to pursue
some level of R&D. If desired, the principal can choose any level of independence and
still reach the efficient level of effort µ∗ but it will be a second-best solution since the
cost to reach this level is higher when αˆ > 0. Because the cost functions of effort and
independence are multiplicative in this model, an upper bound on αˆ for any given
level of effort is not inherently limited by equations (1.2.16) and (1.2.17). The firm
must select the pair (µˆ, αˆ), and then set prizes according to the payoffs in (1.2.18).
1.3 Conclusion
While competition for advancement within a firm clearly is a central tool for motivat-
ing effort, it is important to consider how competitive mechanisms impact managerial
decision-making in other dimensions. We’ve shown that in a corporate setting where
working within the core competency of the firm is most productive, competition and
autonomy create the incentive for managers to drift from core activities.
Competition will motivate divergence from the firm’s core activities, and this may
explain some apparent market behavior of firms. In many organizations independent
decisions-makers may be uncertain about what tasks will yield the greatest return to
invested effort—it may not be obvious to managers where the organization’s greatest
strengths lie. But our model suggests that, even when it is clear what tasks will yield
21
the greatest return to effort for the organization, competitive mechanisms may not
align manager’s incentives to common goals.
The model can also apply to relative consumption theory where individuals seek to
differentiate themselves by consuming goods that have uncertainty about how popular
the good will become. Early adopters of technology may seek to adopt products less
mainstream in the hope the product becomes the new trend and by extension, makes
the person more popular. In a different setting, a salesman might deviate from the
company’s predetermined sales pitch toward a new unproven script to increase the
variation in responses he receives to increase his chances of winning a sales bonus.
22
Chapter 2
Fair Tournaments in Common
Environments
2.1 Introduction
In what ways can tournaments be equitable and efficient? Can both be achieved when
contestants are heterogeneous in both ability and idiosyncratic shock distributions?
Offering all contestants the same payoff contract may seem equitable, but when con-
testants are heterogeneous, these contracts fail to achieve efficiency. A more tractable
path is procedural fairness, which in this context refers to the equity of the process by
which labor contracts are selected and verifiably administered. Organizing a fair pro-
cess is important because tournaments, once played, create both winners and losers
and so by their very nature cannot be considered equitable in the ex post distribution
of payoffs. Psychology theories suggest that even if the requirements of distributive
fairness in outcomes are not met ex post, equitable outcomes can be achieved with a
fair procedure ex ante (Tyler, 1989). If we subscribe to this notion, then we have a
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means to realize both equity and efficiency simultaneously in competitive contracts.
However, it is important to understand the characteristics of the contestants and the
environment they compete in so that policy is verifiably fair. The focus of this paper
is to explore the implications of policies that provide contestants of different back-
grounds procedural fairness in tournaments while maintaining optimal productivity,
and to consider how fairness is impacted when contestants are subjected to common
environmental shocks.
As motivation, consider the broiler tournament. Relative compensation has evolved
in the broiler industry in the U.S. to protect poultry integrators from moral hazard but
also in part as a means to protect growers’ earnings against large common production
shocks like swings in temperature, disease, rapid technological progress, and large in-
dustry price fluctuations (Knoeber, 1989; Knoeber and Thurman, 1995). Yet, despite
these benefits, growers have consistently complained that the tournament scheme is
unfair and that new regulations are needed. Growers are typically individual owners
that raise broilers (chickens) from chicks and are paid by the pound of final broiler
weight. Growers compete each flock for better pay rates against other growers that
vary in production capacity from 10,000 chicks to over 100,000 with production risk
largely proportional to flock size. To account for the heterogeneity, growers are ranked
using a handicap mechanism that converts output into a measure of efficiency called
“settlement costs”, a calculated value of the ratio of input costs to output broiler
weight. Further, practices include weening undesirable birds from the flock prior to
weighing, another form of handicap. With such ranking processes in place, it may
be that one source of grower discontent comes from the lack of procedural fairness.
More specifically, that the complex ranking process designed to make a contest be-
tween heterogeneous growers fair, when combined with large environmental shocks,
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may produce unintended consequences and subsequent discontent in growers.
Using the theory of Lazear and Rosen (1981), we describe a heterogeneous tour-
nament model incorporating a handicapped rank rule to compensate for background
differences in participants. The model provides all participants a strategically sym-
metric opportunity to win and that the process by which a winner is chosen is verifi-
able. The agents modeled here are risk-neutral and heterogeneous in both production
uncertainty and ability and are subject to two forms of common environmental shocks;
an additive output common shock that shift agents’ production and a multiplicative
output common shock that scales agents’ production. Second, we explore how com-
mon shocks alter the outcomes asymmetrically for specific types of handicap rank
rule structures. Lastly, we consider how using fair tournament structures influence
the incentives of the principle. A multiplicative shock characterizes common events
that effect every unit of production, like extremely cold weather that impacts the
growth of all chickens. An additive shock models a common fixed-size event, like how
an integrator might take the same fixed amount of birds for testing from all growers.
To facilitate fairness, a linear rank rule is defined that renders the contest strate-
gically symmetric in equilibrium. To satisfy the verifiability requirement, we define
fair criteria at the efficient equilibrium that each contract must satisfy to insure sym-
metry in the contest. Tournament results are typically unaffected by common shocks;
however, when the idiosyncratic uncertainty is not identically distributed, this may
no longer hold even when the tournament is designed to be procedurally fair. There-
fore, we also show how incomplete information about the environment can lead to
undesirable biases in the probability of winning which fail to meet the criteria of
background fairness. Finally, procedural fairness also demands neutrality of the prin-
cipal or at least a fair process that is enforceable and verifiable to a third party;
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hence, we check for neutral incentives for the principal and do find conditions for a
commitment problem.
In addition to broiler tournaments, the linear model can be applied to many ex-
isting handicap systems where the purpose is to make the contests more fair. Lavy
(2002, 2009) study teachers who compete over student performance in a bonus tour-
nament that is adjusted for school and classroom effects. Also, linear handicaps are
prevalent in sports such as in golf where strokes are added to the score of less able
golfers, in yacht racing where finish times are multiplied by a handicap that is pro-
portional to the performance of the boats, and in horse races where weights are added
to each horse based on past performance to even out the expected finish times.
The notion of background fairness is a complimentary refinement to procedural
fairness that seeks adjustment for the different background conditions in ability, envi-
ronment, or technology between contestants. As Barry (1990) describes, “Procedural
fairness rules out one boxer having a piece of lead inside his gloves, but background
fairness would also rule out any undue disparity in the weight of the boxers; similarly
background fairness would rule out sailing boats or cars of different sizes being raced
against one another unless suitably handicapped.”1 Rawls (1971) formalizes procedu-
ral justice with the concept that a fair outcome is the result so long as the process that
produced that outcome was fair. Fishkin (1983) looks at equal opportunity and states
that procedural and background fairness as essential and distinct notions for justice.
He defines procedural fairness as the principle of merit and background fairness as
the equality of life chances. Konow (2003) highlights that theories of desert (that
is, compensation based on what is deserved) point toward effort as the dimension
1Holding an unfair contest may rule out participation by some part of the population. Barry cap-
tures this sentiment when he writes“One agent demonstrating superior skill is grounds for complaints
based on background fairness.”
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that should determine rewards and that other differences like luck, birth, and other
characteristics of individuals should not affect rewards.
The work by Bolton et al. (2005) is a direct application of the notion of procedural
fairness to an economic context. They compare how often a fair allocation option is
rejected vs. how often a fair procedure option (with unfair allocation) is rejected in
ultimatum games and find that a fair procedure may substitute for a fair outcome.
Their results support the evidence in the psychology literature that these two forms
of fairness are linked, but distinct.
Procedural fairness and background fairness have not been formally modeled in
the tournament literature. However, several papers have considered how tournament
mechanisms can accommodate heterogeneity to make a contest more fair in some
sense. One of the key assumptions for these models is that contestants have identical
distributions of idiosyncratic shocks. This originates with Lazear and Rosen (1981)
who use an additive handicap to even the differences in the levels of median expected
output between agents. O’Keeffe et al. (1984) define“fair contests to be those that are
symmetric with respect to permutations of the contestants” and describe how handi-
caps in the form of translations of the probabilities can preserve player incentives by
shifting outputs or prizes as needed. However, they do not model the effects of com-
mon shocks. Bhattacharya, Sudipto and Guasch (1988) study promotions awarded
over relative effort in hierarchies. Recent work by Gu¨rtler and Kra¨kel (2010) show
that individual prizes dominate single prize contracts and shifting prizes down for the
high ability workers will lead to a more even match without the use of handicaps.
Wu and Roe (2006) find experimental evidence that inequality in tournaments lowers
player’s willingness to pay to enter the tournament. This is an important finding
because it implies a more stringent participation constraint may be needed. We relax
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the identical distribution constraint and look at the type of handicaps that arise in
rank-order tournaments when contestants have non-identical distributions of idiosyn-
cratic shocks. Our concern for the relationship between fairness and risk is supported
by Cappelen et al. (2013) who find experimentally that most people would consider
it unfair when agents must be compensated differently based on different exposures
to risk even when they contribute identical amounts of efficient effort.
The results of the paper show that with perfect information, a general rank rule
that meets the fair criteria when agents are heterogeneous achieves efficiency. When
the perfect information assumption regarding the environment is relaxed, common
shocks are shown to no longer affect agents symmetrically. The handicaps in the
rank rule designed to achieve symmetry now bias the common shocks and can alter
the probability of winning when what is observed by the principal is different from
the actual shock. Under certain conditions, the marginal probability of winning is
increasing in multiplicative common shocks when agents have a higher than average
ability-variance ratio and decreasing when it is below average. Also, the marginal
probability of winning is increasing in additive common shocks when agents have a
variance lower than the harmonic mean and decreasing when it is above the harmonic
mean.
When the principal can control the type of agents that enter the contest, the in-
formation requirements can be relaxed and the basic assumptions made about the
agents dictate the type of rank rule used and biases that might be present. When
we investigate how making tournaments fair affects the incentives for the principal,
we find that fair tournaments that compensate for non-identically distributed shocks
produce a commitment problem for the principal. The principal has an incentive to
bias the rank-order in favor of the agents with the lowest output variance. Procedu-
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ral fairness may be compromised unless the principal can be monitored or the rank
evaluation process can be verified.
Procedural fairness is often intertwined with distributive fairness, the concerned
with other regarding preferences and fairness in the distribution of contract outcomes.
Two popular models, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model fairness as self centered inequity
aversion and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) model equity in an incomplete information
setting. For a discussion on the implications of distributive fairness in the form
of inequity aversion in tournaments, see Grund and Sliwka (2005). Bolton et al.
(2005) use lottery games to show that procedural fairness is conceptually distinct,
but linked to allocation fairness. For information about the link between procedural
and distributive justice, see Roch et al. (2007); Krawczyk (2009); Rousseau et al.
(2009) and Balafoutas et al. (2012). More recently, Saito (2013) builds on the work of
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) to describe a model that bridges the gap between equality
of opportunity and equality of outcome. None of these papers look at the refinement
of background fairness as a contributing factor of inequity.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 develops the tournament
model. Section 2.3 defines the key terms and fair criteria that establish background
fairness. Section 2.4 presents the major results for policy and for the agent. Section
2.5 discusses the principal’s incentives. Section 2.6 concludes. Appendix B contains
the proofs.
2.2 Model
Consider a rank-order tournament held between many risk-neutral agents who have
different abilities and different variance of uncertainty and who are exposed to com-
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mon environmental shocks. Agents compete and are then rank-ordered by a linearly
handicapped output. The top rank wins. The purpose of handicaps are to impose
a symmetric game between agents at the Nash equilibrium. Therefore in our model,
the mechanism for fairness takes on the form of a policy handicap rank rule.
Let i, j, k be in the set of n risk-neutral agents. Agents are heterogeneous in ability
level ai > 0. More broadly, ability can describe differences in talent, technology, or
job characteristics. Agent ability is observable to all. Agents have an individual
variance factor αi > 0 which describes differences in risk or productive uncertainty.
The idiosyncratic output shock is εi = αiκi where κi ∼ (0, σ2κ) is an i.i.d. draw from
a uni-modal and symmetric distribution that is uncorrelated with effort. Individual
variance is σ2i = α
2
iσ
2
κ for all i where σ
2 is a constant variance level associated with
the competitive environment common to all agents.
Agent i produces output qi = θµi + εi + s as a function of his own effort µi, own
shock, an additive output common shock s  (−∞,∞) and a multiplicative output
common shock θ  (0,∞). We study the consequences that common shocks have on
fairness when they are both perfectly and imperfectly observable by the principal.
An agent’s ability influences the cost of effort described by the function aiC
(
µi
ai
)
where the marginal cost to effort is C
′
(
µi
ai
)
, with C
′
(µi) > 0, C
′′
(µi) > 0 and further
C (0) = C
′
(0) = 0. The assumed cost function insures that ability has a marginal
effect on effort in the marginal cost function with the same exponent-order as effort
and that this holds for many different cost specifications.2 Costs functions are known
to all, are invertible at all levels, and fixed costs are zero.
Agent i′s rank in the tournament is a linear function of his own output according
2Examples are kth order functions ai
(
µi
ai
)k
and exponential functions aie
µi
ai . The respective
marginal cost functions are k
(
µi
ai
)k−1
and e
µi
ai which meet the requirements.
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to the rank rule
ri = φiqi + hi (2.2.1)
where φi is a ratio handicap and hi is an additive handicap for player i. Verifiable
to a third party, the rank function adjusts both the offset and slope of the agent’s
productive output depending on the requirements of the evaluation policy. Expanding
qi in equation (2.2.1) yields the agent’s competitive rank rule ri = φiθµi+φiεi+φis+hi.
Note that since the ratio handicap is multiplied directly by output, it modifies not
only the effort but also the uncertainty term and the common shocks.
Payoff contracts (Wi, Li) are offered to agent i where Wi is the winning payoff and
Li is the losing payoff. Agents are ranked based on the rank rule and awarded payoffs
based on the criteria
Player i′s payoff =

Wi if ri > rj for all j 6= i
Li if ri < rj for at least one j 6= i.
The tournament produces n payoff combinations with only one winner and n − 1
losers.
The probability agent i has a higher rank in equation (2.2.1) than agent j for a
given draw of εi, θ, and s is
prob (φjεj < φiεi + φiθµi − φjθµj + (φi − φj) s+ hi − hj)
for all agents j 6= i. Let f be the probability density function and F be the cumulative
distribution function of agent i′s handicapped uncertainty φiεi. Similarly, let zj be
the probability density function and Zj be the cumulative distribution function of
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agent j′s handicapped uncertainty φjεj for all j 6= i. Agent i′s probability of winning
the tournament by being ranked higher than all other agents is
Pi =
ˆ
f (φiεi)
n−1∏
j 6=i
Zj (φiεi + φiθµi − φjθµj + (φi − φj) s+ hi − hj) dεi. (2.2.2)
The marginal effect of effort on the probability of winning is
∂Pi
∂µi
= φiθgi =
φiθ (n− 1)
ˆ
f (φiεi)
n−1∑
j 6=i
{
zj (φiεi + φiθµi − φjθµj + (φi − φj) s+ hi − hj)
×
n−2∏
k 6=j 6=i
Zk (φiεi + φiθµi − φjθµj + (φi − φj) s+ hi − hj)
}
dεi, (2.2.3)
where gi is the integral portion and is everywhere positive; hence, the probability
of winning is strictly increasing in effort ∂Pi
∂µi
> 0.
We are interested in the equilibrium of the tournament that motivates efficient
effort from all agents. Adopting the Nash-Cournot assumptions, we find the best-
response function for a given agent i by maximizing utility taking the actions of
the all other agents as given. With probability of winning from equation (2.2.2), he
produces optimal effort according to
µ∗i = argmax
µi
EUi = Pi (Wi − Li) + Li − aiC
(
µi
ai
)
(2.2.4)
The first order conditions are
∂EUi
∂µi
= φiθgi (Wi − Li)− C ′
(
µ∗i
ai
)
≡ 0. (2.2.5)
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The second order conditions to guarantee a maximum are
∂2EUi
∂µ2i
= (φiθ)
2 g
′
i (Wi − Li)−
1
ai
C
′′
(
µi
ai
)
< 0.
The efficient outcome is reached when the marginal value of product V is equal to
the marginal cost
V = C
′
(
µoi
ai
)
(2.2.6)
where µoi is defined as the agent’s efficient level of effort that satisfies equation (2.2.6).
3
We obtain the efficient Nash equilibrium of the game by evaluating equation (2.2.5)
where all agents meet the condition in equation (2.2.6) such that
µi = µ
o
i = aiµ
o ∀ i (2.2.7)
where µo is a normalized efficient level of effort when ability is equal to one. Define
the individual payoff spread that satisfies equations (2.2.5), (2.2.6), and (2.2.7) as
yoi = Wi − Li|µ∗i=µoi =
V
φiθgoi
(
µoi , µ
o
−i
) . (2.2.8)
The payoffs are now described that yield efficiency and hold agents indifferent to
outside opportunities. Agent i′s participation inequality is EUi (µoi ) ≥ ui for any level
of effort where his expected utility is from equation (2.2.4) and ui is his opportunity
cost. To insure he is held indifferent to outside opportunities, this inequality binds at
3The superscript o is used to denote variables related to the efficient outcome.
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equilibrium and his participation constraint is
Pi (Wi − Li) + Li − aiC
(
µoi
ai
)
= ui. (2.2.9)
Combining equation (2.2.9) with the spread in (2.2.8) obtains individual payoff
contracts
Wi = ui + aiC (µ
o) + (1− Pi) Vφiθgoi
Li = ui + aiC (µ
o)− Pi Vφiθgoi
(2.2.10)
Individual contracts provide a flexible framework with multiple degrees of freedom to
construct mechanisms that meet both efficiency and fairness requirements. When the
contest is also symmetric, Pi =
1
n
and goi are the same for everyone, the levels are scaled
by ui and ai, and the spread is scaled solely by
1
φi
and θ. The firm can compensate for
expected multiplicative shocks by adjusting the spread. If 0 < E [θ] < 1, a negative
environmental shock is expected and the spread can be increased to compensate agents
in preparation for adverse conditions. Likewise, reducing the spread in anticipation
of a positive shock 1 < E [θ] reduces the incentive for agents to overwork during good
times.
We shall explore in Section 2.4 a mechanism to even the variance and ability
between contestants thereby inducing a symmetric tournament. This mechanism
will be shown to set the multiplicative handicap inversely related to agents’ variance
factor φi =
1
αi
. In this case, the spread in a symmetric tournament is increasing in
individual variance factor; agents with relatively larger uncertainty will have larger
payoff spreads.
In addition to the condition for a local maximum that defines the Nash equilib-
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rium, the condition EUi (µi) < EUi (µ
o
i ) ensures that the local maximum is a global
maximum to an agent’s utility maximization problem. This condition protects against
the possibility that agents may have other incentives between some intermediate µi
between zero and µoi or even above efficiency. An agent still has some probability of
winning at zero effort Pi (0) ≥ 0 based on the idiosyncratic draws from all agents.4
From equation (2.2.4) and the payoffs from equations (2.2.10), the global incentive
inequality is
aiC
(
µoi
ai
)
− aiC
(
µi
ai
)
< (Pi (µ
o
i )− Pi (µi)) yoi ∀ i, µi 6= µoi .
The discrete change in costs must be less than the discrete change in the expected
payoff spread between effort levels.
As an illustration, consider a tournament between n = 3 agents who exhibit effi-
cient equilibrium behavior. Agents are of types i = {l,m, h} = {low, meduim, high}
and have cost functions {cl, cm, ch} and expected revenue functions {Rl., Rm, Rh} re-
spectively. The cost functions ci = u+aiC
(
µi
ai
)
describe where agents are indifferent
between the contest and outside opportunities u. The expected revenue functions
Ri = Pi (µi) y
o
i + Li describe the revenue for agent i holding all other agent effort at
the Nash equilibrium. Figure 2.1 describes the case where no policy rules are being
imposed (φi = 1, hi = 0), hence ri = qi for all four plates.
5 The horizontal axis is
effort, the vertical axis is money. The efficient Nash equilibrium, if it exists, is found
4The global participation constraint inO’Keeffe et al. (1984) assumes that zero effort yields a zero
probability of winning. In this context with rank rules, we tighten the constraint so that no other
level of effort produces higher expected utility than at efficiency.
5All figures are modeled in Matlab. The cost function is of the form 1.5+ai
(
µi
ai
)4.3
where u = 1.5.
Uncertainty is logistic with σ = 0.147. Agents of type {l,m, h} have variance factors {αl, αm, αh} =
{1, 2, 5}. Nash equilibrium, if it were to exist, is {(µol , cl (µol )) , (µom, cm (µom)) , (µoh, ch (µoh))} =
{(0.90, 2.13) , (1.79, 2.75) , (4.48, 4.63)}. Common parameters are: V = 3, θ = 1, s = 0.
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where EUi = ci − Ri = 0 and is depicted by the points (µoi , ci (µoi )). In plate 2.1(a),
agents are homogeneous of ability type am and uncertainty is i.i.d. with variance
factor αm. In plate 2.1(b), all agents have ability am and different variance factors
αl < αm < αh. In plate 2.1(c), agents are heterogeneous in ability al < am < ah
and uncertainty that is i.i.d. with variance factor αm. In plate 2.1(d), agents vary
in ability al < am < ah and variance factors where αi ∝ ai. Only plate 2.1(a) is
symmetric.
The necessary conditions for a pure strategy Nash equilibrium to exist in a tour-
nament are observable in the figures. The first order condition in equation (2.2.5)
requires the slope of the expected revenue function to equal the slope of the cost func-
tion at µoi . The participation equation (2.2.9) requires the expected revenue function
to equal the cost function at µoi ; hence the two functions are tangent at the Nash
equilibrium. The second order condition insures that the slope of the cost function
is increasing at a faster rate than the slope of the expected revenue function at µoi .
The global incentives insure that the cost function lies above the expected revenue
function at all levels of effort except at µoi where they are equal.
In this example, only Plates 2.1(a) and 2.1(b) meet all the necessary constraints for
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium to exist. Because agents are homogeneous in Plate
2.1(a), the optimal payoff contracts and spreads are symmetric. Expected revenue is
bounded by the payoffs Rm [Lm,Wm], and is everywhere below cm except at µ
o
m where
it is equal and so meets the global constraint. The slope of cm is increasing faster
than the slope of Rm at equilibrium so the second order conditions are satisfied. The
equilibrium is located where the probability of winning is symmetric at 1
3
of the way
up Rm between Lm and Wm at point (µ
o
m, cm (µ
o
m)). Plate 2.1(b) plots the revenue
functions when agents have homogeneous ability am, but heterogeneous variance αl <
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Figure 2.1: No rank rules. Cost and revenue vs. effort for an efficient tournament.
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αm < αh. The contest in Plate 2.1(b) meets the global incentive requirements and
second order conditions, however the probability of winning for each agent is not
symmetric at equilibrium Pl < Pm < Ph. The plotted R functions reflect different
spreads. When agents are heterogeneous in variance, the payoff contracts have the
same expected payoff, but the spreads are increasing in αi since gi is decreasing in αi.
An equilibrium does not exist in Plates 2.1(c) and 2.1(d) because the global par-
ticipation constraint and second order condition are not met for agent l for the given
variance levels αi. This is visible in plate 2.1(c) where Rl > cl and also for agent m,
Rm > cm. In Plate 2.1(c), agents are heterogeneous in ability al < am < ah, but are
characterized by individual uncertainty that is i.i.d. with αi = αm. Agent h has a very
high probability of winning and hence is offered a very small Wh and a highly negative
Lh as an incentive to reach efficiency. Both l and m have such low probabilities of
winning, their winning payoff must be set extremely high to induce effort. However,
neither l nor m meet the global incentive constraints nor the second order conditions.
The second order condition is violated because Rl departs the equilibrium point with
a slope that increases faster than cl so the least capable agent has the incentive to
overwork, likewise for m. Agent m has the additional incentive to shirk and collect
Lm which is greater than u. The final Plate 2.1(d) depicts the heterogeneous ability
and variance case where αi ∝ ai. Agent h is now taking on more risk, hence his spread
and Wh are increased to compensate. Agent l is taking on less risk which compresses
his spread and worsens his incentives compared to Plate 2.1(c).
We now turn the discussion toward the criteria necessary to achieve fairness. The
section after next identifies a rank rule for fair and efficient tournaments, identifies
sources of bias, and looks at some special cases of handicaps often found in the
literature.
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2.3 Fair Criteria
The model in the previous section describes a simple tournament based on the frame-
work of Lazear and Rosen (1981) with the addition of a rank rule. In this section,
We explore the question: what criteria characterize an efficient tournament as fair?
Prior to a contest, the rank rule can compensate for known differences in capabili-
ties, variance factors, and expected shocks. However, to insure procedural fairness,
the final ranking must also account for any asymmetries that might arise from the
introduction of the policy instrument. In other words, in order for the policy to be
procedurally fair, the implementation must be impartial, neutral, and induce symme-
try without creating unintentional or perverse incentives. Therefore we seek a notion
of equality that induces strategically symmetric behavior between agents as a policy
ideal at equilibrium.
We constrain the discussion to solutions at the efficient equilibrium. In the context
of this model, the first concern for fairness is that there should be a means to balance
the effect of ability between agents. Second, there should be a means to equalize
the distributions of idiosyncratic shocks. The final concern is to insure that common
environmental conditions do not effect the agents asymmetrically. The definitions
and criteria that follow describe how unfair and fair tournaments are identified and
evaluated at the efficient equilibrium
Definition 2.1. Background differences are disparities of agent ability ai, uncer-
tainty variance factor σ2i or handicapped common shocks φiθ and φis that influence
the probability of winning in a non-symmetric way such that some agents gain an
advantage toward winning over others.
Differences in ability lead to non-symmetric levels of effort in the probability equa-
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tion (2.2.2) at the efficient equilibrium. Differences in variance leads to non-symmetric
draws which too can affect the probability of winning Gilpatric (2009). When the
rank rule is used to neutralize the non-symmetric effects of ability and uncertainty
differences, common shocks may become biased. This leads to the undesirable re-
sult that environmental conditions can have non-symmetric influences. Barry (1990)
describes the notion that a background fair contest exists when all background dif-
ferences are made symmetric. We confine our interpretation of Barry to mean that
a background fair contest exists when all of the effects from the defined background
differences are compensated in the rank rule. We formalize this concept now in the
framework of our model.
Definition 2.2. Background fairness is the condition that occurs when the influences
of the background differences are strategically symmetric at equilibrium.
This does not mean the influences are non-zero, but it does require all of the
effects of the differences comparable between agents be equivalent at equilibrium. In
the rest of this paper, the terms fair, fairness, and background fair are synonymous
with Definition 2.2.
We now develop a set of requirements that establish the conditions for background
fairness and address these concerns. The following fair criteria describe the condi-
tions when background differences no longer influence the probability of winning in
a non-symmetric way at efficient equilibrium and hence meet the requirements of a
background fair tournament. Specifically, in order to be considered efficient and fair, a
tournament that uses a rank rule must have equal probabilities, identical uncertainty
distributions, and no common shock biases in equilibrium as defined as follows.
40
Criterion 1 Equal probabilities. The probability of winning for any one agent is
equal to the probability of winning for all other agents. Pi =
1
n
for all i in
equilibrium.
This only occurs where everyone has the same probability of winning in equilibrium.
Hence the background differences in ability that lead to differences in efficient effort
must be made symmetric in effort, using the rank rule, without creating any other
biases. This criterion addresses the concern that Barry describes in his 1990 doc-
ument “One agent demonstrating superior skill is grounds for complaints based on
background fairness.” The next two criteria reenforce this requirement. Criterion 2.3
keeps the distribution of lucky draws symmetric.
Criterion 2 Equal variance. The variance of every agent’s handicapped uncertainty
term is identically distributed. E
[
(φiεi)
2] = σ2κ for all i.
This insures no single agent has an intrinsic advantage in luck over any other. We
prove in the appendix that an increase in variance increases the probability of winning
at the efficient equilibrium for n > 2 handicapped agents. This proof is essentially the
same used by Gilpatric (2009) who shows that when an agent chooses his own vari-
ance, he gains an advantage in the probability of winning.6 To insure the contest is
fair in luck, all agents must have an independent draw from the same effective distri-
bution after the rank rule has compensated for all background differences. Common
shocks must also be symmetric to satisfy Criterion 1, which leads to a more formal
requirement for common effects.
6Gilpatric (2009) also shows that for the case when n = 2, the effect of an agent strategically
changing his own variance does not effect the probability of winning in equilibrium. This is also the
case here for two agents endowed with different variances and the proof is omitted.
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Criterion 3 No common shock bias. The marginal effect of common shocks on the
probability of winning for every agent is zero. ∂Pi
∂θ
= 0 and ∂Pi
∂s
= 0 for all i.
This insures that the application of the rank rule does not adversely affect the relative
strength of the common shocks between agents. Using ratio handicaps in the rank rule
to compensate for differences in ability and variance multiplies the effect of the shocks
differently for each agent and makes common shocks uncommon. Resolving this may
ultimately require an investment in information for the principal by observation of the
common shocks over the course of the tournament. Taken together, the fair criteria
establish the symmetry requirements for background fairness.
2.4 Fair Tournaments
The previous section established the criteria for fair and efficient tournaments. This
section identifies a general rank rule and the organizer requirements that can produce
a fair and efficient outcome with perfect information. Additionally, we relax the
information assumption that commons shocks are observed perfectly and characterize
the bias effects on symmetry. We then move from the general rank rule to more specific
combinations of background differences, those common to the literature and new, and
the rank rules that both meet and fail to meet the fair criteria for these reduced forms.
2.4.1 Fair Tournaments with Perfect Information
Fair procedural requirements add information demands on the tournament organizer
to collect and observe agent and environmental properties. A practical limitation
of using a handicap rule like equation (2.2.1) in actual tournaments is the need to
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observe and compensate for background differences accurately. We first establish
fairness when the organizer has perfect knowledge of agent characteristics µoi , ai,
and αi. Further, we assume the environmental shocks, θ, and s can be measured
accurately.
For the case where all background differences are perfectly observable, a general
fair and efficient rank rule of the form in equation (2.2.1) can be identified. To be
useful, the rank rule must satisfy the fair criteria for each agent even for the case
where agents are heterogeneous in ability, have unique uncertainty distributions and
experience both multiplicative and additive common shocks. A linear rank rule limits
the effective mechanism to a combination of φi and hi that can overcome all four
differences, so care must be taken when crafting a legitimate rank rule. One solution
is to first adjust for the background differences of variance, then ability, then any
common shock bias that may be present.
To meet the equal variance criteria, agent i′s rank rule in equation (2.2.1) must
offset his unique variation term αi in σ
2
i = α
2
iσ
2
κ to make his exposure to uncertainty
the same as all other agents. However, the idiosyncratic uncertainty is inseparable
from observable output hence any attempt to compensate for αi will also distort the
effect on rank from effort and the common shocks. Nevertheless, equating variance
can be accomplished with the multiplicative handicap in equation (2.2.1) set to the
inverse of the unique variation term φi =
1
αi
such that 1
αi
qi =
θµoi
αi
+ s
αi
+ εi
αi
. This
does, however, create undesirable effects: a distorted effort term
θµoi
αi
and a distorted
additive common shock term s
αi
.
The multiplicative handicap can be used as a mechanism to adjust the uncertainty
variation so long as the distortions to effort and shocks are managed in hi. Setting
hi = − θµ
o
i
αi
− s
αi
accomplishes this task. Individual effort is also inseparable from
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observable output; however in equilibrium, we can use the property in equation (2.2.7)
to describe the handicap as a function of agent i′s ability and the level of effort
synonymous with having ability equal to unity, namely µoi = aiµ
o. The conditions of
differences and the rank rule that achieve a fair and efficient outcome are formalized
in Proposition 2.1. (all proofs are found in Appendix A).
Proposition 2.1. Efficient tournaments with agents of heterogeneous ability and
unique idiosyncratic uncertainty distributions, who experience common shocks s and
θ, are background fair when evaluated using the rank rule
ri =
1
αi
(qi − s− θaiµo).
Proposition 2.1 describes the general case where all differences are known and can
be used to reach a fair and efficient tournament outcome. In comparison, O’Keeffe
et al. (1984) describe how tournaments are made fair between agents heterogeneous in
ability where idiosyncratic shocks are drawn from an identical distribution by shifting
the probabilities to be equal at the point of efficiency. The rank rule in Proposition
2.1 acts to shift the levels as they described, but unlike O’Keeffe et al., also adjusts
the slopes of the probabilities to compensate for the differences in variance.
Recall the example from Figure 2.1 where no rank rule was used. This can be
compared to Figure 2.2 where rank rules are used. The plates in Figure 2.1 correspond
to the same agent backgrounds as the plates in Figure 2.2.7 In all cases, Pi = 1/3 where
the efficient Nash equilibrium should be. However, for this case only plates (a) and
(d) meet all the necessary constraints for a Nash equilibrium to exist. First, note the
7Just as in Figure 2.1, the backgrounds in Figure 2.2 are: plate (a) describe curves for agents
homogeneous of ability type am and uncertainty that is i.i.d. with variance factor αm; in plate (b),
agents are described by ability am and different variance factors αl < αm < αh; in plate (c), agents
are described by ability al < am < ah and uncertainty that is i.i.d. with variance factor αm; in plate
(d), agents have ability al < am < ah and variance factors αi ∝ ai. All plates are symmetric.
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homogeneous case in plate 2.2(a) has the identical outcome to plate 2.1(a); all agents
are offered the same payoff contract and the tournament is fair with no handicaps
ri = qi. However in plate 2(b) where agents are homogeneous in ability with different
variances, the payoff levels at (µoi , ci (µ
o
i )) remain the same for all agents but the
spread in equation (2.2.8) is increasing in αi because φi =
1
αi
. All strategies satisfy
the second order conditions, but one consequence for this example is that the fair
contract for agent l does not meet the global incentives requirement. Shirking is
the optimal strategy for l because the fair contract would set Ll > u. In this case,
there is insufficient variance in the performance of l to warrant including him in the
tournament.
A similar shirking incentive is seen in plate 2(c). However, it is now agent h
with incentives to deviate because Lh > u. The spread is identical for all three
agents because the shocks are i.i.d. This effect will worsen if ability and variance are
inversely proportional, reducing the spread on the high types even more. However,
when ability and variance are directly proportional as is shown in plate 2(d), the fair
payoff spread is increasing with ability and the result is fair, efficient, and incentive
compatible.
To reach this level of fairness, however, information demands on the tournament
organizer may be large. While sufficient statistics for αi, ai, and µ
o are determined ex
ante, the common shocks θ and s must also be observed ex post. This requires a means
of disentangling the multiplicative and additive shocks from observable output and
inserting them into the rank rules as correcting factors prior to final ranking. The
information costs may be impractical or undesirable in many competitive settings.
A potential solution is presented by Holmstrom (1982) who suggests the weighted
average of productive output can capture the relevant information about the common
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Figure 2.2: Using a rank rule. Cost and revenue vs. effort for an efficient
tournament that has been made fair.
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shocks for very similar specifications.
The need to observe common shocks reveals a conundrum: under certain con-
ditions and rank rules, efficient tournaments can either be unfair and filter out un-
observed common shocks or be fair but require observation of the common shocks.
Which problem is better to have may depend on the particular circumstances. The
next subsection details how the effect of imperfectly observable common shocks can
bias the results of an otherwise fair and efficient tournament.
2.4.2 Common shock bias
One of the most desirable characteristics of relative performance compensation high-
lighted in the literature is the ability to filter out common shocks. We now look at the
case where the organizer’s expectation of the environmental shocks are normalized to
θ = 1, and s = 0.
The rank rule in Proposition 2.1 then simplifies to
ri =
1
αi
(qi − aiµo) . (2.4.1)
The effective rule in this reduced form is only a function of individual differences ai,
αi, and µ
o. At the efficient equilibrium, if the realized common shocks are s = 0 and
θ = 1, agent i′s rank depends solely on a common level of uncertainty ri = κi which
is the desired result. When s 6= 0 or θ 6= 1, agent i will experience a change in ri ex
post.
The bias in the rule due to the additive shock difference is ∂ri
∂s
= 1
αi
. If αi is the
same for everyone, the typical result in the literature is achieved when error terms
are i.i.d.: the bias will shift the rank for everyone by the same amount and not effect
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the rank order outcome. However, if αi is unique to individuals, this result no longer
holds and the effects of s are no longer balanced across agents.
The bias in the rule due to the multiplicative shock difference ∂ri
∂θ
= aiµ
o
αi
is made
unique to individuals by the ability-variance ratio
aj
αj
. If we take high ability or low
variance as a signal of quality, then ai
αi
can be considered the agents’ intrinsic signal to
noise ratio. Having higher quality can disproportionately increase rank as θ increases.
However, when θ is decreasing, rank will decline instead.
When agents are inherently different and rank rules are designed to be fair, com-
mon shocks no longer cancel out of the contest. Both types of common shock will
alter the probability of winning asymmetrically for each agent in the contest with
changes in ability and variance . The result in Proposition 2.2 captures the effect of
the multiplicative bias.
Proposition 2.2. At the efficient equilibrium using the rank rule in Proposition 2.1;
(i) for the case θ = 1 or ai
αi
=
aj
αj
for all i, j, the tournament is background
fair, no multiplicative common shock exists, and ∂Pi
∂θ
= 0;
(ii) for the case θ 6= 1 and ai
αi
6= aj
αj
for any one i or j, the tournament is not
background fair and a positive multiplicative shock improves the relative probability of
winning for agents with greater than average ability-variance ratio and worsens the
probability of winning for agents with a lower than average ability-variance ratio, and
vice-verse when a negative multiplicative shock occurs according to
∂Pi
∂θ
T 0 if ai
αi
T 1
n
n∑
j
aj
αj
.
Proposition 2.2 describes the conditions when a multiplicative common shock bias
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occurs in efficient tournaments that are made fair. Case 2.2.(i) states the conditions
necessary for background fairness such that no bias is created from the realized multi-
plicative common shock in the probability of winning for any agent. When organizers
accurately observe the shock θ = 1 the probability of winning will be unaffected. Ad-
ditionally, when variance changes proportional to ability for all agents such that ai
αi
is
the same for all i, the multiplicative common shock is filtered out of the tournament.8
However, if even one agent does not have the same ability-variance ratio as the rest
of the contestants, the probability for everyone will be effected.
Case 2.2.(ii) describes what happens when ability-variance ratios are different for
one or more agents. If agent i′s ability-variance ratio is above the average ratio of all
agents, he experiences an increase in his probability of winning with a positive shock
θ > 1. The advantage goes to the more precise and able. However, a negative shock
difference θ < 0 has the opposite effect on the highly productive and precise. Instead,
the agent with an ability-variance ratio below the average will gain an advantage in
probability of winning. The advantage goes to the less precise and less able.9
Without loss of generality, the results of Proposition 2.2 can be written in terms of
a weighted harmonic mean of the variance where the weighted values are either ability
or efficient effort. If we compare the level of effort agents put forth at efficiency, the
effort-variance ratio
µoi
αi
can be substituted for the ability variance ratio in 2.2.(ii).10
8A similar result is found in Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983).
9If the settling cost rule in broiler tournaments is susceptible to this effect, growers may have
incentives to install new, large capacity houses with the latest technologies to increase production
and reduce the effect of ambient temperature variations to gain an advantage over the previous
generation of technologies if the integrator systematically under-reports, θ > 1. However, this
incentive may reverse, inducing sloppy management practices in low capacity growers if the shock
difference is systematically negative θ < 1.
10An alternate specification of equation (2.4.1) is ri =
1
αi
(qi − µoi ) which leads to a different
interpretation of Proposition 2.2, specifically ∂Pi
∂θ˙
T 0 if µ
o
i
αi
T 1n
n∑
j
µoj
αj
; or in terms of the weighted
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Agents that exhibit greater than average efficient effort gain an advantage when θ > 1
and agents that have lower than average efficient effort gain an advantage when θ < 1
holding variance the same.
We now turn our attention to the additive shock term s
αi
in equation (2.4.1). Let
α˘ =
(
n
1
n
∑
j
1
αj
)−1
be the harmonic mean of variance for all j. When the additive shock
is non negative, this term alters the probability of winning asymmetrically for agent
i as a function of his variance. The specific formulation of Proposition 2.3 captures
the effect of the additive bias when s is non-zero.
Proposition 2.3. At the efficient equilibrium using the rank rule in Proposition 2.1;
(i) for the case s = 0 or αi = αj for all i, j, the tournament is background
fair, no additive common shock bias exists, and ∂Pi
∂s
= 0;
(ii) for the case s 6= 0 and αi 6= αj for any one i, j pair, the tournament is
not background fair and a positive additive shock improves the relative probability of
winning for agents with a variance less than the harmonic mean of variance and wors-
ens the probability of winning for agents with a variance greater than the harmonic
mean of variance, and vice-verse when a negative additive shock occurs according to
∂Pi
∂s
T 0 if αi S α˘.
Proposition 2.3 describes the conditions when an additive common shock bias
occurs in efficient tournaments made fair. Case 2.3.(i) states the conditions necessary
for background fairness such that no bias is created from the realized additive common
harmonic mean of variance ∂Pi
∂θ˙
T 0 if αiµoi S
(
n
1
n
∑
j
µoi
αj
)−1
.
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shock in the probability of winning for any agent. When organizers accurately observe
the additive shock, then s = 0 and the probability of winning will be unaffected by
the additive shock. Additionally, when the variance for all agents is identical such
that α = αj and therefore σ
2
j = α
2σ2κ for all j, the additive common shock is filtered
out of the tournament. Hence, for a fair and efficient tournament, both homogeneous
and heterogeneous agents with identically distributed uncertainty are unaffected by
additive common shocks which supports the findings in Lazear and Rosen (1981) and
Green and Stokey (1983).
Case 2.3.(ii) describes what happens when at least one agent has a unique level
of variance from all others in the group. The rank rule can compensate for the
asymmetry between agents in both ability and variance, but an additive shock bias
will result from an imperfect observation of s. If agent i′s variance is below the
harmonic mean of all agents’ variance, he experiences an increase in his probability of
winning when a positive additive shock occurs. The harmonic mean is smaller than
the arithmetic mean and will be sensitive to abnormally small values of variance.
Agents who have comparatively high precision in output gain a competitive ad-
vantage when faced with positive additive shocks s > 0. This incentive counter-acts
the gains from increasing own variance as a strategy. In contrast, if s < 0, the agent
with variance above the harmonic mean will experience an increase in probability of
winning. Negative additive shocks help those who have more risk, but hurt those who
have it safe.
In general, If tournament organizers are unaware of the common shock biases,
then they may create contests that can be gamed.
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2.4.3 Special cases
In some settings, entry fees and certifications can act to sort agents into more homo-
geneous groups. Additionally, the uncertainty of outcomes to agents can be managed
with increased monitoring. In such situations, a simplification of the rank rule in
Proposition 2.1 can reduce the burden of sufficient statistics for the principal.
We focus on three prevalent combinations of background differences that lead to
unique rank rules to highlight their affect in matters of fairness. The first two cases
consider environments where agents have identical uncertainty distributions but may
or may not be the same in ability. The last case considers an environment where the
uncertainty distributions of heterogeneous agents are proportional to ability αi ∝ ai.
Uncertainty increasing with ability satisfies the stylized facts of hierarchy as described
in Malcomson (1984) and is used later in the discussion of groups in Section ??. 11
Following are four Corollaries to Proposition 2.1 with a brief discussion for each.
Corollary 2.1. Efficient tournaments with agents of identical ability and identical
idiosyncratic uncertainty distributions, and who experience common shocks s and θ,
are background fair when evaluated using the outcome rule ri = qi.
Proposition 2.1 describes that the basic homogeneous agent tournament as orig-
inally described by Lazear and Rosen (1981), meets the fair criteria. Identical un-
certainty distributions give all agents a fair draw. The fair criteria are satisfied as
a direct result of the inherent symmetry of the background differences. The rank
function naturally meets the equal variance criterion condition E[(φiεi)
2] = σ2κ when
11Malcomson (1984) highlights that the variance of earnings increases with experience as a stylized
fact of internal hierarchical labor markets.
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φi = 1.
12 The efficiency requirement in equation (2.2.7) reduces to µoi = µ
o
j which also
supports setting φi = 1. Common shocks cancel when the multiplicative handicaps
are identical which meet the no common shock bias criterion and leads to hi = 0.
With the background differences accounted for, equation (2.2.2) will satisfy the equal
probabilities criterion.
For the second case, the simplified outcome rule in Corollary 2.1 is no longer fair
when agents have heterogeneous ability and therefore a different rule is needed. This
is because agents of different ability put forth different amounts of efficient effort so
the simple comparison of output directly is no longer symmetric and fails to satisfy
the equal probabilities criterion.
One possible solution is to use the simplified ratio handicapped rule ri =
1
ai
(qi − s)
that satisfies the efficiency criteria in equation (2.2.7) such that the effort terms are
symmetric. However, using any ratio handicap when distributions are identical im-
poses an asymmetry across agents; hence, φi =
1
ai
modifies the uncertainty distribu-
tions and the equal variance criterion is violated. Just as is the case in Corollary 2.1,
the equal variance criterion is satisfied only when φi = 1 for an identical uncertainty
distribution.
The solution is to only use an additive handicap to compensate for the differences
in effort and therefore satisfies the equal probabilities criterion without adding any
other biases. Any additive handicap that satisfies hi = r − θµi where r is common
to all agents will provide an adequate solution. For convenience, we set r = 0 and
describe the conditions that satisfy an efficient and fair solution in Corollary 2.2 and
also prove the other rules are not fair.
12It would be equally fine to set φi to any constant to satisfy the equal variance criterion, however
any value other than 1 simply scales the values for all agents.
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Corollary 2.2. Efficient tournaments with agents of different ability and identical
idiosyncratic uncertainty distributions who experience common shocks s and θ,
(i) are background fair using ri = qi − θµoi ;
(ii) are not background fair using ri = qi;
(iii) are not background fair using ri =
1
ai
(qi − s).
When agents are heterogeneous in ability only, multiplicative common shocks must
be observable, but additive common shocks can be ignored as is found in Proposition
2.3.(i). Corollary 2.2.(i) describes that the basic handicapped heterogeneous agent
tournament as originally described by Lazear and Rosen (1981) meets the fair criteria,
but only when the additive handicap fully compensates for the level of efficient effort
hi = −θµoi . The notable difference is, however, that θ must be observed by the
principal and incorporated into the rank rule to be fair.13 Rule ri = qi fails the equal
probabilities criterion because it does not adequately compensate for differences in
ability. Rule ri =
1
ai
(qi − s) fails the equal variance criteria because the ratio handicap
term 1
ai
distorts the identical distributions and the equal variance criterion is violated.
For the third case, heterogeneous agents with variance proportional to ability
are analyzed. Recall that the variance of agent i′s uncertainty term is σ2i = a
2
iσ
2
κ.
The ratio handicap set inversely proportional to ability φi =
1
ai
is appropriate to
use to satisfy the equal variance criterion in this case. The variance of handicapped
uncertainty becomes E[(φiεi)
2] = σ2κ for all agents which meets the equal variance
criteria. The rank rule must also satisfy the symmetric effort requirements in the
equal probabilities criterion which also occurs when φi =
1
ai
.
13A direct comparison with Lazear and Rosen (1981) requires θ = 1.
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Corollary 2.3. Efficient tournaments with agents of different ability and idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty distributions proportional to ability who experience common shocks
s and θ,
(i) are background fair using ri =
1
ai
(qi − s);
(ii) are not background fair using ri = qi;
(iii) are not background fair using ri = qi − θµoi ;
When agents are heterogeneous in ability and αi ∝ ai, additive common shocks
must be observable, but multiplicative common shocks can be ignored. The burden
on the principal to observe and report shocks is similar to Corollary 2.2, but opposite
in the type of shock and is a direct result of Proposition 2.2.(i).
Corollary 2.3.(i) states that the rule ri =
1
ai
(qi − s) fully compensates for all
background differences under these circumstances and is fair. However, as is the case
in Corollary 2.2, rule ri = qi fails the equal probabilities criterion because it does
not adequately compensate for differences in ability. It also fails the equal variance
criterion because it does not adjust for heteroskedasticity. Rule ri = qi − θµoi solves
the symmetric effort problem and therefore adequately compensates for differences
in ability, but it fails the equal variance criterion. An additive handicap alone is not
sufficient to compensate for differences in variance. To meet the no common shock
bias criterion, the additive handicap must take on the form hi =
s
ai
.
Section 2.4.1 provided a general solution for fairness with perfect information
when agents are highly heterogeneous. Section 2.4.2 demonstrated the bias effects
that imperfect information about common shocks can have on the probability of
winning and subsequent rank order and how this violates procedural fairness. When
a procedurally fair and efficient tournament is required ex ante, imperfectly observed
common shocks can bias the rank order of the agents, ex post. Finally, Section 2.4.3
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outlined how the rank rule in Proposition 2.1 can be relaxed when the principal can
control the type of agents that enter the contest or the exposure to risk. The basic
assumptions made about the agents dictate the use of a different rank rule, but still
requires diligent awareness of environmental conditions. Hence, there is no policy
panacea for fairness, only a recipe for fair practices.
2.5 The Principal
Standard symmetric tournament models indicate that the principal need only commit
to awarding the specified prizes, because he has no incentive to prefer awarding the
winning prize to one contestant over another. This has been argued to be an important
advantage of tournament mechanisms because it may be much easier to make such a
commitment then commit to a more complex contract that requires a third party to
observe output. However, this result may not obtain in the more general tournament
context that we have modeled here in which the organizer employs handicaps and
differential prize spreads to achieve efficiency and fairness. We show that the organizer
may have an incentive ex post to award the winning prize to some contestants rather
than others.
What, if any, incentives exist for the principal when he has already committed to
using fair tournaments? Consider a single efficient tournament where the organizer
has perfect information and Proposition 2.1 is satisfied. The organizer has expected
profits of
E [Π1] =
n∑
i=1
{
V µoi −
1
n
(Wi + (n− 1)Li)
}
.
When the tournament is fair and efficient, the integral portion of the marginal prob-
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ability of winning in equation (2.2.3) is symmetric for all agents go = goi = (n −
1)
´
z (κi)
2 Z (κi)
xH−2 dκi. Let α¯ = 1n
n∑
j=1
αj be the average variance factor. Using
payoffs in equation (2.2.10), actual profits when agent i wins are
Π1|i wins =
n∑
j=1
{
V µoj − uj − ajC (µo)
}
+
V
θgo
(α¯− αi) .
The summation is equivalent to expected profit. The term V
θgo
(α¯− αi) is a result of
organizing fair tournaments between agents with different shock distributions.
Proposition 2.4. The organizer has an incentive to choose an agent with a below
average variance factor according to ∂Πi
∂αi
= − V
θgo
, and actual profits differ from expec-
tations according to Π|i wins = E [Π] + Vθgo (α¯− αi) .
The organizer is no longer indifferent to who wins. If the organizer has any
control over who the winner might be in the contest, he has incentives to choose an
agent with a relatively low variance based on the size of the spread according to the
comparative static ∂Πi
∂αi
< 0. For the proportional case αi ∝ ai, the firm has incentives
to bias the tournament and promote from the low ranks of managers to avoid paying
the larger wages associated with senior managers. The magnitude of this effect is
increasing in the value of the marginal product, decreasing in the expected value of
the multiplicative environmental condition, and increasing in the overall uncertainty
level of the organization.
The organizer can create a hidden benefit when environmental conditions are
favorable if the agents are naive or cannot negotiate. Propositions 2.2 and 2.3 provide
the conditions for when common shocks can favor agents with low variance. When
the expectation of additive shocks are positive E [s] > 0, agents with small relative
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variance gain an advantage in both probability of winning and overall ranking. The
principal can increase profits by letting nature bias the outcome. Identifying the exact
conditions when the principal can benefit from multiplicative environmental shocks is
more complicated because the benefit of the bias effect depends on variance weighted
by ability. Consider again the case when heterogeneity is proportional αi ∝ ai. The
organizer has a higher probability of losing profits by overpaying those with the highest
winning payoff when E [θ] > 1 because the most productive and precise agents gain
the advantage. In contrast, the principal gains an advantage in profits when E [θ] < 1
because the relatively less precise, less capable, and least productive have an increased
probability of winning.
2.6 Conclusion
A first best solution exists for background fairness and efficiency in heterogeneous
tournaments under perfect information. When information costs are high for the
principal, the second best solution depends greatly on the characteristics of the agents,
the environmental conditions, and the verifiability of the principal’s ranking process.
To be procedurally fair, a tournament must be designed to be fair ex ante and also
insure the rank-order outcomes are not biased by environmental conditions ex post.
We define background fairness and the fair criteria necessary to qualify a symmetric
contest as fair, then use a linear rank rule to satisfy the conditions of symmetry
between heterogeneous agents.
We identify a general rank rule in Proposition 2.1, that meets the fair criteria
when agents are heterogeneous in ability and idiosyncratic uncertainty. The neces-
sary assumption behind this result is perfect information about the agents as well
58
as the two environmental shocks. When the perfect information assumption about
the environment is relaxed, common shocks no longer affect agents symmetrically.
The handicaps in the rank rule designed to achieve symmetry now bias the common
shocks and can alter the rank order ex post when what is observed by the principal
is different from the actual shock.
Under certain conditions, Proposition 2.2 states the marginal probability of win-
ning is increasing in multiplicative common shocks when agents have a higher than
average ability-variance ratio and decreasing when it is below average. We find that
the advantage goes to the more capable and precise agents when the principal under
reports positive environmental conditions. Yet, when he overestimates the positive
shock, the advantage is reversed and now favors the less capable and imprecise agents.
A similar result is found in Proposition 2.3; the marginal probability of winning
is increasing in additive common shocks when agents have a variance lower than the
harmonic mean and decreasing when it is above the harmonic mean. Capability is
not a factor. Agents who face lower overall variation in uncertainty will gain an
advantage when the principal under reports positive environmental conditions and
conversely, agents who face higher overall uncertainty will gain an advantage when
negative environmental conditions are under reported.
When the principal can control the type of agents that enter the contest, the
basic assumptions made about the agents dictate the use of a different rank rule.
Not surprisingly, the basic homogeneous agent tournament as originally described by
Lazear and Rosen (1981) meets the fair criteria and is captured in Corollary 2.1 to
Proposition 2.1. When agents are heterogeneous in ability with uncertainty that is
i.i.d, only an additive handicap is needed to make tournaments fair. However, as
shown in Corollary 2.2, the multiplicative common shock can still bias the results if
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not perfectly monitored. When variance is proportional to ability, only the additive
common shock need be monitored as captured in Corollary 2.3.
A final concern captured in Proposition 2.4 is that imperfectly monitored envi-
ronmental conditions can create a hidden benefit for the principal when common
shock bias increases the probability that someone from a low variance group wins.
Industries where risk increases with output and that regularly experience negative
environmental shocks that scale the effect of effort are particularly susceptible. Fair
tournaments used in other industries that are subject to positive additive productive
shocks on average also bias in favor of lower risk groups. It is the combination of a
contest between groups of different levels of risk, imperfectly monitored environmental
shocks, and the policy of a calculated fair rank rule that produce these effects.
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Chapter 3
Fairness and workplace incentives:
Evidence from a tournament
experiment with heterogeneous
agents
3.1 Introduction
Workers are inherently different. The challenge for the firm is how to motivate work-
ers who are different using incentive contracts when the workplace is competitive.
Employees, for instance, may desire that contracts provide equal opportunity regard-
less of worker differences. Managers may care because if they treat everyone who
is different the same, workers may not produce efficient effort. If a less able worker
is competing for a bonus with his colleagues and they are better than him in some
way, he may not even try for the bonus; nor might he think it fair. Likewise, the
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worker who is endowed with some advantage over his colleagues, might perceive that
attaining the bonus is a foregone conclusion and not work hard.
Managers are left to choose between overpaying less able workers or run the risk of
losing top talent by underpaying them to maintain equality among employees. Man-
agers who care about efficiency, morale, and retention may therefore seek a relative
compensation scheme that generates efficient effort from all types of workers and
provides equal opportunity at the same time. Using a tournament experiment, this
chapter investigates contract options that vary in perceptions of equal opportunity
by observing behavior when workers who are heterogeneous in both ability and the
distribution of idiosyncratic shock uncertainty compete for high earnings.
An experimental setting provides the necessary control over the heterogeneous
characteristics of the workers and specific contract treatments to study worker behav-
ior that would not be practical in a real world setting. The results in this article are
applicable to actual economic settings where the characteristics of the workers align
with those in the study as well as in a general sense.
Worker heterogeneity is often lumped into a single characteristic—ability. But
doing so ignores how differences in precision of execution, individual preparation,
or differences in monitoring can asymmetrically effect the distributions of worker
uncertainty. Similar to differences in ability, if managers treat workers with different
random shock distributions the same, they will not produce efficient effort. The
advantage goes to the worker who in comparison to his colleagues is not monitored
as closely. The increased spread in his shock uncertainty makes it less likely he will
win if his shock is negative, but this is more than offset by his increased probability
of winning if his shock is positive. Similarly, a worker endowed with a more precise
production process than his equally able peers stands less of a chance of winning
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the bonus and may become discouraged, all the while a colleague with low precision
can slack off expecting to catch a big break. Work groups comprised of complex
combinations in ability and uncertainty of random shocks confounds the efficiency
and equity tradeoff even more.
To capture these differences in the experiment, we characterize five work groups
based on their differences. Unique to this study, two groups include members het-
erogeneous in both ability and uncertainty. The first of these captures the natural
correlation that can occur when ability and uncertainty scale proportionally. Broiler
tournaments where uncertainty scales with capacity are a widely known example.
The second one captures the correlation that can occur when ability and precision
scale proportionally, such as the composition of workers found in service industries
or sports competitions like golf where top performers are also characterized with rel-
atively high precision. The other three groups include a homogeneous benchmark, a
group heterogeneous in ability only, and a group heterogeneous in uncertainty only.
The last group describes a bonus contest between equally able fund managers who
manage portfolios with different risk profiles.
When a firm seeks an incentive mechanism that optimizes effort from all work-
ers, what form of equality is most relevant? Equal opportunity in one sense means
equal access. Programs of affirmative action provide minority groups access to the
competitive workplace and the opportunities for the same bonuses and advancement
that reside within. However, equal opportunity can also refer to equal pay - the same
pay for the same work, regardless of worker differences. Even so, in a relative com-
pensation setting characterized by uncertainty in outcomes where many compete but
not every worker earns a bonus or promotion, equal pay in final earnings is by its
very nature antithetical. In what way, then, can relative compensation contests be
63
considered fair? Workers may consider the differences they receive in distributions
to be fair so long as the contest itself, the process by which colleagues are judged,
is considered fair. Within the context of procedural fairness, equal pay may take
on the form of incentive contracts that equalize expected earnings, regardless of em-
ployee differences. In this way, workers enter the contest with equal expectations of
outcomes and are more willing to accept differences in actual earnings as a result of
competition. Contracts in an equal pay setting are therefore unique to the individual
to compensate for heterogeneity and deliver equal expected earnings.
A third perception of equal opportunity relevant in contest settings is an equal
chance to win. Holding all else constant, the worker with the largest variance in
random shocks will have the highest probability of winning. Recall that one argument
for equal access is that workers from minority groups have just as much to offer
as those in majority groups, but only need access to the same arena. But innate
differences between groups in terms of access to education, life long experiences,
or preparation may provide an advantage to one worker over another, giving them
a higher probability of winning. Likewise, a worker that has been in the workforce
longer will have gained valuable experience, have stronger networks and methods that
increase his/her probability of winning the promotion or bonus in spite of an incentive
contract that offers equal pay. If a fair chance is also important to workers, should
the firm seek a contract that can deliver efficiency and all three forms of equality?
To investigate how important equal access, equal pay, and equal chances are to
competitive workers, we define three contract types. The first is a homogenous con-
tract that does not vary across agents and as such is not theoretically optimal for the
principal. The second and third contracts are made to be optimal and use handicaps
to establish procedural fairness (i.e. equate expected earnings across agents). The
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third contract treatment is strategically symmetric and is distinguished by the fact
that it equalizes the probability of winning as well as equating expected earnings.
To explore the importance of equal access, equal pay, and equal chance, we develop
a novel linear rank mechanism that allows the firm to compensate for heterogeneous
ability and uncertainty. The mechanism allows the firm to choose between different
notions of equality by varying a handicap and payoff structure. A firm that can
employ individual offset handicaps and has the means to adjust the prize spread and
prize levels individually can induce efficiency in a tournament heterogeneous in ability
and uncertainty and achieve equal expected payoffs. However, there are insufficient
degrees of freedom to also equalize the probability of winning across agents. When
equal chance is also desired, the multiplicative handicap provides an additional degree
of freedom to accommodate differences in uncertainty.
The main hypotheses of the experiment are that equal pay increases the percep-
tion of procedural fairness over the distributional fairness concept of equal access,
and that equal chance increases the perception of procedural fairness even further.
Additionally, that this result holds for many different group compositions so long as
the contest is made strategically symmetric across agents.
The identification method is to observe and compare effort choices, solicit role
preferences, contract preferences, and assess fairness. The experimental design is to
randomly assign subjects into roles (types) that are endowed with different levels
of ability and shock uncertainty, then assign them into groups composed of 2 other
agents of different types. In a single session, each group plays two of the four equal
opportunity tournament contracts specified in the experiment. After a subject gains
experience in a contract from 20 round of play, he is asked to state his preferences for
roles. After both contracts are played, a subject is asked to vote for which contract
65
he would prefer to play again. In a group, the contract choice one of the three players
is randomly selected and the group plays 5 more rounds of the chosen contract.
Results of the experiment in both effort and contract choice observed at the firm
(pooled) level and the individual group level appear neutral even though individual
effort contributions and contract choices are not. The general result is that contracts
that promote equal pay in the form of equal expected outcomes promote efficiency as
well as greater perceptions of fairness than do contracts that promote equal access.
Additionally, the effort performance and contract choices made by the group of
agents heterogeneous in ability conform to theory. As expected, both the low ability
and medium ability types prefer equal pay over equal access and the high ability type
prefers equal access over equal pay. Moreover, we show that fairness preferences are
transitive for this group: a homogeneous contract is considered more fair than an
equal pay contract which is considered more fair than an equal access contract at the
group level. However, introducing complex combinations of ability and uncertainty
spoils these results.
The choices made by the individual worker types, for the most part, reflect a
preference for having a strategic advantage. As expected, except in one case of in-
difference, all of the types that had a strategic advantaged in the groups selected
equal access over either equal pay or equal chance nearly unanimously. At the same
time, those types that had a strategic disadvantage chose exactly the opposite nearly
unanimously with only three cases of indifference. Contradictions to our predictions
were found in the group heterogeneous in uncertainty. Those with a strategic dis-
advantage, low uncertainty and medium uncertainty types, chose equal access over
equal pay while the advantaged high types were indifferent between all three con-
tracts, suggesting that the advantages that come from differences in uncertainty are
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less salient than the advantages that come from differences in ability.
Also striking are the results from the fairness solicitation. All of the advantaged
types across all the groups considered the equal access contract to be just as fair as
the equal pay and equal chance contract. However, most disadvantaged types felt
that either equal pay or equal chance were more fair than equal access, supporting
the premise that fairness is a matter of perspective.
3.1.1 Literature Review
One of the contributions to the experimental literature is the introduction of a linear
rank rule that combines the offset handicap and multiplicative handicap into the
same model. Handicaps are a common mechanism to adjust for different ability
in tournaments. Lazear and Rosen (1981) originated the idea by introducing the
offset handicap and O’Keeffe et al. (1984) improved on the theory and show how
offsets can be used to achieve efficiency among heterogeneous agents and how equal
expected payoffs can be achieve by adjusting the prize levels individually for each
agent. Bhattacharya, Sudipto and Guasch (1988) develop a form of multiplicative
handicap used to compare workers across hierarchies of different ability. They also
point to a need for more sophisticated models to account for differences in shocks
correlated across ability levels. Gu¨rtler and Kra¨kel (2010) show how individual prize
levels can be used in leu of handicaps to make the contest less uneven by shifting the
winning prize for the more able worker below that of the less able worker.
Less common in the literature is theory that considers handicaps in tournaments
between agents heterogeneous in ability and non-identically distributed shocks. O’Keeffe
et al. (1984) and Bhattacharya, Sudipto and Guasch (1988) broach the topic, but do
not describe a tournament model with many agents. Chapter 2 in this dissertation
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describes a tournament model that accounts for heterogeneity in both ability and
shock uncertainty and a linear rank rule to compensate for agent differences. The
model of Chapter 2 is adopted here and developed for the purpose of the experiment.
Several experiments including Bull et al. (1987),Schotter and Weigelt (1992), Dijk
et al. (2001), and Harbring and Lunser (2008) test tournament model predictions with
agents heterogeneous in ability. Results of these studies generally support the theory
with the exception that low ability agents are found to systematically work more than
predicted. The overworking low ability agent is also found in our study. The use of
handicaps is less frequent. Experiments that evaluate inequalities using some form of
offset handicap include Schotter and Weigelt (1992) and Orrison et al. (2004) who use
an offset to describe discrimination and Gu¨rtler and Harbring (2010) who investigate
head-starts in contests. Related to the concern for equal pay is Gneezy et al. (2003)
who compare the competitive performance of men and women in a gender study.
The experiment most closely related to ours is Wu et al. (2006) who elicit WTP
between playing two agent tournaments versus piece rate contracts by comparing bids
in a sealed-bid auction after an initial training period. Using the distributional fair-
ness inequity model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), they show that when subjects are
disadvantaged by tournaments, they are willing to pay more to avoid them. Our study
differs from Wu et al. by eliciting contract choice in an ex-ante procedural frame-
work (prior to a third stage) and asking a subject to rate the fairness of tournament
mechanisms and preferences for different roles.
Hammond and Zheng (2013) model both additive and multiplicative production
effects in both ordinal and cardinal tournament models in a real effort experiment.
Harbring and Irlenbusch (2005) and more recently Dechenaux et al. (2012) provide
a comprehensive summary of tournaments in the experimental literature. The rele-
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vant literature Dechenaux et al. review covers handicaps and affirmative action in
tournaments and finds that the disadvantaged benefit from affirmative action. Our
investigation differs from these experiments on several levels. First, these studies are
building a consensus that current models of fairness, risk, and competition in exper-
iments are incomplete and fall short of a comprehensive explanation of ex ante and
ex post concerns. This article is the first experimental investigation of behavior when
agents are heterogeneous in shock uncertainty, including settings where the shock un-
certainty is both positively and negatively correlated with ability differences. Also,
this study is the first to investigate the effectiveness of multiplicative handicaps in a
tournament experiment.
Most advances in behavioral models of fairness have come in the form of dis-
tributive fairness such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).
Grund and Sliwka (2005) develops a tournament model around Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) to show that inequity averse agents produce less effort than self-interested
ones. Alternatively, Krawczyk (2009) proposes a model of the interaction of proce-
dural and distributional fairness. He points out that the distributional preferences
models of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) only focus on
the other regarding preferences of distributional outcomes and disregard the way in
which those outcomes came about. He expands the Bolton and Ockenfels model to
include differences in expected payoff and average expected payoff as a proxy for per-
ceived procedural fairness. We are testing a different channel of procedural fairness
than Krawczyk. His model uses differences in the expected payoffs as a proxy for
procedural fairness and does not consider uneven background differences as a source
of unrest.
More recent, Saito (2013) develops the expected inequality-averse model that
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builds on the guilt and envy model of Fehr and Schmidt with preferences for equality
of opportunity. The Saito model captures the preferences between expected outcome
and distributional outcomes but requires that the agent be inequality averse. For the
experiment in this article, efficiency and expected payoff are held constant for two of
the contracts. The variation in contracts in our study are derived from compensat-
ing for background differences between agents; hence the perceived fairness between
contracts comes from comparing probabilities of winning, prize levels, prizes spreads,
and handicaps across agent types. Therefore, the Krawczyk and Saito models may
not be well suited to capture the nature of procedural fairness we seek to uncover in
these contracts.
The next section introduces the theoretical model. Section 3.3 describes the exper-
imental design. Section 3.4 contains the results and Section 3.5 provides concluding
remarks. Appendix C contains documents used in the experiment including screen
shots.
3.2 Theoretical Model
A risk neutral, profit-maximizing firm employs n heterogeneous agents in produc-
tion. An agent’s output qi = µi + εi is a linear combination of his effort µi and
an idiosyncratic shock εi ∼ i.n.i.d (0, σ2i ). The distribution of εi is independent but
not identically distributed with other agents; is unimodal and symmetric about zero.
Because of the uncertainty introduced by the shock, only qi is verifiable at the end
of the work period. The variation in distributional spread between agents represents
the innate differences in uncertainty that come from individual preparation, work
environment, or the measurement error in the firm’s assessment of performance.
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In addition to differences in uncertainty, an agent is endowed with idiosyncratic
ability ai that affects his cost of performance. Effort is costly for an agent and is
denoted by c (µi, ai), where cµ, cµµ > 0 and c (0) , cµ (0) = 0. As ability increases, the
marginal cost of effort is decreasing such that for any given level of effort, agents with
higher ability have a lower cost and lower marginal cost to effort. Cost functions are
known such that the ability of each agent can be inferred.
The firm earns total revenue from the output of all agents
∑n
i=1 = V qi where V
is the marginal product of output. The firm would like to compensate agents based
on actual performance, but output does not accurately represent agent effort due to
uncertainty. Unverifiable effort creates a moral hazard for the firm that is solved by
the rank-order winner-take-all tournament model of Lazear and Rosen (1981).
The firm offers a winning payoff Wi and losing payoff Li to each agent. When
agents are homogeneous, Lazear and Rosen show how a common payoff Wi = WH
and Li = LH for all i are sufficient to reach efficiency, but that offering this same
contract to agents heterogeneous in ability leads to inefficient effort.
When agents are risk-neutral, the inefficiency can be overcome by adjusting the
spread of the individual payoffs, and the levels can be adjusted to equalize expected
earnings, but more flexibility is needed in the contract to equalize the chances of
winning. This is important when crafting incentives in practical settings. When only
payoff adjustments are used, the low ability agent may have a probability of winning
so close to zero that he will have to be offered an exorbitant winning payoff just to
participate. Conversely, the high ability agent endowed with a probability of winning
very close to one may need to be threatened with bankruptcy if he loses. This type of
contract may be impractical and constrained in limited liability settings where firing
the top agent is the worse punishment that can be delivered. The model we develop
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introduces two additional degrees of freedom to overcome these problems.
To facilitate equal opportunity and equal probability, the firm ranks agents by a
linear rule ri (µi, φi, hi) = φiqi (µi) + hi where φi is a multiplicative handicap and hi
is an offset handicap, both used to adjust for differences in ability and uncertainty
distributions. Agent rank is the only determinant of earnings and is decoupled from
actual effort. Individual payoffs are distributed to agents according to ordinal rank
Payoffi =
 Wi if ri > rj for all j 6= iLi if ri < rj for at least one j 6= i .
Let fj be the probability density function and let Fj be the cumulative distribution
function of εj for all j. As a function of effort, ability and standard deviation, the
probability agent i ranks higher than j is
Fj = prob
(
εj (σj) <
1
φj
(−φjµj (aj)− hj + φiµi (ai) + φiεi (σi) + hi)
)
. Let µ, φ, and
h be the set of effort, multiplicative handicaps, and offset handicaps for all agents
respectively. In the contest, agent i′s probability of being ranked higher than all
other agents j 6= i can be written
Pi(µ, φ, h) =
ˆ
fi (εi)
n−1∏
j 6=i
Fj
(
εj − 1
φj
(rj (µj, φj, hj)− ri (µi, φi, hi))
)
dεi. (3.2.1)
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The marginal probability of effort for i is
gi(µ, φ, h) =
∂Pi(µ, φ, h)
∂µi
=
ˆ
fi (εi)
n−1∑
j 6=i
{
φi
φj
fj
(
εj − 1
φj
(rj (µj, φj, hj)− ri (µi, φi, hi))
)
×
n−2∏
k 6=j 6=i
Fk
(
εk − 1
φk
(rk (µk, φk, hk)− ri (µi, φi, hi))
)}
dεi
and gi > 0 such that the probability of winning is increasing in effort.
The firm will pay one agent his winning payoff Wi with a probability Pi, otherwise
he will be paid Li. Summing up all of the revenue and expected payoffs for the agents,
expected profit for the firm is described by
pi =
n∑
i=1
{V qi (µi)− Pi (µ, φ, h)Wi − (1− Pi (µ, φ, h)Li)} .
The firm solves the principal-agent problem by backward induction, evaluating the
incentives of the agent to choose a contract (Wi, Li, ri (φi, hi)) that will deliver optimal
effort µ∗i while holding all agents indifferent to outside opportunities X.
Agent i maximizes his expected utility choosing effort according to
max
µi
ui = Pi(µ, φ, h)Wi + (1− Pi(µ, φ, h))Li − c (µi, ai) . (3.2.2)
Using Nash-Cournot assumptions, the best response function for i that implicitly
describes the Nash equilibrium given that all other n−1 agents j are playing optimal
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strategies is
Si = Wi − Li = c
′
(µ∗i )
gi (µ∗, φ, h)
, (3.2.3)
where Si is the payoff spread and the non-subscripted µ
∗ is the set of optimal effort
levels of all agents. The outcome of the contest is efficient when V = c
′
(µ∗i , ai) in
equation (3.2.3) for all i.
The firm can choose equal access by offering all agents the same contract
(W,L, ri (1, 0)) by setting φi = 1 and hi = 0, and S = Si = W − L for all i.
However, the firm cannot achieve efficiency with this contract because at efficient
effort, gi (µ
∗
i , 1, 0) 6= SV in equation (3.2.3) for all heterogeneous agents i.1
The contract preference of equal expected earnings is achieved by holding agent i
indifferent to outside opportunities Xi in equation (3.2.2) at the Nash equilibrium, and
satisfying the optimum strategies in equation (3.2.3), the individual payoff functions
based on optimal effort µ∗i and the handicaps are
Wi (µ
∗, φ, h) = Xi + c (µ∗i , ai) + (1− Pi (µ∗, φ, h))Si (µ∗, φ, h)
Li (µ
∗, φ, h) = Xi + c (µ∗i , ai)− Pi (µ∗, φ, h)Si (µ∗, φ, h)
. (3.2.4)
Individual contracts (Wi (µ
∗, φ, h) , Li (µ∗, φ, h) , ri (φi, hi))|V=c′µ will deliver the effi-
cient outcome when V = c
′
µ.
2
The contract preference of equal chance is achieved by selecting the set of φ and
1For equal access, gi (µ
∗
i , 1, 0) =
´
fi (εi)
∑n−1
j 6=i fj
(
µ∗i − µ∗j + εi
)∏n−2
k 6=j 6=i Fk (µ
∗
i − µ∗k + εi) dεi and
is unique for different abilities and standard deviations. This is the same for equal expected earnings
with no handicaps φi = 1, and hi = 0 for all i.
2For equal expected earnings using h only, gi (µ
∗
i , 1, h) =
´
fi (εi)
∑n−1
j 6=i fj (εi)
∏n−2
k 6=j 6=i Fk (εi) dεi
and is the same for i.i.d. distributions but is unique when distributions are i.n.i.d. at the efficient
equilibrium and φi = 1 for all i.
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h in the rank rule so that Pi =
1
n
for all i. One solution to equalize probabilities and
simultaneously yield efficient effort, handicapped or otherwise, is to set the expecta-
tion of agent rank the same for all agents at the Nash equilibrium. Let r be a target
adjusted output for all agents in equilibrium. Equating the target adjusted output to
the expectation of the rank rule E [ri] = r, the offset handicap for any agent can be
calculated as hi = r−φi (σi)µ∗i (ai). When distributions are i.i.d., setting φi = 1 and
r = 0 so that hi = −µ∗i is sufficient to equalize effort across agents and achieve Pi = 1n .
However, when the distributions of the idiosyncratic shocks are heterogeneous, agents
endowed with greater variance gain an advantage in equation (3.2.1) for contests where
n > 2 (see Equal Variance proof in Chapter 2). To overcome this, the multiplicative
handicap can be used to equalize the variance of the distributions. The distributions
are normalized by setting φi =
1
σi
so that Dist(φjεj(σj)) = Dist(φiεi(σi)) for all
j 6= i. With both handicaps and µ∗i , Fj = prob
(
εj (σj) <
σj
σi
εi (σi)
)
= 1
2
for any two
agents.3 The ratio φi
φj
=
σj
σi
is equal to the square root of the variance ratio between i
and j.
3.3 Experimental Design
The main objectives of the equal opportunity experiment are to test if the competitive
contract of equal pay (equal expected earnings) increases the perception of fairness
over the contract of equal access (identical payoffs) and if the contract of equal chance
(equal expected earnings and equal probability of winning) increases the perception of
3For equal probability, gi
(
µ∗i ,
1
σi
, hi
)
=
´
fi (εi)
∑n−1
j 6=i
σj
σi
fj
(
σj
σi
εi
)∏n−2
k 6=j 6=i Fk
(
σk
σi
εi
)
dεi and is
unique for different abilities and standard deviations at the efficient equilibrium where hi = r − µ
∗
i
σi
.
The incentive for i derived from the marginal probability gi is identical to what he would experience
if he were to play a homogeneous tournament against members of his peer group at equilibrium.
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fairness over the contract of equal pay for many different group compositions. We do
this by testing the effort decisions made by agents and the choices they make between
playing different tournament contracts.
3.3.1 Player Types and Functional Relationships
The experiment focuses on tournaments with groups of n = 3 agents {i, j, k}. Three
ability levels are defined: low aL, medium aM , and high aH . Ability levels vary within
a group to better understand the effects that may arise from having the perception of
being very far ahead or very far behind or in-between. Three standard deviations are
defined: low σL, medium σM , and high σH . Uncertainty levels vary within a group
to address the advantages and disadvantages that more uncertainty brings to some
agents, but not others.
Individual contracts (Wi, Li, r
∗
i (φi, hi)) are calculated by solving equation (3.2.3)
for optimum effort µ∗i based on the group composition and contract objective where
r∗i (φi, hi) = φiµ
∗
i + φiεi + hi.
Idiosyncratic uncertainty is modeled as a uniform distribution. The pdf of the
distribution in terms of rank rule and standard deviation for the opponents of i at
the Nash equilibrium is
fj(εj) =

1
2
√
3σj
for −√3σj ≤ εj − 1φj
(
r∗j − r∗i
) ≤ √3σj
0 otherwise
∀ j 6= i.
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Likewise, the cdf at the Nash equilibrium for all j 6= i is
Fj(εj) =

0 for εj − 1φj
(
r∗j − r∗i
)
≤ −√3σj
1
2
√
3σj
(
εj − 1φj
(
r∗j − r∗i
)
+
√
3σj
)
for −√3σj ≤ εj − 1φj
(
r∗j − r∗i
)
≤ √3σj
1 for
√
3σj ≤ εj − 1φj
(
r∗j − r∗i
)
The mean of the distribution for j relative to the mean of i is determined by φi
φj
µ∗i −
µ∗j +
φi
φj
εi − 1φj (hi − hj). Let I be an activation term for fi (εi) and Fi (εi), let J be
an activation term for fj (εj) and Fj (εj), and let K be an activation term for fk (εk)
and Fk (εk) that correspond to the intervals described by the uniform distribution.
The probability agent i wins at the Nash equilibrium is
Pi =
ˆ (
1
2
√
3σi
)I (
1
2
√
3σj
(
εj − 1
φj
(
r∗j − r∗i
)
+
√
3σj
))J
×
(
1
2
√
3σk
(
εk − 1
φk
(r∗k − r∗i ) +
√
3σk
))K
dεi.
The marginal probability of effort at the Nash equilibrium is
gi =
ˆ (
1
2
√
3σi
)I {(
φi
φj2
√
3σj
)J (
1
2
√
3σk
(
εk − 1
φk
(r∗k − r∗i ) +
√
3σk
))K
×
(
φi
φk2
√
3σk
)K (
1
2
√
3σj
(
εj − 1
φj
(
r∗j − r∗i
)
+
√
3σj
))J}
dεi.
Although the distributions are uniform and finite, the probability functions are in-
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Table 3.1: Fundamental Functional Parameters
Description Parameter Parameter Values
Cost exponent k 4
Marginal product V 32
Low ability aL 10
Medium ability aM 15
High ability aH 30
Low standard deviation σL 13.53175
Medium standard deviation σM 20.29763
High standard deviation σH 40.59525
Opportunity Cost X 2000 lab dollars
definite integrals. With heterogeneous ability and uncertainty, the widths of the
distributions vary as well as the means at the Nash equilibrium causing discontinu-
ities in the probability functions; hence, the integrals are calculated by intervals and
programmed using visual basic to automate contract parameter selection.
We define a convex exponential cost function c (µi, ai) = ai
(
µi
ai
)k
and c
′
(µi, ai) =
k
(
µi
ai
)k−1
where the parameter k is common to all agents. Using the relationship
V = c
′
(µ∗i ), efficient effort is calculated µ
∗
i = ai
(
V
k
) 1
k−1 .
A common fixed payment X was included in each payoff function. Agent High
Payment and Low Payments are calculated according to
Wi = X + ai
(
µ∗i
ai
)k
+ (1− Pi) Vgi
Li = X + ai
(
µ∗i
ai
)k
− Pi Vgi
.
The fundamental parameters used in the experiment are shown in Table 3.1.
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3.3.2 Group Compositions and Contracts
We define five competitive groups {g0, g1, g2, g3, g4}, composed of 3 agents each. The
composition of all five groups is shown in Table 3.2. As a benchmark, the homoge-
neous group g0 is formed where agents are identical in ability aM and uncertainty σM
described by i0(aM , σM), j0(aM , σM), and k0(aM , σM). Group g1 comprises the most
common form of heterogeneity modeled in the literature where agents vary in ability
only i1(aL, σM), j1(aM , σM), and k1(aH , σM). Less common, agents within group g2
vary only by uncertainty i2(aM , σL), j2(aM , σM), and k2(aM , σH).
Table 3.2: Group compositions of heterogeneous backgrounds
Group Composition Agent i∗ Agent j∗ Agent k∗
0 Homogeneous i0 (aM , σM ) j0 (aM , σM ) ko (aM , σM )
1 Heterogeneous Ability i1 (aL, σM ) j1 (aM , σM ) k1 (aH , σM )
2 Heterogeneous Uncertainty i2 (aM , σL) j2 (aM , σM ) k2 (aM , σH)
3 Ability ∝ Uncertainty i3 (aL, σL) j3 (aM , σM ) k3 (aH , σH)
4 Ability ∝ Precision i4 (aL, σH) j4 (aM , σM ) k4 (aH , σL)
* Ability: {aL, aM , aH} = {10, 15, 30}, Std. Dev.: {σL, σM , σH} = {13.5, 20.3, 40.6}
Groups g3 and g4 represent previously unexplored cases in the experimental litera-
ture in that agents vary in both dimensions of ability and variance. Group g3 models
the composition of agents typically found in the production of goods where the abil-
ity to produce a given level of output is positively correlated with the variance of
idiosyncratic uncertainty by i3(aL, σL), j3(aM , σM), and k3(aH , σH). Broiler tourna-
ments are a widely known example. Group g4 depicts the composition of agents found
in service industries or sports competitions such as golf where top performers are also
characterized with relatively high precision i4(aL, σH), j4(aM , σM), and k4(aH , σL).
When agents are heterogeneous, relative compensation contracts must account for
these differences to achieve an efficient outcome. To better understand why this is
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µ∗i , µ
∗
j , µ
∗
k
Group 0: Homogeneous
fi(aM , σM), fj(aM , σM), fk(aM , σM)
µ0 50 100
µ∗i µ
∗
j µ
∗
k
Group 1: Heterogeneous Ability
fi(aL, σM) fj(aM , σM) fk(aH , σM)
µ0 50 100
µ∗i , µ
∗
j , µ
∗
k
Group 2: Heterogeneous Uncertainty
fi(aM , σL)
fj(aM , σM)
fk(aM , σH)
µ0 50 100
µ∗i µ
∗
j µ
∗
k
Group 3: Ability ∝ Uncertainty
fi(aL, σL)
fj(aM , σM)
fk(aH , σH)
µ0 50 100
µ∗i µ
∗
j µ
∗
k
Group 4: Ability ∝ Precision
fi(aL, σH)
fj(aM , σM)
fk(aH , σL)
µ0 50 100
Figure 3.1: Group density graphs for socially optimal strategies
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so, the group compositions described in Table 3.2 are graphed in Figure 3.1 at the
efficient Nash equilibrium. The uniform density functions f overlap in equilibrium
for each group setting. The mean of each density is centered at the efficient Nash
equilibrium effort level chosen by the agent and the density limits are ±√3σv where
v ∈ {L,M,H}.
The parameter values are selected to satisfy several design constraints. As shown
in Table 3.1, ability levels in the experiment have the following relationship 3aL =
2aM = aH . Likewise, standard deviations in the experiment have the following rela-
tionship 3σL = 2σM = σH . The ratios are kept the same so that ability and uncer-
tainty scale proportionally in g3 and inversely proportional in g4 in order to examine
how well multiplicative handicaps perform independent of offset handicaps. Abilities
are chosen so that strategies in equilibrium that yield efficient effort were sufficiently
separated in the decision interval [0, 100]. As depicted in Figure 3.1, the ability lev-
els {aL, aM , aH} = {10, 15, 30} generate effort levels
{
µ∗i , µ
∗
j , µ
∗
k
}
= {20, 30, 60} when
agents work efficiently. Second, the standard deviations were made just large enough
to satisfy the second order conditions and the global participation constraint so that
all tournaments have a theoretical Nash equilibrium {σL, σM , σH} = {13.5, 20.3, 40.6}.
Table 3.3: Tournament contracts
Contract Groups Description Efficient φ h Payoffs
H Homogeneous, g0 Homogeneous Yes No No Identical∗
A g1, g2, g3, g4 Equal access to opportunity No No No Identical∗
B g1, g2, g3, g4 Equal expected earnings, E [u] Yes No Yes Individual
C g2, g3, g4 Equal E [u] and chance to win Yes Yes Yes Individual
* The payoffs are the same for all types and for all groups, including the homogeneous group
To study concepts of fairness and efficiency, we evaluate the performance of the
groups and agents in three contracts and one benchmark. The tournament contracts
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are listed in Table 3.3. The first and second contracts do not use handicaps. The third
contract incorporates offset handicaps h = {hi, hj, hk} to induce efficient effort µ∗ ={
µ∗i , µ
∗
j , µ
∗
k
}
. The fourth contract employs both offset and multiplicative handicaps
φ = {φi, φj, φk}.
Contract H is a benchmark case and exhibits all the properties of fairness: equal
access to opportunity, equal expected earnings, and equal chance to win. H is designed
as an incentive for agents in the homogeneous group g0 to work efficiently. Since g0
is homogeneous, handicaps are unnecessary, the probability of winning for each agent
is P = 1
3
, and expected earnings are equal to the fixed payment X.
In Contract A, the firm offers agents in the heterogeneous groups equality in
pay structure with no handicaps φ = {1, 1, 1} and h = {0, 0, 0}. The contract is
identical to the payoffs offered in Contract H (i.e. all agents in groups g1, g2, g3, g4
are offered the same winning and losing payoffs). A contest offering equal payoffs
is common practice in labor settings; however, because agents are heterogeneous,
the best response functions lead to non-uniform strategies, unequal probabilities of
winning, and lower than efficient effort. Therefore, expected earnings are unique
and no longer equal to X. The concept of fairness in Contract A is equal access
of opportunity; even though agents are different, they all have access to the same
contest. Differences in ability and uncertainty are ignored in policy.
In Contract B, the firm incorporates only offset handicaps to provide the incentive
for all agents to perform efficiently. The Multiplicative handicaps are not used, φ =
{1, 1, 1}. All agents in Contract B have fairness in expected earnings equal to X.
The offset handicap provides the firm with an extra degree of freedom to create
the proper incentives for agents to generate efficient effort. Offset handicaps are
set h = {40, 20, 0} to compensate for differences in expected efficient effort when
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µ∗i 6= µ∗j 6= µ∗k in groups g1, g3, and g4. Since ability is the same for agents in group
g2, handicaps are unnecessary h = {0, 0, 0} to adjust for differences in effort. To
equate expected earnings to X, individual payoff contracts are offered to each agent
by adjusting winning and losing payoffs based on individual attributes of ability and
uncertainty. The firm does not have enough degrees of freedom in Contract B to
equate the probability of winning between agents in g2, g3, and g4 because the offset
handicap is not sufficient to compensate for the differences in uncertainty. However,
since uncertainty in g1 is i.i.d., agents have the same probability of winning for this
one case in Contract B.
In the final Contract C, the firm induces efficiency, equalizes expected outcomes,
and equalizes the probability of winning. This mechanism is unique in the literature
and uses a combination of multiplier and offset handicaps as needed to achieve the
firm’s design goals for each group. Differences in risk contribute to inequalities in
expected earnings and the probability of winning in Contract A. To eliminate this
effect, the multiplicative handicap is used in Contract C to equate the distributions
of uncertainty between agents. The agents endowed with the standard deviations
{σL, σM , σH} correspond to the set of handicaps φ = {3, 2, 1}. The agent with the
smallest variance in distribution receives the largest multiple. Since r∗i = φiµ
∗
i +φiεi+
hi, the handicap φ has the effect of scaling both the error term and the effort for the
agent.
This is a desirable property in g3 because ability is proportional to uncertainty.
The specific cost function in this experiment induces the same proportion in equi-
librium effort when agents are working efficiently; therefore in g3, the multiplicative
handicap is sufficient to equate the distributions and effort simultaneously such that
the offset handicap is not needed h = {0, 0, 0}. In the other heterogeneous groups
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g2, and g4, h is used to compensate for the scaling effect of φ. Evaluating the expec-
tation of the rank rule E [ri] = r, the offset handicap for all agents were calculated
hi = r − φiµ∗i . To avoid inducing loss aversion, the offset handicaps were normalized
so that hi ≥ 0 by choosing r = max
[
φiµ
∗
i , φjµ
∗
j , φjµ
∗
j
]
and the agent of the group
with the smallest offset handicap received hi = 0. In g1, the handicap φi = 1 since
the variance is identical across agents. In fact, the optimal contract for group g1 is to
use only h as in Contract B; hence g1 is omitted from Contract C.
3.3.3 Participant Pool and Procedures
The experiment consists of 216 subjects broken up into 10 sessions of 24, 21 or 18
subjects each depending on how many subjects showed up to the session. Subjects
were accepted in groups of three. Any subject who did not match into a group of 3
were paid a $5 show-up fee and asked sign up again for a later session. A typical 24-
subject session has 8 total groups, 2 of each type of group. Undergraduate students
from the University of Tennessee economics experimental subject pool volunteer to
participate using the ORSEE online registration process (Greiner, 2004). z-Tree was
used to conduct the experiment (Fischbacher, 2007). Average earnings per subject is
$34.7. The experiment lasted for 2 hours and 15 minutes.
A session, depicted in Figure 3.2, proceeds as follows. Subjects arrive and are
given a randomly assigned seat at one of the computer terminals in the lab. Once all
of the subjects have arrived, instructions are read aloud by a moderator and subjects
are given a chance to ask questions. Instructions are shown in subsection C.3 of the
Appendix. Subjects then complete a training session, play three training rounds, and
are again given the opportunity to ask questions. Based upon the random order of
arrival, and a pseudo-random group assignment chart that is unique to each session,
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Figure 3.2: Typical session block diagram
subjects are assigned into one of the 5 groups and into an agent type within the group.
180 of the subjects remain in the same group and same type for the entire session.
36 subjects change between groups g0 and g1 between stages. The session was split
into two Sets to control for order effects that balance the group exposure to contracts
across Stage 1 and Stage 2. The only difference between Set 1 and Set 2 is which two
of the four contracts will be given and in which order.
At the beginning of Stage 1, subjects play two training rounds in the contract
assigned to the stage. Agent High Payment and Low Payments are calculated and
displayed on the decision screen for each contract. A typical decision screen is shown in
the Appendix in Figure C.3. Subjects then make decisions in 20 paid rounds. During
a paid decision round, the cost of effort was shown in a table on the decision screen
and was also calculated interactively on the screen as subjects considered different
decision numbers. As subjects made decisions, High Earnings and Low Earnings
based on actual decision numbers were interactively displayed on the screen.
After each decision round, a unique random number is added to the decision
number, then the rank rule is applied to create a total number. The total numbers of
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each group member are ranked. The rank and total number of each group member
are shown on a result screen. A typical result screen is shown in the Appendix in
Figure C.3. The random number drawn for the subject is also shown on the result
screen as a graphical bar and value.
In the final 21st round of the stage, a questionnaire is distributed to solicit role
preferences, then the stage ends. Stage 2 is conducted in exactly the same manner
as Stage 1 except the contract changes between stages. To solicit which contract
is preferred, subjects are asked which stage they prefer to play again in the Stage
Choice block immediately following Stage 2. One of the choices is randomly selected
and each group plays 5 more rounds of the chosen stage. The final period solicits
fairness preferences and demographic information at the end of the session for all 24
subjects. Results of the risk elicitation and earnings are then shown. Subjects are
paid in private using envelopes as they leave the room.
Role preferences are solicited in the 21st paid round for each contract for all sessions
except the pilot run. The role preference sheet is shown in subsection C.4 of the
Appendix. The question asks subjects to circle the role (type) they would prefer to
play again if they were given the opportunity. In the pilot run, a question of role
preference was in the questionnaire at the end of the session that asked if subjects
would prefer to play the same role (type) or switch to one of the other roles.
3.3.4 Hypotheses
In the equal access contract A, each agent has the same contract with the firm.
However, agents k1, k2, k3 k4, and j3 have an advantage in either ability, a larger
variance in uncertainty, or a combination of both that enhances their probability of
winning at the Nash equilibrium and ultimately leads to the highest expected earnings
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in their group. We expect this to be an overwhelming reason for these types to choose
an equal access contract over either equal pay or equal chance. For the same reason, we
expect the disadvantaged agents i1, i2, i3, i4 and j1, j2, j4 to prefer to not play equal
access because they have lower probability of winning at the Nash equilibrium that
ultimately leads to lower expected earnings in their group as compared to contracts
equal pay or equal chance. Agent j2 is only slightly worse off in expected earnings
in contract A and j3 is slightly better off in expected earnings in contract A than
in either B or C, hence these two may be indifferent as these difference may not be
perceptible to the agents.
Hypothesis 1. Advantaged types will choose contract equal access A over both equal
pay B and equal chance C.
Hypothesis 2. Disadvantaged types will choose contract equal pay B or equal chance
C over equal access A.
In the equal pay contract B, agents have individual payoffs and offset handicaps such
that everyone has the same expected earnings. However, the offset handicap is only
able to make group g1 strategically symmetric. In the other groups, Agents k2, k3,
and i4 have an advantage from a larger variance in uncertainty that enhances their
probability of winning to 0.43 at the Nash equilibrium. If equal expected earnings is
all that is considered important to an agent ex ante, then having a higher probability
of winning should not make a difference and therefore there should be no perceptible
preferences for any agent between contract B or C. On the other hand, if strategic
symmetry is considered more fair than equal expected earnings are alone ex-ante, then
we can expect a higher probability of winning to be a reason for the advantaged types
to choose an equal pay contract over equal chance. Likewise, we expect the agents
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i2, i3 and k4 with low variance in uncertainty and a relatively lower probability of
winning of 0.27 in B to prefer C to B. Agents j2, j3, and j4 all have a slightly lower
probability of winning of 0.30 in contract B compared to P = 1/3 in contract C and
hence these agents may be slightly in favor of contract C.
Hypothesis 3. Types with high probability of winning in B will choose contract
equal pay B over equal chance C.
Hypothesis 4. Types with low probability of winning in B will choose contract
equal chance C over equal pay B.
Role preferences are also tested. The advantages that lead to Hypotheses 1 and 2
also lead to another prediction about which role is most preferred in contract A. Any
type should prefer to play the role in his group with the greatest expected earnings.
Hypothesis 5. Types in contract equal access A will choose to play the role with
the highest expected payoff.
Also, if differences in probability of winning are considered important, then any type
should prefer to play the role in his group with the greatest probability of winning
in contract B. Finally, if we are to assume that a symmetrically strategic contest is
considered most fair in this experiment, then all types should be indifferent between
playing any role in a strategically symmetric game. The strategically symmetric
games include the homogeneous group g0in contract H, group g1in contract B, and
groups g2, g3, and g4 in contract C.
Hypothesis 6. Types in groups g2, g3, and g4 in contract equal pay B will choose
to play the role with the highest probability of winning.
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Hypothesis 7. Types in strategically symmetric contracts H,C and g1 in B will be
indifferent between playing any role.
3.4 Experimental Results
We now look at the results of the experiment for the three categories of contract
choice and fairness, role preferences, and effort. Firms that employ equal opportunity
contracts may have inadequate resources to monitor the results of such programs in
great detail. In such cases, it is likely average results are used to quantify program
effectiveness in terms of efficiency and equity. Therefore, we use a top-down approach
to view the data at different levels of aggregation at the firm level, group level, and
individual agent type level conditional on group composition.
3.4.1 Contract Choice and Fairness
After gaining experience playing contracts in stage 1 and 2, subjects are asked to
choose which of the two contracts they prefer to play again. After all group members
make a decision, the choice of one group member is selected at random and the group
plays 5 more rounds of the chosen stage. The contract choice options are as follows:
# I SELECT TO PLAY ACCORDING TO STAGE 1 CONDITIONS
# I SELECT TO PLAY ACCORDING TO STAGE 2 CONDITIONS
The 216 observations are coded into a single variable yi ∈ [0, 1] where 1 indicates
contract x is preferred to contract z and 0 indicates contract z is preferred to contract
x. In this way, a coefficient will measure what percentage of subjects prefer contract
x to contract z. The dependent variable is coded as contract choice pairs {x or z} =
{A or H; B or H; A or B; A or C; B or C}.
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Subjects are also asked on the same screen to indicate the strength of their pref-
erences with the following question.
Please indicate how strongly you prefer your chosen Stage over the al-
ternative one (This will not be used to determine the outcome, it is for
research purposes only):
1. I strongly prefer the stage I selected.
2. I moderately prefer the stage I selected.
3. I weakly prefer the stage I selected.
4. I have no preference of one stage over the other.
Since subjects are forced to choose between the two stages in the contract choice
question, selecting“4”in the preference strength question is interpreted as indifference.
The preference strength, combined with the binary contract, is used to construct a
preference Decision (gradient) variable. Specifically, a choice between Contract x and
z is coded {z1, z2, z3, z4 = x4, x3, x2, x1} → {0, 0.17, 0.33, 0.50, 0.67, 0.83, 1}. In this
case, a score of 0.5 represents indifference between the two contracts, a score of 1
indicates strong preference for Contract x and a score of 0.17 represents a moderate
preference for Contract z.
A Fairness dependent variable in created as the difference between two identical
questions about fairness that subjects answer during the questionnaire about either
Stage 1 or Stage 2, shown here:
In [STAGE 1 | STAGE 2] of the experiment, did you feel that the
experiment was “fair” in the sense that all players had the same
potential to earn money?
1. Not fair at all
2. Somewhat fair
3. Moderately fair
4. Mostly fair
5. Perfectly fair
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The Fairness variable is constructed as the difference between the two questions
and then scaled to the interval [0, 1]. A value of 0.5 represents that contract x and
z are considered to be of equal fairness by the same subject (however, since Fairness
represents the difference between Likert scales, it does not indicate at what level
of fairness that would be). A value of 1 represents that contract x was considered
perfectly fair while contract z was considered not fair at all. A value of 0 represents
that contract z was considered perfectly fair while contract x was considered not fair
at all.
An Earnings difference dependent variable is constructed as the difference in total
earnings received in 20 paid rounds from contract x minus total earnings received in
20 paid rounds from contract z for each subject in US dollars. We also count the
number of times a subject won in a contract out of 20 rounds of play and calculate
the percentage. The Percent Won difference dependent variable represent the average
difference between winning in contract x minus winning in contract z.
Tables at the pooled level and individual type level are shown in this section.
Tables at the Group level are shown in Appendix C.1. The first column of the tables,
Decision, shows the percentage of the group that prefers contract x to z. The second
column shows the same Decision (gradient) augmented by the preference strength
question. The Fairness variable is in the third column, the Earnings difference is in
column 4, and the Percent Won difference in column 5. Significant values on variables
in columns 1, 2, and 3 indicate statistical difference from the midrange value, 0.50. A
significant value on Earnings difference indicates an average earnings difference exists
for the group in one contract over another where a negative value indicates more was
earned in Contract z than x. By design, the earnings difference between contracts
B and C is expected to be zero since they both have equal expected earnings. A
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significant value on Percent Won difference indicates subjects won more often in one
contract over another, a negative sign indicates subjects won more often in contract
z.
Table 3.4: Pooled Contract Choice
Decision Decision Fairness Earnings Percent Win
Variable [0,1] (gradient) [0,1] (difference) (difference)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Choice was Contract A or B 0.486 0.500 0.481 0.619 -0.004
(0.059) (0.051) (0.022) (0.936) (0.036)
Choice was Contract A or C 0.537 0.512 0.505 2.472 -0.002
(0.068) (0.058) (0.030) (1.597) (0.035)
Choice was Contract B or C 0.556 0.519 0.525 0.331 0.002
(0.068) (0.060) (0.020) (0.700) (0.027)
R-sqr 0.524 0.583 0.879 0.027 0.000
dfres 179 179 179 179 179
BIC 275.8 223.3 -79.4 1299.2 41.2
N 180.0 180.0 180.0 180.0 180.0
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Significant values on Choice variables indicate statistical
difference from the midrange value, 0.50.
Of the 216 subjects, Table 3.4 shows the results from the pooled regressions for
the 180 who make a choice between contracts without switching roles or group com-
position. At the aggregate level, there is no statistical preference for one contract
type over the other. This result is not entirely unexpected for choices made between
Contracts B and C since both contracts are handicapped and have the same expected
payoff. However, the result that subjects are indifferent from a handicapped or ho-
mogeneous contract and Contract A with no handicaps suggests the votes made by
subjects in advantaged roles may be canceling the votes made by those in disadvan-
taged roles. Overall, only 3.14% of subjects were indifferent over contracts, but were
still required to make a choice.4
4The histogram of contract choice with a preference strength gradient is bimodal ( 1=x strongly
preferred to z is 31.02%, 0.83 is 16.67%, 0.67 is 1.9%, 0.5=no preference is 3.24%, 0.33 is 3.70%,
0.167 is 14.81%, and 0=z strongly preferred to x is 28.70%.
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Table 3.5: Tabulation of Group by Contract Choice
Choice
Group Contract A Contract B Contract C Contract H Total
homogeneous or ability A 9 9 18 subjects
50.00 50.00 100 %
homogeneous or ability B 9 9 18 subjects
50.00 50.00 100 %
diff ability 7 11 18 subjects
38.89 61.11 100 %
diff uncertainty 21 17 16 54 subjects
38.89 31.48 29.63 100 %
ability ∝ uncertainty 15 22 17 54 subjects
27.78 40.74 31.48 100 %
ability ∝ precision 21 17 16 54 subjects
38.89 31.48 29.63 100 %
Total 73 76 49 18 216 subjects
33.80 35.19 22.68 8.33 100 %
First number is subject count, second is percent of row.
The group composition was altered on the other 36 subjects to investigate what
happens when subjects are exposed to a homogeneous group g0 and to one with
different abilities g1. The pooled level results of these 36 subjects and a discussion
are in Appendix C.1.
3.4.1.1 Aggregated Group Results
This subsection discusses the results of Group level contract choice decisions. Each
regression includes twelve dummy variables that indicate contract choices made by
each group. Errors are grouped at the subject level. The regression Tables that
support this discussion are in Appendix C.1.
Table 3.5 provides the tabulation summary of how often a contract was chosen
in the experiment. None of the observations are statistically different from equal
expectations in each contract choice. This is easily seen for those who switched
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between homogeneous and ability groups in the first two rows where subjects preferred
being in the homogeneous contract 50% of the time. For groups in rows 4, 5, and
6, none of the percentages are statistically different from 1/3. Tabulating the binary
contract choice, we also find no significant difference in contract preference in the
pooled data. This result suggests that a collection of heterogeneous groups in mixed
contracts may on average vote to use any of the three contracts with equal probability.
Overall, contract preferences, fairness, and percent won aggregated at the group
level are shown to be neutral. There is also no significant difference in average earnings
between any contract even though the expected earnings are different for different
types in contract A. When averaged at the group level, the Percent Won should be
1/3 for all contracts.
One exception was in Group 0 and Group 1 where contracts were found to display
transitive properties in fairness. Table C.2 shows the results of the five regressions for
agents in homogeneous Group 0 and Group 1, heterogeneous in ability only. Column 3
shows that the homogeneous contract H is considered more fair than either contract A
or contract B and that contract B is considered more fair than contract A. Therefore,
for groups of agents with differences in ability, fairness preferences are transitive
A ≺ B ≺ H at the group level. The only other exception to neutral results is found
in Group 2 with heterogeneous uncertainty. Contract A is considered slightly more
fair than contract B to the 10% level.5
3.4.1.2 Individual Type Results
The variation in the contract choice data that is hidden at the firm and group levels
becomes more evident at the type level, conditional on group composition. The ex-
5Table C.3 shows the results of the five regressions for agents in Group 2.
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Table 3.6: Contract Preferences, Type Decisions in Group 0
Decision Decision Fairness Earnings Percent Won
Group 0 Variables [0,1] (gradient) [0,1] (difference) (difference)
(Ability/Homogeneous) Type Choice b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
T14: ability/homo i : Low A or H 0.000*** 0.167*** 0.146*** -6.483 -0.175***
(.) (0.09) (0.08) (5.08) (0.03)
T14: ability/homo i : Low B or H 0.667 0.639 0.333 1.948 0.142**
(0.21) (0.20) (0.14) (1.22) (0.07)
T15: ability/homo j : Med A or H 0.500 0.528 0.313 -1.606 -0.158*
(0.22) (0.19) (0.12) (1.57) (0.08)
T15: ability/homo j : Med B or H 0.500 0.556 0.375 0.020 -0.008
(0.22) (0.16) (0.12) (0.84) (0.04)
T16: ability/homo k : High A or H 1.000*** 1.000*** 0.417 8.312*** 0.342***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.14) (1.85) (0.08)
T16: ability/homo k : High B or H 0.333 0.361 0.229*** -0.190 -0.142***
(0.21) (0.18) (0.09) (1.13) (0.05)
R-sqr 0.685 0.734 0.872 0.322 0.535
dfres 215 215 215 215 215
BIC 372.4 337.1 77.4 1642.9 51.9
N 216.0 216.0 216.0 216.0 216.0
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Significant values on choice variables in columns 1, 2,
and 3 indicate statistical difference from the midrange value, 0.50.
periment captures the unique perspectives of subjects endowed with different abilities
and shock uncertainty as they face contracts of equal access, equal pay, and equal
chance. The same five regressions run for the group level are rerun at the type level
and split by group into the next 5 tables. With 216 subjects and 36 contract choices,
this provides 6 fairness observations per type per contract choice.
Table 3.6 shows the partial results of the five type-level regressions for agents in
Group 0 that switch roles and choose between heterogeneous ability contracts and a
homogenous contract. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, a high ability type (T16−G0, k)
unanimously prefers equal access over a homogeneous contract in column 1. A reason
for this can be seen in column 4 where the high type earned $8.31 more in contract A
than in H and won more often in A as seen in column 5. Consistent with Hypothesis
2, the low ability type (T14−G0, i) unanimously prefers a homogeneous contract
to equal access. Although not significant, the low types suffered a loss differential
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Table 3.7: Contract Preferences, Type Decisions in Group 1
Decision Decision Fairness Earnings Percent Won
Group 1 Variables [0,1] (gradient) [0,1] (difference) (difference)
(Different Ability) Type Choice b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
T1: ability i : Low A or B 0.000*** 0.028*** 0.271*** -8.634*** -0.208***
(.) (0.03) (0.08) (3.28) (0.07)
T2: ability j : Med A or B 0.167** 0.139*** 0.396 -4.112*** -0.250***
(0.17) (0.11) (0.08) (1.28) (0.07)
T3: ability k : High A or B 1.000*** 1.000*** 0.542 7.935*** 0.433***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.84) (0.13)
R-sqr 0.685 0.734 0.872 0.322 0.535
dfres 215 215 215 215 215
BIC 372.4 337.1 77.4 1642.9 51.9
N 216.0 216.0 216.0 216.0 216.0
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Significant values on choice variables in columns 1, 2,
and 3 indicate statistical difference from the midrange value, 0.50.
of -$6.48 (5.08). The low type considered the homogeneous contract more fair than
equal access, while the high type was indifferent in column 3. The medium type
(T15−G0, j) is neutral in fairness between all three A, B, or H contracts.
Table 3.6 shows the partial results of the five type-level regressions for agents
in Group 1 that are endowed with heterogeneous ability and choose between equal
access A and equal pay/equal chance contract B. Preferences are strong in this group
and consistent with the literature on contests between agents heterogeneous in ability
in column 1. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, both the low ability type and medium
ability type prefer equal pay over equal access. Both low and medium ability win
more often in contract B and lose more money playing A than in B by a differential
of -$8.63 and -$4.11 respectively and not surprisingly, they both prefer the equal pay
contract B. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the high ability type prefers equal access
over equal pay. The low ability type also considers B to be more fair. The high type
is able to collect $7.94 more on average in contract A and votes unanimously for A
over B, but does not consider A to be more fair than B.
The type-level decisions from Group 2 that come from agents heterogeneous in
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Table 3.8: Contract Preferences, Type Decisions in Group 2
Decision Decision Fairness Earnings Percent Won
Group 2 Variables [0,1] (weighted) [0,1] (difference) (difference)
(Different Uncertainty) Type Choice b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
T4: uncertainty i : Low A or B 0.833** 0.694 0.542 3.078 -0.008
(0.17) (0.12) (0.07) (3.53) (0.06)
T4: uncertainty i : Low A or C 0.500 0.444 0.500 -1.504 -0.067
(0.22) (0.19) (0.08) (0.99) (0.07)
T4: uncertainty i : Low B or C 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.436 0.050
(0.22) (0.18) (0.03) (1.59) (0.07)
T5: uncertainty j : Med A or B 0.500 0.556 0.667*** -0.076 0.033
(0.22) (0.16) (0.06) (2.01) (0.10)
T5: uncertainty j : Med A or C 0.500 0.500 0.625* 1.422 0.058
(0.22) (0.20) (0.06) (1.30) (0.05)
T5: uncertainty j : Med B or C 0.500 0.444 0.458 -0.278 -0.075
(0.22) (0.18) (0.08) (1.02) (0.07)
T6: uncertainty k : High A or B 0.500 0.556 0.521 3.057 -0.042
(0.22) (0.18) (0.07) (2.08) (0.08)
T6: uncertainty k : High A or C 0.667 0.639 0.563 9.942 0.025
(0.21) (0.18) (0.13) (9.12) (0.06)
T6: uncertainty k : High B or C 0.667 0.556 0.563 -0.137 0.025
(0.21) (0.18) (0.05) (3.66) (0.11)
R-sqr 0.685 0.734 0.872 0.322 0.535
dfres 215 215 215 215 215
BIC 372.4 337.1 77.4 1642.9 51.9
N 216.0 216.0 216.0 216.0 216.0
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Significant values on choice variables in columns 1, 2,
and 3 indicate statistical difference from the midrange value, 0.50.
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Table 3.9: Contract Preferences, Type Decisions in Group 3
Decision Decision Fairness Earnings Percent Won
Group 3 Variable [0,1] (gradient) [0,1] (difference) (difference)
(ability ∝ uncertainty) Type Choice b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
T7: ability ∝ uncertainty i : Low A or B 0.000*** 0.083*** 0.396** -9.920*** -0.350***
(.) (0.06) (0.05) (2.92) (0.04)
T7: ability ∝ uncertainty i : Low A or C 0.000*** 0.028*** 0.292*** -2.865 -0.317***
(.) (0.03) (0.05) (3.66) (0.06)
T7: ability ∝ uncertainty i : Low B or C 0.500 0.72 0.500 2.151 -0.100
(0.22) (0.21) (0.03) (3.99) (0.08)
T8: ability ∝ uncertainty j : Med A or B 0.167** 0.278 0.521 1.042 0.050
(0.17) (0.14) (0.08) (1.51) (0.05)
T8: ability ∝ uncertainty j : Med A or C 0.500 0.444 0.458 0.466 -0.075
(0.22) (0.16) (0.04) (2.17) (0.11)
T8: ability ∝ uncertainty j : Med B or C 0.500 0.583 0.625* -0.118 -0.075
(0.22) (0.19) (0.06) (1.27) (0.06)
T9: ability ∝ uncertainty k : High A or B 1.000*** 0.972*** 0.479 9.543*** 0.300***
(0.00) (0.03) (0.07) (2.39) (0.06)
T9: ability ∝ uncertainty k : High A or C 0.833** 0.778** 0.604 6.562** 0.375***
(0.17) (0.13) (0.10) (3.05) (0.11)
T9: ability ∝ uncertainty k : High B or C 0.833** 0.806* 0.500 -1.491 0.167
(0.17) (0.16) (0.10) (1.60) (0.12)
R-sqr 0.685 0.734 0.872 0.322 0.535
dfres 215 215 215 215 215
BIC 372.4 337.1 77.4 1642.9 51.9
N 216.0 216.0 216.0 216.0 216.0
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Significant values on choice variables in columns 1, 2,
and 3 indicate statistical difference from the midrange value, 0.50.
shock uncertainty are reported in Table 3.8. These agents experience all three contract
types of equal access, equal pay, and equal chance. In all but one case, all types are
indifferent between which contract they play, suggesting differences in uncertainty are
not salient enough to matter. The one exception is for the low type where, contrary
to predictions, they prefer contract A to B. This result goes away in column 2 when
preference strength is included. The medium type considered A more fair than B or
C.
Table 3.9 shows the partial results of the five type-level regressions for agents in
Group 3 that are endowed with heterogeneous ability proportional to uncertainty and
choose between equal access, equal pay, and equal chance contracts. Contract choice
by each type is largely as predicted. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the disadvantaged
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Table 3.10: Contract Preferences, Type Decisions in Group 4
Decision Decision Fairness Earnings Percent Won
Group 4 Variables [0,1] (gradient) [0,1] (difference) (difference)
(ability ∝ precision) Type Choice b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
T10: ability ∝ precision i : Low A or B 0.500 0.528 0.438 2.712 -0.208***
(0.22) (0.19) (0.05) (3.51) (0.07)
T10: ability ∝ precision i : Low A or C 0.667 0.611 0.542 9.797 -0.017
(0.21) (0.17) (0.12) (8.97) (0.09)
T10: ability ∝ precision i : Low B or C 0.333 0.361 0.583*** -0.817 0.058
(0.21) (0.20) (0.03) (1.67) (0.05)
T11: ability ∝ precision j : Med A or B 0.167** 0.222* 0.479 -2.860 -0.158*
(0.17) (0.16) (0.09) (1.83) (0.08)
T11: ability ∝ precision j : Med A or C 0.333 0.389 0.438 -4.408* -0.108
(0.21) (0.18) (0.12) (2.25) (0.08)
T11: ability ∝ precision j : Med B or C 0.833** 0.639 0.500 1.992** 0.033
(0.17) (0.16) (0.09) (0.88) (0.06)
T12: ability ∝ precision k : High A or B 1.000*** 0.944*** 0.521 5.657*** 0.358***
(0.00) (0.04) (0.06) (1.16) (0.09)
T12: ability ∝ precision k : High A or C 0.833** 0.778* 0.521 2.840*** 0.108
(0.17) (0.16) (0.05) (0.59) (0.09)
T12: ability ∝ precision k : High B or C 0.333 0.306 0.500 0.237 -0.067
(0.21) (0.19) (0.05) (1.91) (0.08)
R-sqr 0.685 0.734 0.872 0.322 0.535
dfres 215 215 215 215 215
BIC 372.4 337.1 77.4 1642.9 51.9
N 216.0 216.0 216.0 216.0 216.0
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Significant values on choice variables in columns 1, 2, and 3 indicate
statistical difference from the midrange value, 0.50.
type (T7, i) endowed with low ability and low uncertainty, won less often and earned
less in A, and unanimously vote for a handicapped contract and consider them to both
be more fair than A. However, contrary to Hypothesis 4 they are indifferent between
which handicap contract they play. On the other spectrum, the advantaged type
(T9, k) endowed with high ability and high uncertainty, won more often and earned
more in A, and voted for an equal access contract A over either the equal pay B or
equal pay/chance C as predicted in Hypothesis 1. The type (T8, j) endowed with
medium ability and medium uncertainty is indifferent between all contracts except
does prefer B over A to the 5% level in column 1. Consistent with Hypothesis 3,
(T9, k) prefers B over C.
The type-level decisions of Group 4 that come from agents with ability propor-
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Table 3.11: Hypotheses Results Summary
Hypothesis Preference i1 i2 i3 i4 j1 j2 j3 j4 k1 k2 k3 k4
1 A over B - - - - - - Y - Y I Y Y
1 A over C - - - - - - I - - I Y Y
2 B over A Y N Y I Y I - Y - - - -
2 C over A - I Y I Y I - I - - - -
3 B over C - - - I - - - - - I Y -
4 C over B - I I - - - - - - - - I
5 high E [u] role in A Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y Y N Y
6 high P role in B N N N N N N N N Y Y N N
7 role indifference in C - Y Y N - Y N N - N Y N
Y, the hypothesis is statistically satisfied; N, it is not; I, the type was indifferent
tional to precision are reported in Table 3.10. Type (T12, k) endowed with high ability
and low uncertainty has the advantage in A and unanimously prefers A over B or C
as predicted. This is coincident with earnings premiums in A compared to B or C.
Both type (T10, i) and (T11, j) prefer equal pay/chance over equal pay, suggesting
that having an equal probability of winning is desirable; although, (T10, i) does find
B to be more fair than C, suggesting otherwise. The medium type earned $1.99 more
in B than C and prefers B over C.
The results of all hypotheses are summarized in Table 3.11 including the role
preference results from the next subsection. Additionally, all of the advantaged types
report neutral fairness between contract A or B and A or C. This result suggests
that those endowed with an advantage consider an even playing field just as fair as
the one stacked in his favor.
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3.4.2 Role Preferences
Role preferences were solicited in the 21stround of each stage with the following ques-
tion.
If you had the ability to choose, which role would you play? (circle one)
my current role role of 1stgroup member role of 1stgroup member
Overall, 50.23% reported they would play the same role again. This proportion
may be high because subjects may have preferences for the status quo. A subject who
switches away from his current role must have preferences strong enough to overcome
his preferences for the familiarity of his current role. Similarly, indifference between
contracts may appear as a choice to play the same role more frequently.
The next three tables show the tabulation of role preferences chosen by the actual
role of the subject type.6 Role preference variables were coded as Prefer Role i, Prefer
Role j, and Prefer Role k and regressed on dummy variables for each type for each
contract. The hypothesis results are summarized in Table 3.11.
Table 3.12 shows the role preference tabulation for Type-level decisions in equal
access Contract A. As expected, the benchmark case with homogeneous agents does
not show a statistical difference in preference, supporting hypothesis 7, since all of the
other roles are the same. For the case of equal access, agents with greater ability have
a higher likelihood of winning which leads to a higher expected payoff. Consistent with
Hypothesis 5, the low ability types in G1 prefer to be high ability as do the medium
and high ability types. Without handicaps, higher uncertainty increases the chances
6The initial session did not include a role preference solicitation. As such, Contract C has 10
respondents per type. Contract B has 11, and Contract A has 11. Since contract H is composed of
homogeneous agents, it has 33.
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Table 3.12: Equal Access Role Preferences, Type Decisions in Contract A
Variable Prefer Role i Prefer Role j Prefer Role k
(Contract A) Type b/se b/se b/se
G0-Homogeneous 0.333 0.242 0.424
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
G1: ability i : Low 0.167 0.083*** 0.750***
(0.11) (0.08) (0.13)
G1: ability j : Med 0.083*** 0.167 0.750***
(0.08) (0.11) (0.13)
G1: ability k : High 0.000*** 0.167 0.833***
(.) (0.11) (0.11)
G2: uncertainty i : Low 0.455 0.273 0.273
(0.16) (0.14) (0.14)
G2: uncertainty j : Med 0.182 0.455 0.364
(0.12) (0.16) (0.15)
G2: uncertainty k : High 0.364 0.000*** 0.636**
(0.15) (.) (0.15)
G3: ability ∝ uncertainty i : Low 0.364 0.000*** 0.636**
(0.15) (.) (0.15)
G3: ability ∝ uncertainty j : Med 0.182 0.455 0.364
(0.12) (0.16) (0.15)
G3: ability ∝ uncertainty k : High 0.182 0.091*** 0.727***
(0.12) (0.09) (0.14)
G4: ability ∝ precision i : Low 0.091*** 0.273 0.636**
(0.09) (0.14) (0.15)
G4: ability ∝ precision j : Med 0.364 0.182 0.455
(0.15) (0.12) (0.16)
G4: ability ∝ precision k : High 0.000*** 0.091*** 0.909***
(.) (0.09) (0.09)
R-sqr 0.419 0.362 0.555
dfres 194 194 194
BIC 641.9 551.4 674.3
N 390.0 390.0 390.0
n 168.0 168.0 168.0
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Significant values on role variables in columns
1, 2, and 3 indicate statistical difference from the even preference value of 0.333.
Statistic ”n” represents the sub-sample size of this table, ”N” is the regression size.
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of winning holding all else constant; hence, we should expect a similar response that
all subjects prefer to by the high uncertainty type. However in equal access contracts,
only the high type appears to recognize the benefit of his own endowment such that
63.6% choose to remain in the same role. In the ability ∝ uncertainty group, 63.6%
of low type respondents recognize the advantages and choose to be high types and
72.7% of high types also choose to remain high types. This pattern is repeated in
the ability ∝ precision group 4. Overall, the medium type, who is always endowed
with the same medium ability and medium uncertainty in all groups, does not show
a significant preference for any role except in Group 1.
The role preferences for the equal pay contract B is shown in Table 3.13. In-
consistent with hypothesis 6, 54.5% of low ability types in Group 1 now choose to
stay in their own role compared to only 16.7% under equal access. This pattern is
repeated for all low types in every group suggesting status quo preferences may be
present. Medium types only slightly increase their desire to be in the same role again.
High types mostly reduce their preference to stay in the same role again, suggesting
the advantage they experienced in A is reduced in B. Taken together, these results
suggest equal pay increases the perception of fairness in all group compositions over
equal access.
The role preferences for the equal chance (with equal pay) contract is shown in
Table 3.14. Much like equal pay, the prediction is that equal expected payoffs with
equal probabilities will induce procedural fairness such that all types will be indifferent
between playing any role. Interestingly, preferences for the status quo does appear to
effect contract C. On average, subjects choose their same role more frequently than
the other two options. Although this does not suggest indifference between roles exists
in contract C, it does confirm that the incentives that make subjects in disadvantaged
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Table 3.13: Equal Pay Role Preferences, Type Decisions in Contract B
Variable Prefer Role i Prefer Role j Prefer Role k
(Contract B) Type b/se b/se b/se
G1: ability i : Low 0.545 0.091*** 0.364
(0.16) (0.09) (0.15)
G1: ability j : Med 0.455 0.182 0.364
(0.16) (0.12) (0.15)
G1: ability k : High 0.364 0.000*** 0.636**
(0.15) (.) (0.15)
G2: uncertainty i : Low 0.818*** 0.091*** 0.091***
(0.12) (0.09) (0.09)
G2: uncertainty j : Med 0.364 0.455 0.182
(0.15) (0.16) (0.12)
G2: uncertainty k : High 0.273 0.000*** 0.727***
(0.14) (.) (0.14)
G3: ability ∝ uncertainty i : Low 0.455 0.273 0.273
(0.16) (0.14) (0.14)
G3: ability ∝ uncertainty j : Med 0.364 0.545 0.091***
(0.15) (0.16) (0.09)
G3: ability ∝ uncertainty k : High 0.364 0.182 0.455
(0.15) (0.12) (0.16)
G4: ability ∝ precision i : Low 0.545 0.182 0.273
(0.16) (0.12) (0.14)
G4: ability ∝ precision j : Med 0.182 0.636** 0.182
(0.12) (0.15) (0.12)
G4: ability ∝ precision k : High 0.182 0.364 0.455
(0.12) (0.15) (0.16)
R-sqr 0.419 0.362 0.555
dfres 194 194 194
BIC 641.9 551.4 674.3
N 390.0 390.0 390.0
n 132.0 132.0 132.0
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Significant values on role variables in columns
1, 2, and 3 indicate statistical difference from the even preference value of 0.333.
Statistic ”n” represents the sub-sample size of this table, ”N” is the regression size.
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Table 3.14: Equal Chance Role Preferences, Type Decisions in Contract C
Variable Prefer Role i Prefer Role j Prefer Role k
(Contract C) Type b/se b/se b/se
G2: uncertainty i : Low 0.400 0.400 0.200
(0.16) (0.16) (0.13)
G2: uncertainty j : Med 0.500 0.300 0.200
(0.17) (0.15) (0.13)
G2: uncertainty k : High 0.200 0.100** 0.700**
(0.13) (0.10) (0.15)
G3: ability ∝ uncertainty i : Low 0.600 0.200 0.200
(0.16) (0.13) (0.13)
G3: ability ∝ uncertainty j : Med 0.400 0.500 0.100**
(0.16) (0.17) (0.10)
G3: ability ∝ uncertainty k : High 0.600 0.100** 0.300
(0.16) (0.10) (0.15)
G4: ability ∝ precision i : Low 0.300 0.100** 0.600
(0.15) (0.10) (0.16)
G4: ability ∝ precision j : Med 0.200 0.500 0.300
(0.13) (0.17) (0.15)
G4: ability ∝ precision k : High 0.100** 0.500 0.400
(0.10) (0.17) (0.16)
R-sqr 0.419 0.362 0.555
dfres 194 194 194
BIC 641.9 551.4 674.3
N 390.0 390.0 390.0
n 90.0 90.0 90.0
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Significant values on role variables in columns
1, 2, and 3 indicate statistical difference from the even preference value of 0.333.
Statistic ”n” represents the sub-sample size of this table, ”N” is the regression size.
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roles want to switch into advantages roles are no longer present. Given this evidence,
equal chance also improves perceptions of equality over equal access.
3.4.3 Effort
Pooling results for all 216 subjects and 8640 observations, average effort is 33.13 which
is not statistically different from the expected average of 32.66 if everyone chooses
the Nash. By design, the equal access contract A was expected to deliver lower
than efficient effort. The pooled average effort reflects this result and is statistically
different from the expected average of 34.44 if everyone were to choose the efficient
level of effort given their endowed ability level. For reference, Appendix C.2 contains
graphs that show the average effort for each period for each group in each contract.
To evaluate effort, a dependent variable is created as the difference between actual
effort and predicted effort for all paid rounds. Four contract dummy variables are cre-
ated to indicate what contract each subject was playing. Five group dummy variables
are created to indicate subject membership in a particular group. Thirteen dummy
variables are also created to indicate subject membership in a particular type of role
that is specific to a group.7 Both group and type dummy variables are interacted
with contract dummy variables for part of the analysis. For regression tables in this
section, the first column Effort shows the actual effort from the subjects, the second
column shows the Predicted level of effort, and the third column shows the Difference
between actual and predicted. Errors are clustered at the subject level.
Table 3.15 shows the mean effort by contract. Agents overworked when subjected
to contract A with no handicaps, significant to the 1% level.8 In contrast, the handi-
7The homogeneous contract counts as a single type since i0 = jo = k0,
8Values reported in the text are significant to the 1% unless otherwise indicated. Significance
levels in the tables are reported as * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.15: Effort by Contract
Contract Effort Predicted Difference
b/se b/se
Homogeneous 30.828 30.000 0.828
(1.21) (1.21)
Contract A 32.490 29.638 2.852***
(1.32) (0.90)
Contract B 33.852 35.000 -1.148
(1.38) (1.02)
Contract C 33.801 34.444 -0.643
(1.49) (1.04)
R-sqr 0.752 0.013
dfres 215 215
BIC 75465.1 72115.7
N 8640.0 8640.0
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
capped contracts B and C yield both optimal and efficient effort as predicted, a result
also found with the homogeneous control group.
Table 3.16 shows the mean effort by group. In Table 3.16 and subsequent tables,
a handicap of none indicates equal access or Contract A, offset indicates equal pay or
Contract B, and full indicates equal chance to win or Contract C. The homogeneous
case serves as a benchmark of the experiment and is shown to be the same as predicted.
Generally, we find there is no significant difference in effort from the predicted level.
The group characterized by different ability only is observed as inefficient. When
subjects are in heterogeneous groups, the benefits of employing fairness rules that
equalize the expected output or make the probability of winning the same between
agents may go unobserved. Then again, these results may exist simply because data
is pooled by groups, so we now look at how each group responded to the treatments.
Table 3.17 shows the mean level of effort by group and contract treatment. Results
are organized by group, then by treatment. Using a Wald test to compare the coef-
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Table 3.16: Effort by Group
Group Effort Predicted Difference
b/se b/se
G0: homogeneous 30.828 30.000 0.828
(1.21) (1.21)
G1: diff ability 32.411 33.980 -1.569
(2.26) (1.63)
G2: diff uncertainty 28.726 28.774 -0.048
(1.13) (1.13)
G3: ability ∝ uncertainty 35.282 34.236 1.047
(1.91) (1.14)
G4: ability ∝ precision 36.642 34.966 1.677
(2.48) (1.32)
R-sqr 0.758 0.006
dfres 215 215
BIC 75262.9 72190.1
N 8640.0 8640.0
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 indicate significance from
zero of effort minus predicted in the Difference column.
ficients for a particular group, we observe no significant difference in effort between
treatments at the group level in the first column. This result suggests that Firms
may not observe the impact that handicaps have on effort at the group level when
comparing contract performance. A neutral result from a policy to increase contract
fairness in an attempt to improve group performance may leave managers unable to
observe a difference in output.
Also, all groups produced the predicted level of effort except in three cases. Com-
mon to findings in the literature and predictions, the different ability group falls short
of the efficient level of effort when no handicaps are applied. However, contrary to
predictions, the addition of offset handicaps did not improve the efficiency of the
group; the ability group still underperforms by -4.204 at the 10% level.
For the group endowed with ability proportional to uncertainty, having no hand-
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Table 3.17: Effort by Group and Contract
Variable Handicap Effort Predicted Difference
contract-group b/se b/se b/se
G0: Homogeneous 30.828 30.000 0.828
(1.21) (0.00) (1.21)
CA-G1: ability none 32.360 31.293 1.066
(2.93) (2.86) (1.92)
CB-G1: ability offset 32.463 36.667 -4.204*
(2.80) (2.84) (2.47)
CA-G2: uncertainty none 28.364 26.323 2.041
(1.27) (0.30) (1.28)
CB-G2: uncertainty offset 29.664 30.000 -0.336
(1.84) (0.00) (1.84)
CB-G2: uncertainty full 28.151 30.000 -1.849
(1.73) (0.00) (1.73)
CA-G3: ability ∝ uncertainty none 35.326 29.373 5.953***
(2.77) (2.26) (1.61)
CB-G3: ability ∝ uncertainty offset 36.611 36.667 -0.056
(2.97) (2.84) (1.75)
CB-G3: ability ∝ uncertainty full 33.910 36.667 -2.757
(2.08) (2.84) (2.12)
CA-G4: ability ∝ precision none 33.911 31.563 2.348
(3.08) (2.96) (2.17)
CB-G4: ability ∝ precision offset 36.672 36.667 0.006
(3.04) (2.84) (1.92)
CB-G4: ability ∝ precision full 39.343 36.667 2.676*
(3.33) (2.84) (1.36)
R-sqr 0.759 0.853 0.028
dfres 215 215 215
BIC 75286.0 69771.4 72060.8
N 8640.0 8640.0 8640.0
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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icap induced a significantly larger level of effort than predicted of 5.953. So much
so that effort is statistically equal to the efficient level of effort for that group. The
reason for this is unclear when viewed at this level of aggregation. Lastly, when ability
and precision are proportional in the group, the full handicap case yields significantly
higher effort than predicted by 2.676 at the 10% level.
Results from Table 3.17 suggest for any given group type, the firm might not
observe a perceptible difference in output when implementing rules that equalize
the expected output or make the probability of winning the same between agents.
The increased costs of administering a handicapped contest might be too high to
implement, especially with no concrete evidence of improved performance. Yet, agent
performance is predicted to improve with the use of handicaps, so why don’t they?
The difference in performance becomes more apparent when we look closer at how
subject types perform in each group across treatments.
Some of the aggregated results can be understood by examining the groups from
within to see how each type behaved. In all, there are 12 unique types across the
4 different groups in addition to the homogeneous type. Table 3.18 shows the effort
delivered by each type, which group they were in, and by contract treatment. Effort
is predicted to be below efficient levels for all types in the untreated Contract A (CA),
however 6 of the 12 types significantly overworked as is indicated in the Difference
column for the “none” treatment cases in Table 3.18.
We can now see that the different ability group in Contract A (CA − G1, none)
behaved as predicted except for the Low ability type who overworked by 6.422 units
of effort on average at the 1% level. The High ability type’s underperformance for
Contract A was not significant enough to be non-optimal at the individual level, but
as we saw in Table 3.17, it was enough to mask the climbing behavior of the Low
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Table 3.18: Effort by Group 0, 1, 2, Contract, Type Treatment
Variable Type Handicap Effort Predicted Difference
contract-group b/se b/se b/se
Group 0 (Homogeneous):
Contract H 30.828 30.000 0.828
(1.22) (0.00) (1.22)
Group 1 (Heterogeneous Ability):
Contract A i : Low none 20.642 14.220 6.422***
(1.89) (0.00) (1.89)
Contract A j : Med none 24.717 24.980 -0.263
(3.32) (0.00) (3.32)
Contract A k : High none 51.721 54.680 -2.959
(3.85) (0.00) (3.85)
Contract B i : Low offset 20.738 20.000 0.738
(1.27) (0.00) (1.27)
Contract B j : Med offset 30.546 30.000 0.546
(1.63) (0.00) (1.63)
Contract B k : High offset 46.104 60.000 -13.896**
(6.26) (0.00) (6.26)
Group 2 (Heterogeneous Uncertainty):
Contract A i : Low none 26.854 27.580 -0.726
(2.03) (0.00) (2.03)
Contract A j : Med none 30.942 27.580 3.362
(2.31) (0.00) (2.31)
Contract A k : High none 27.296 23.810 3.486*
(2.07) (0.00) (2.07)
Contract B i : Low offset 29.704 30.000 -0.296
(3.88) (0.00) (3.88)
Contract B j : Med offset 29.538 30.000 -0.463
(2.26) (0.00) (2.26)
Contract B k : High offset 29.750 30.000 -0.250
(3.23) (0.00) (3.23)
Contract C i : Low full 25.038 30.000 -4.963
(3.32) (0.00) (3.32)
Contract C j : Med full 29.529 30.000 -0.471
(2.42) (0.00) (2.42)
Contract C k : High full 29.887 30.000 -0.113
(2.97) (0.00) (2.97)
R-sqr 0.845 1.000 0.091
dfres 215 215 215
BIC 71681.8 . 71681.8
N 8640.0 8640.0 8640.0
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
111
Table 3.19: Effort by Group 4 & 5, Contract, and Type Treatment
Variable Type Handicap Effort Predicted Difference
contract-group b/se b/se b/se
Group 3 ( Ability ∝ Uncertainty):
Contract A i : Low none 22.346 15.330 7.016**
(3.11) (0.00) (3.11)
Contract A j : Med none 29.675 25.170 4.505
(2.90) (0.00) (2.90)
Contract A k : High none 53.958 47.620 6.338***
(2.28) (0.00) (2.28)
Contract B i : Low offset 22.104 20.000 2.104
(2.15) (0.00) (2.15)
Contract B j : Med offset 31.192 30.000 1.192
(1.43) (0.00) (1.43)
Contract B k : High offset 56.538 60.000 -3.462
(4.40) (0.00) (4.40)
Contract C i : Low full 24.321 20.000 4.321*
(2.20) (0.00) (2.20)
Contract C j : Med full 32.604 30.000 2.604
(1.64) (0.00) (1.64)
Contract C k : High full 44.804 60.000 -15.196***
(3.69) (0.00) (3.69)
Group 4 ( Ability ∝ Precision):
Contract A i : Low none 19.046 15.870 3.176*
(1.69) (0.00) (1.69)
Contract A j : Med none 30.238 22.480 7.757***
(2.34) (0.00) (2.34)
Contract A k : High none 52.450 56.340 -3.890
(5.33) (0.00) (5.33)
Contract B i : Low offset 21.975 20.000 1.975
(2.76) (0.00) (2.76)
Contract B j : Med offset 31.863 30.000 1.863
(1.94) (0.00) (1.94)
Contract B k : High offset 56.179 60.000 -3.821
(4.48) (0.00) (4.48)
Contract C i : Low full 20.888 20.000 0.888
(1.86) (0.00) (1.86)
Contract C j : Med full 33.038 30.000 3.038**
(1.27) (0.00) (1.27)
Contract C k : High full 64.104 60.000 4.104
(3.35) (0.00) (3.35)
R-sqr 0.845 1.000 0.091
dfres 215 215 215
BIC 71681.8 . 71681.8
N 8640.0 8640.0 8640.0
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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ability type to deliver predicted group level performance. We can also see in Table
3.18 why the addition of offset handicaps did not increase effort to the efficient level
of the group in Table 3.17. The Low ability and Med ability types in Contract B
(CB −G1, offset) do perform as predicted, however the High ability type shirked by
a large amount -13.896, or 23.2% lower than predicted at the 1% level.
From the model, increasing idiosyncratic uncertainty for an agent increases his
probability of winning holding all else constant. Therefore expected output is higher
for any given level of effort. Without handicaps, agents with high uncertainty have
incentives to work below efficient levels. The types endowed with the most uncertainty
in their respective group include the High type in (CA − G2), the High type in
(CA−G3), and the Low type in (CA−G4). In all three cases, subjects climbed beyond
predicted at varying levels of significance for the none handicap case, suggesting
having relatively low precision creates an incentive to overwork. If this is true, then
we might see the opposite behavior (or at least the absence of climbing) from types
endowed with high precision. The types endowed with the least uncertainty in the
group include the Low type in (CA − G2), the Low type in (CA − G3) and the
High type in (CA − G4). Both the Low type in (CA − G2) and the High type in
(CA − G4) perform as predicted for the none case which supports the conjecture.
However, we have already noted the curious climbing behavior of the Low type in
(CA − G3) where low ability may be the dominating trait that drives the incentive
in the opposite direction.
We now look at the handicapped contracts (CB/offset and CC/full) in Table
3.18. Both handicap contracts are designed to equate expected output as well as
deliver the efficient level of effort for all types. Contract C also sets the probability
of winning at P = 1
3
for all agents in a group when they play the Nash equilibrium.
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Of the 21 handicapped cases, only 4 types performed non-optimally as shown in the
Difference column: the High type in (CB−G1) under performed, while the Low type
in (CC − G3), the High type in (CC − G3), and the Med type in (CC − G4) all
overworked at varying levels of significance.
We looked at how effort changed across treatments for each type. Using a Wald
test, we find that effort is statistically the same across treatments for all 12 types
except for the following two. First, the medium type in the ability group increased
effort from 24.7 to 30.5 between Contract A (CA − G1) and B (CB − G1) at the
10% level, this is as predicted. Second, we observe non-predicted behavior from the
high type in the ability ∝ uncertainty group. Subjects in this type significantly
overworked from the predicted Nash by 6.3 in the untreated contract A (CA−G3),
yet in the full handicap treatment (CC − G3), underworked by 15.196. This type
is endowed with the highest ability and highest uncertainty in the group which is
a distinct advantage over the other two group members in the untreated contract;
with his chance of winning predicted to be 61.8%, this type was expected to shirk
by 20.6%, but instead only shirked by 10%. When this type was treated with full
handicaps, shirking increased to 25.3% when it was predicted to be zero. However,
this type did behave as predicted during the offset handicap contract.
3.4.4 Design Effects
When contract order is controlled for, the significance of the pooled effort results
only hold for the second contract stages. The significance of the pooled effort in the
first stage is reversed; effort is statistically higher than the expected Nash and not
statistically different from the efficient level of effort. We believe the higher effort
present in the first contract stage is due to learning by doing. Splitting the 40 rounds
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of contract play into sets of 10 rounds each, the average effort of the first quartile is
35.41 and is statistically larger than the subsequent quartiles which are all statistically
the same as the expected Nash. Replicating these tests on the third contract stage,
average effort is recorded to be 32.66 and is statistically identical to the expected
Nash, adding support to this conclusion. The third stage result holds even when
controlling for which contract stage is repeated.
The concern preferences for the status quo may be present in the contract choice
mechanism was tested. A dummy to indicated the last contract played was created to
test if subjects preferred to re-play the most recently played contract more often. This
dummy was added to the contract choice, gradient choice, and the fairness difference
regressions in section 3.4.1 with insignificant coefficient results of 0.056 (0.06), 0.048
(0.05), and 0.017 (0.03) respectively.
3.5 Conclusion
This study uses experiments to examine issues of fairness and efficiency in rank-
order tournaments with heterogeneous agents. We consider settings where agents
are different both in their abilities and in their random shocks and evaluate agent
performance under three contracts that vary in perceptions of equal opportunity:
equal access, equal expected earnings, and equal changes of winning. After gaining
experience, agents choose which role they would prefer to play if they had a chance
to play again. They also vote on which contract to re-play in a third round while
remaining in their current role to elicit preferences for fairness. Results in both effort
and contract choice observed at the firm level and the group level appear neutral
even though individual contributions and choices are not, suggesting that firms with
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limited ability to monitor results may have a difficult time evaluating both efficiency
and equity in the workforce.
The primary result is that having equal pay in the form of expected outcomes pro-
motes efficiency and well as greater perceptions of fairness than does having equal
access. The results for groups composed of homogeneous agents and groups com-
posed of agents with heterogeneous ability support previous findings in the literature.
Without handicaps, in groups with agents that differ only in ability, agents perform as
predicted and offset handicaps improve performance. Supported by results observed
in contract choice, fairness elicitations, and role preferences, both the low ability and
medium ability types prefer equal pay over equal access and the high ability type
prefers equal access over equal pay. Introducing complex combinations of ability and
uncertainty do not lead to the same results and opens the door for further analysis
to isolate the competing incentives in Groups 3 and 4.
Differences in shock uncertainty did not have the same level of effect on partici-
pants as differences in ability. One reason for this might be that not all agent types
perceive the advantages gained with an increase in uncertainty. This reaction may
also be due to risk aversion. It may also be the case that when ability is homogeneous,
precision is viewed as an advantage in an equal access setting or that the size of the
loss that comes from greater uncertainty is undesirable in a loss averse context, even
though losing by a little is the same as losing by a lot. However, one exception to this
observation are the agents endowed with high uncertainty. High uncertainty agents
in Group 2 prefer their role over any other in equal access settings, while the low and
medium types do not prefer to be high types.
In general, role preference results suggest equal pay increases the perception of
procedural fairness in all group compositions over equal access, and that equal chance
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also improves perceptions of equality over equal access, but may not have significant
benefits in terms of perceived fairness over equal pay.
The disadvantaged types may find it necessary to pay the advantaged types rents
to enter into fair contracts. This is because in every group setting, the advantaged
types consider the equal access contract to be just as fair as the equal pay or the
equal chance contract and in most cases, having an advantage in an equal access
contract resulted in higher earnings. In contrast, the disadvantaged types considered
equal access to be the least fair contract of all and that having a disadvantage in an
equal access contract resulted in lower earnings compared to either the equal pay or
equal chance contracts. This contrast supports the premise that fairness is a matter
of perspective.
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Appendix A
Competition and Core
Competency: Risk Independence
as a Strategy
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1.1
For any point of symmetry (µs, αs), the marginal effect of αi on Pi in equation (1.2.5)
can be simplified. The expression in F reduces to the idiosyncratic shock κ = εi and
∂Pi
∂αi
=
n− 1
1 + αj
¨
(εi − x) f (εi)2 F (εi)n−2 dεi g (x) dx
can be simplified by first evaluating the integral of x. The integral is a linear combi-
nation and can be separated into two components.
∂Pi
∂αi
=
n− 1
1 + αj
¨
εif (εi)
2 F (εi)
n−2 dεi g (x) dx
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− n− 1
1 + αj
¨
f (εi)
2 F (εi)
n−2 dεi xg (x) dx.
Since εi and x are i.i.d., the double integrals can be rewritten as products of single
integrals
∂Pi
∂αi
=
n− 1
1 + αj
ˆ
εif (εi)
2 F (εi)
n−2 dεi
ˆ
g (x) dx
− n− 1
1 + αj
ˆ
f (εi)
2 F (εi)
n−2 dεi
ˆ
xg (x) dx.
The integrals
´
g (x) dx = G (x)|∞−∞ = 1 and
´
xg (x) dx = E [x] = 0; hence, the
marginal effect reduces to the single integral
∂Pi
∂αi
=
n− 1
1 + α
ˆ
εif (εi)
2 F (εi)
n−2 dεi.
For case (i), when n = 2, the term F (εi)
n−2 = 1 and the expression of the inner
integral reduces to the expectation of the idiosyncratic shock weighted by its own
symmetric distribution E [εif (εi)] =
´ {εif (εi)} f (εi) dεi = 0; hence ∂Pi∂αi = 0.
For case (ii), when n > 2, an inequality across the support of εi results from the
fact that F (εi)
n−2 ∈ (0, 1) and is increasing in εi. Hence, every negative value of
εi is outweighed by a corresponding and equally likely positive value of εi such that
F (−εi)n−2 < F (εi)n−2 for all i; therefore, the integral is positive. The terms n−11+α in
front of the integral are always positive; hence ∂Pi
∂αi
> 0.
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A.2 The Relative Variance Condition
Assume agent i only changes his level of independence αi but continues to hold his
level of effort constant at µi = µ
∗. Recall that the probability of winning at the
symmetric Nash is 1
n
. In comparison, the probability of winning for agent i from
equation (1.2.3) becomes
Pi =
¨
g (x) f (εi)F
(
1 + αi
1 + α∗
εi +
α∗ − αi
1 + α∗
x
)n−1
dεi dx.
Because F is raised to n − 1, increasing the variance in the arguments in F
can be shown to increase the probability of winning for n > 2 by moving more
density to the right tail of the distribution. Note that for an arbitrary function
R =
´
s (y)S (θy)n−1 dy where θ is a scaling parameter and where y ∼ i.i.d. (0, σ2y) is
symmetric and unimodal with pdf of s and cdf of S, then
∂R
∂θ
= (n− 1) ´ ys (y) s (θy)S (θy)n−2 dy. Increasing θ increases the variance of the
argument of S, var = θ2σ2y. For n = 2,
∂R
∂θ
= 0. For n > 2, R is increasing in θ,
∂R
∂θ
> 0; hence, the function R is increasing with variance of the argument. We use
this result to simplify the problem. We analyze the variance of the argument in F in
what follows to show when Pi ≤ 1n .
Since εi and x are i.i.d., the variance of the argument in F is
(
1+αi
1+α∗
)2
σ2ε +(
α∗−αi
1+α∗
)2
σ2x. Noting that the variance of the argument at the Nash is σ
2
ε , we can
solve for a ratio of σ2x : σ
2
ε that describes when Pi ≤ 1n .
σ2x
σ2ε
≤ 2 + α
∗ + αi
α∗ − αi . (A.2.1)
The upper bound of this requirement is infinite as αi → α∗, meaning σ2x can be
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very large compared to σ2ε for a local region around α
∗ and the Nash will still hold.
However, the lower bound requirement will depend upon µi and the explicit cost
functions in (1.2.11), but it will be found where σ2x/σ2ε  3 for the extreme case when
the Nash is at α∗ = 1 and an agent chooses αi = 0. Equation (A.2.1), therefore, is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for a Nash Equilibrium.
To see why this is not a sufficient condition, consider the case of equality when
σ2x = 3σ
2
ε at the lower bound, agent i can maintain his probability of winning Pi =
1
n
while holding his level of effort constant at µi = µ
∗ by adhering to the firm’s core
competency even when all other agents are fully independent. Since his costs of effort
are less at αi = 0, his expected utility is greater than at the Nash which violates
equilibrium. If he can also re-optimize µi > µ
∗
i , he will increase Pi >
1
n
and further
increase his expected utility by working harder than everyone else because he is also
now more efficient, which imposes an even stronger restriction on σ2x/σ2ε.
Consequently, the cost functions in the global constraint in equation (1.2.11) re-
quire the ratio of σ2x and σ
2
ε to be even smaller than shown in equation (A.2.1) to
insure Pi is small enough at αi = 0 to offset any gains from increased effort µi > µ
∗
i .
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1.2
From the model assumptions, at a point µi = 0 and αi = 0, costs c (0) = c
′
(0) = 0 and
z (0) = z
′
(0) = 0; i.e. there is no marginal cost to increase effort or independence
from zero. The incentive to increase effort from zero comes from equation (1.2.4),
namely ∂Pi
∂µi
> 0 and the incentive to increase independence from zero is shown in
Proposition 1.1, ∂Pi
∂αi
> 0. At a Nash equilibrium with the constraint S > 0, the right
hand side of both equations (1.2.9) and (1.2.10) are positive. It then follows that
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µ∗ > 0 and α∗ > 0.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 1.3
From equations (1.2.18), calculate the first spread S1 = W1 −W2 to be
S1 (µˆ, αˆ) = m+
λ (n− 2)
2nk
(1 + αˆ) z
′
(αˆ) c (µˆ) +
V
2h
(1 + αˆ) (1 + λz (αˆ))
−m+ λ
nk
(1 + αˆ) z
′
(αˆ) c (µˆ)
S1 (µˆ, αˆ) =
λ
2k
(1 + αˆ) z
′
(αˆ) c (µˆ) +
V
2h
(1 + αˆ) (1 + λz (αˆ))
From equations (1.2.18), calculate the second spread S2 = W2 −W3 to be
S2 (µˆ, αˆ) = m− λ
nk
(1 + αˆ) z
′
(αˆ) c (µˆ)
−m− λ (n− 2)
2nk
(1 + α∗) z
′
(αˆ) c (µˆ) +
V
2h
(1 + αˆ) (1 + λz (αˆ))
S2 (µˆ, αˆ) = − λ
2k
(1 + αˆ) z
′
(αˆ) c (µˆ) +
V
2h
(1 + αˆ) (1 + λz (αˆ))
The difference of the spreads is S1 − S2 = λk (1 + αˆ) z
′
(αˆ) c (µˆ). Then the first
order condition in equation (1.2.17) is
130
λz
′
(α∗) c (µ∗i ) =
(
λ
k
(1 + αˆ) z
′
(αˆ) c (µˆ)
)
k
1 + α∗
,
which reduces to the first symmetric equation
(1 + α∗) z
′
(α∗) c (µ∗) = (1 + αˆ) z
′
(αˆ) c (µˆ) .
The sum of the spreads is then S1 +S2 =
c
′
(µˆ)
h
(1 + αˆ) (1 + λz (αˆ)). Then the first
order condition in equation (1.2.16) is
(1 + λz (α∗)) c
′
(µ∗) =
(
c
′
(µˆ)
h
(1 + αˆ) (1 + λz (αˆ))
)
h
1 + α∗
,
which reduces to the second symmetric equation
(1 + α∗) (1 + λz (α∗)) c
′
(µ∗) = (1 + αˆ) (1 + λz (αˆ)) c
′
(µˆ) .
Given the two symmetric equations and that z is a monotonically increasing function
of α, and that c is a monotonically increasing function of µ, it follows that α∗ = αˆ
and µ∗ = µˆ simultaneously.
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Appendix B
Fair Tournaments in Common
Environments
B.1 Equal Variance
The fair criterion 2. For the case n > 2, the outcome that unequal variance leads to a
non-symmetric probability of winning is shown for the case of no common shocks and
when uncertainty is distributed proportional to ability ai = αi and hence σ
2
i = a
2
iσ
2.
We show that from a symmetric equilibrium, a change in one agent’s variance changes
the probability of winning.
Proof. Let all agents have ratio handicaps equal to their inverted ability φi =
1
ai
.
At efficient equilibrium,
µoi
ai
=
µoj
aj
from equation (2.2.7), effort terms cancel in the
probabilities of equation (2.2.2). The variance of the handicapped distribution is
E
[
(φiεi)
2] = E [( εi
ai
)2]
= σ2κ and idiosyncratic uncertainty becomes
εi
ai
= κi for all
i; hence f = zj and F = Zj for all j. The probability of winning for agent i is then
Pi =
´
f (κi)F (κi)
n−1 dκi,
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Pi =
1
n
F (κi)
n
∣∣∣∣∞
−∞
=
1
n
[1− 0]n = 1
n
.
To find out what happens to the probability of winning when the variance increases,
take the comparative static of probability with respect to the standard deviation
∂Pi
∂σi
=
´ ∂f(κi)
∂σi
F (κi)
n−1 dκi. Since f is symmetric about zero,
∂f(κi)
∂σi
= ∂f(−κi)
∂σi
and
F (κi) = 1− F (−κi). Then the comparative static can be rewritten as
∂Pi
∂σi
=
ˆ ∞
0
∂f (κi)
∂σi
[
F (κi)
n−1 +
(
1− F (κi)n−1
)]
dκi.
Define b (κi) =
[
F (κi)
n−1 +
(
1− F (κi)n−1
)]
, then
∂b (κi)
∂κi
=
(n− 1)
ai
f (κi)
[
F (κi)
n−2 +
(
1− F (κi)n−2
)]
For κi [0,∞), F (κi) ≥ (1− F (−κi)), therefore ∂b(κi)∂κi > 0. The comparative static
can then be written ∂Pi
∂σi
=
´∞
0
∂f(κi)
∂σi
b (κi) dκi. The term
∂f(κi)
∂σi
is decreasing for κi close
to zero and increasing for values further from zero at both ends of the distribution.
Therefore, define k such that ∂f(κi)
∂σi
< 0 for −k < κi < k and ∂f(κi)∂σi > 0 otherwise.
Since
´∞
0
f (κi) dκi =
1
2
for any σ2i , then
´∞
0
∂f(κi)
∂σi
dκi = 0 and it must be the case
that
´ k
0
∂f(κi)
∂σi
dκi =
´∞
k
∂f(κi)
∂σi
dκi. The comparative static can be rewritten again as
∂Pi
∂σi
=
ˆ k
0
∂f (κi)
∂σi
b (κi) dκi +
ˆ ∞
k
∂f (κi)
∂σi
b (κi) dκi.
The first term is negative and the second term is positive. Since b (κi) is strictly
increasing on κi [0,∞), then
´ k
0
∂f(κi)
∂σi
b (κi) dκi <
´∞
k
∂f(κi)
∂σi
b (κi) dκi and
∂Pi
∂σi
> 0.
An increase in variance increases the probability of winning at the efficient equi-
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librium for n > 2 handicapped agents.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2.1
The proof that efficient tournaments in equilibrium with agents of heterogeneous
ability and unique idiosyncratic uncertainty distributions who experience common
shocks s and θ are background fair when evaluated using the outcome rule ri =
1
αi
(qi − s− θaiµo) is as follows.
Proof. From the hypothesis, a fair and efficient tournament using the evaluation rule
ri =
1
αi
(qi − s− θaiµo) must satisfy the fair criteria of equal probabilities, equal
variance, and no common shock bias. Given φi =
1
αi
, hi = − 1αi (s+ θaiµo), σ2i = α2iσ2κ,
and expanding ri =
1
αi
(θµoi + s+ εi − s− θaiµo), then
Criterion 2 - Equal variance: E
[
(φiεi)
2] = E [( εi
αi
)2]
=
α2i σ
2
α2i
= σ2κ is constant
for all i.
Criterion 1 - Equal probabilities: from equation (2.2.2),
Pi =
ˆ
f
(
εi
αi
) n−1∏
j 6=i
Zj
(
εi
αi
+
θµoi
αi
− θµ
o
j
αj
+
(
1
αi
− 1
αj
)
(s− s)− θµo
(
ai
αi
− aj
αj
))
dεi.
Satisfying µoi = aiµ
o from equation (2.2.7), the terms
θµoi
αi
= θaiµ
o
αi
cancel for all i. The
additive common shock is perfectly observed and symmetric and cancels out. Since
the equal variance criterion is satisfied above, the terms εi
αi
and
εj
αj
are i.i.d., then
f = zj and F = Zj for all j which leads to Pi =
´
f
(
εi
αi
)
F
(
εi
αi
)n−1
dεi,
Pi =
1
n
F
(
εi
αi
)n∣∣∣∣∞
−∞
=
1
n
[1− 0]n = 1
n
.
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Criterion 3 - No common shock bias: Using the probability from the proof of
Criterion 1 above, ∂Pi
∂s
= ∂
∂s
´
f
(
εi
αi
)
F
(
εi
αi
)n−1
dεi = 0 and
∂Pi
∂θ
= ∂
∂θ
´
f
(
εi
αi
)
F
(
εi
αi
)n−1
dεi = 0
B.3 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Proof. From equation (2.2.2) and the rank rule ri =
1
αi
(qi − aiµo), the probability
of i winning with a single draw from the distribution of the common shock at the
efficient equilibrium is
Pi =
ˆ
f
(
εi
αi
) n−1∏
j 6=i
Zj
((
εi
αi
+
1
αi
θµoi +
1
αi
s− ai
αi
µo
)
−
(
1
αj
θµoj +
1
αj
s− aj
αj
µo
))
dεi
recall µoi = aiµ
oin equation (2.2.7),
Pi =
ˆ
f
(
εi
αi
) n−1∏
j 6=i
Zj
(
εi
αi
+
(
1
αi
− 1
αj
)
s+
(
ai
αi
− aj
αj
)
(θ − 1)µo
)
dεi
where the term ai
αi
is the ability to variance ratio for agent i. Taking the comparative
static of the probability with respect to θ yields
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∂Pi
∂θ
=
n−1∑
j 6=i
(
ai
αi
− aj
αj
)
µo
×
ˆ
f
(
εi
αi
) n−1∑
j 6=i
{
zj
(
εi
αi
+
(
1
αi
− 1
αj
)
s+
(
ai
αi
− aj
αj
)
(θ − 1)µo
)
×
n−2∏
k 6=j 6=i
Zk
(
εi
αi
+
(
1
αi
− 1
αj
)
s+
(
ai
αi
− aj
αj
)
(θ − 1)µo
)}
dεi.
The integral is everywhere positive and the summation of the differences in the ability
to variance ratios in the first term will determine the sign of ∂Pi
∂θ
. The coefficient term
can be rearranged to (n− 1)µo ai
αi
− µo
n−1∑
j 6=i
aj
αj
. Add and subtract the term µo ai
αi
yields
nµo
(
ai
αi
− 1
n
n∑
j
aj
αj
)
. For case (i), when aj = αj for all j, nµ
o
(
1− n
n
)
= 0 and ∂Pi
∂θ
= 0.
For case (ii), when aj 6= αj for at least one j, ∂Pi∂θ > 0 if aiαi > 1n
n∑
j
aj
αj
. Generalizing,
the probability for player i changes with a change in multiplicative common shock
difference according to
∂Pi
∂θ

> 0 if ai
αi
> 1
n
n∑
j
aj
αj
= 0 if ai
αi
= 1
n
n∑
j
aj
αj
< 0 if ai
αi
< 1
n
n∑
j
aj
αj
.
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B.4 Proof of Proposition 2.3
The proof of proposition 2.3 is as follows.
Proof. From equation (2.2.2) and the rank ruleri =
1
αi
(qi − aiµo), the probability of i
winning with a single draw from the distribution of the common shock at the efficient
equilibrium is
Pi =
ˆ
f
(
εi
αi
) n−1∏
j 6=i
Zj
((
εi
αi
+
1
αi
θµoi +
1
αi
s− ai
αi
µo
)
−
(
1
αj
θµoj +
1
αj
s− aj
αj
µo
))
dεi
recall µoi = aiµ
oin equation (2.2.7),
Pi =
ˆ
f
(
εi
αi
) n−1∏
j 6=i
Zj
(
εi
αi
+
(
1
αi
− 1
αj
)
s+
(
ai
αi
− aj
αj
)
(θ − 1)µo
)
dεi
where the term ai
αi
is the ability to variance ratio for agent i. Taking the comparative
static of the probability with respect to s yields
∂Pi
∂s
=
n−1∑
j 6=i
(
1
αi
− 1
αj
)
×
ˆ
f
(
εi
αi
) n−1∑
j 6=i
{
zj
(
εi
αi
+
(
1
αi
− 1
αj
)
s+
(
ai
αi
− aj
αj
)
(θ − 1)µo
)
×
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n−2∏
k 6=j 6=i
Zk
(
εi
αi
+
(
1
αi
− 1
αj
)
s+
(
ai
αi
− aj
αj
)
(θ − 1)µo
)}
dεi.
The integral is everywhere positive, and the summation of the differences in
handicaps will determine the sign of ∂Pi
∂s
. The first term can be rearranged to
(n− 1) 1
αi
−
n−1∑
j 6=i
1
αj
. Add and subtract the term 1
αi
yields n
(
1
αi
− 1
n
n∑
j
1
αj
)
. For the
identically distributed case, let α = αj for all j, then n
(
1
α
− 1
α
)
= 0 and ∂Pi
∂s
= 0.
When α 6= αj for at least one j, ∂Pi∂s > 0 if 1αi > 1n
n∑
j
1
αj
. For convenience, the in-
equality can be inverted such that αi <
(
n
1
n
∑
j
1
αj
)−1
. Generalizing, the probability
for player i changes with a change in additive common shock difference according to
∂Pi
∂s

> 0 if αi <
(
n
1
n
∑
j
1
αj
)−1
= 0 if αi =
(
n
1
n
∑
j
1
αj
)−1
< 0 if αi >
(
n
1
n
∑
j
1
αj
)−1 .
B.5 Proof of Corollary 2.1
The proof that efficient tournaments with agents of identical ability and identical
idiosyncratic uncertainty distributions who experience common shocks s and θ are
background fair when evaluated using the outcome rule ri = qi is as follows.
Proof. Given φi = 1 and hi = 0,
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2.1.1. Criterion 1: From equation (2.2.2),
Pi =
ˆ
f (εi)
n−1∏
j 6=i
Zj
(
εi +
(
µoi − µoj
)
θ + s− s) dεi.
From equation (2.2.7), µoi = µ
o
j and the effort and common shock terms are sym-
metric. Since εi and εj are i.i.d., then f = zj and F = Zj which reduces the
probability to Pi =
´
f (εi)F (εi)
n−1 dεi,
Pi =
1
n
F (εi)
n
∣∣∣∣∞
−∞
=
1
n
[1− 0]n = 1
n
.
2.1.2. Criterion 2: Using the probability from the proof of 2.1.1 above,
∂Pi
∂s
= ∂
∂s
´
f (εi)F (εi)
n−1 dεi = 0 and
∂Pi
∂θ
= ∂
∂θ
´
f (εi)F (εi)
n−1 dεi = 0. .
2.1.3. Criterion 3: is met by hypothesis.
B.6 Proof of Corollary 2.2
The proof that efficient tournaments with agents of different ability and identical
idiosyncratic uncertainty distributions who experience common shocks s and θ, (i)
are background fair using ri = qi− θµoi ; (ii) are not background fair using ri = qi; (iii)
are not background fair using ri =
1
ai
(qi − s) is as follows.
Proof. 2.2.(i) Using the evaluation rule ri = qi− θµoi produces a fair outcome: Given
φi = 1 and hi = −θµoi ,
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2.2.(i).1. Criterion 1: From equation (2.2.2),
Pi =
ˆ
f (εi)
n−1∏
j 6=i
Zj
(
εi +
(
µoi − µoj
)
θ + s− s− θµoi + θµoj
)
dεi
From equation (2.2.7), the effort and common shock terms are symmetric. Since εi
and εj are i.i.d., then f = zj and F = Zj which reduces the probability to Pi =´
f (εi)F (εi)
n−1 dεi,
Pi =
1
n
F (εi)
n
∣∣∣∣∞
−∞
=
1
n
[1− 0]n = 1
n
.
2.2.(i).2. Criterion 2: Using the probability from the proof of 2.2.(i).1 above,
∂Pi
∂s
= ∂
∂s
´
f (εi)F (εi)
n−1 dεi = 0 and
∂Pi
∂θ
= ∂
∂θ
´
f (εi)F (εi)
n−1 dεi = 0.
2.2.(i).3. Criterion 3: is met by hypothesis.
2.2.(ii) Using the evaluation rule ri = qi does not produces a fair outcome: Given
φi = 1 and hi = 0,
2.2.(ii).1. Criterion 1: From equation (2.2.2),
Pi =
ˆ
f (εi)
n−1∏
j 6=i
Zj
(
εi +
(
µoi − µoj
)
θ + s− s) dεi.
All of the common shock terms are symmetric. Since εi and εj are i.i.d., then f = zj
and F = Zj for all j. Also, given ai 6= aj, rearrange equation (2.2.7) to µoj = ajaiµoi ,
then substitute into the probability
Pi =
ˆ
f (εi)F
(
εi + µ
o
i
(
1− aj
ai
)
θ
)n−1
dεi 6= 1
n
.
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Term µoi
(
1− aj
ai
)
θ represents a unique non-zero bias in equilibrium for each instance
of F for every i.
2.2.(ii).2. Criterion 2: Using the probability from the proof of 2.2.(ii).1 above,
∂Pi
∂s
= ∂
∂s
´
f (εi)F
(
εi + µ
o
i
(
1− aj
ai
)
θ
)n−1
dεi = 0. However,
∂Pi
∂θ
= µoi
(
1− aj
ai
)
(n− 1)
× ´ f (εi) f
(
εi + µ
o
i
(
1− aj
ai
)
θ
)
F
(
εi + µ
o
i
(
1− aj
ai
)
θ
)n−2
dεi and
∂Pi
∂θ
6= 0.
2.2.(ii).3. Criterion 3: is met by hypothesis.
2.2.(iii) Using the evaluation rule ri =
1
ai
(qi − s) does not produces a fair outcome:
Given φi =
1
ai
and hi = − sai ,
2.2.(iii).1. Criterion 1: (is not met) From equation (2.2.2),
Pi =
ˆ
f
(
εi
ai
) n−1∏
j 6=i
Zj
(
εi
ai
+
(
µoi
ai
− µ
o
j
aj
)
θ +
(
1
ai
− 1
aj
)
(s− s)
)
dεi.
Satisfying equation (2.2.7), all of the terms
µoi
ai
− µoj
aj
cancel. Common shock terms are
symmetric. Since εi and εj are i.i.d. and given ai 6= aj, then εiai 6=
εj
aj
for all i 6= j and
Zj
(
εi
ai
)
6= Zk
(
εi
ai
)
for all i 6= j 6= k, hence Pi =
´
f
(
εi
ai
) n−1∏
j 6=i
Zj
(
εi
ai
)
dεi 6= 1n .
2.2.(iii).2. Criterion 2: Using the probability in 2.2.(iii).1,
∂Pi
∂s
= ∂
∂s
´
f
(
εi
ai
) n−1∏
j 6=i
Zj
(
εi
ai
)
dεi = 0 and
∂Pi
∂θ
= ∂
∂θ
´
f
(
εi
ai
) n−1∏
j 6=i
Zj
(
εi
ai
)
dεi = 0.
2.2.(iii).3. Criterion 3: The variance E
[(
εi
ai
)2]
= σ
2
a2i
is not identical for all i.
See the equal variance proof of asymmetry.
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B.7 Proof of Corollary 2.3
The proof using Efficient tournaments with agents of different ability and idiosyncratic
uncertainty distributions proportional to ability who experience common shocks s
and θ, (i) are background fair using ri =
1
ai
(qi − s); (ii) are not background fair using
ri = qi; (iii) are not background fair using ri = qi − θµoi is as follows.
Proof. 2.3.(i) Using the evaluation rule ri =
1
ai
(qi − s) produces a fair outcome:
Given φi =
1
ai
and hi = − sai ,
2.3.(i).3. Criterion 3: E
[(
εi
ai
)2]
=
a2i σ
2
a2i
= σ2κ is identical for all i.
2.3.(i).1. Criterion 1: From equation (2.2.2),
Pi =
ˆ
f
(
εi
ai
) n−1∏
j 6=i
Zj
(
εi
ai
+
(
µoi
ai
− µ
o
j
aj
)
θ +
(
1
ai
− 1
aj
)
(s− s)
)
dεi.
Satisfying equation (2.2.7), the terms
µoi
ai
=
µoj
aj
cancel. Common shock terms are
symmetric. From the result in 2.3.(i).3, the terms εi
ai
and
εj
aj
are i.i.d., then f = zj
and F = Zj for all j and Pi =
´
f
(
εi
ai
)
F
(
εi
ai
)n−1
dεi,
Pi =
1
n
F
(
εi
ai
)n∣∣∣∣∞
−∞
=
1
n
[1− 0]n = 1
n
.
2.3.(i).2. Criterion 2: Using the probability from the proof of Criterion 1 above,
∂Pi
∂s
= ∂
∂s
´
f
(
εi
ai
)
F
(
εi
ai
)n−1
dεi = 0 and
∂Pi
∂θ
= ∂
∂θ
´
f
(
εi
ai
)
F
(
εi
ai
)n−1
dεi = 0.
2.3.(ii) Using the evaluation rule ri = qi does not produces a fair outcome: Given
φi = 1 and hi = 0,
2.3.(ii).3. Criterion 3: E
[
(εi)
2] = a2iσ2κ is not identical for all i.
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2.3.(ii).1. Criterion 1: From equation (2.2.2),
Pi =
ˆ
f (εi)
n−1∏
j 6=i
Zj
(
εi + θµ
o
i − θµoj + s− s
)
dεi.
The common shocks cancel. Rearranging equation (2.2.7) to µoj =
aj
ai
µoi and in-
serted into Pi, the term µ
o
i
(
1− aj
ai
)
θ emerges and is a unique non-zero bias in each
instance of Zj. Additionally, εi and εj are different distributions and Zj (εi) 6= Zk (εi)
for all i 6= j 6= k, hence Pi =
´
f (εi)
n−1∏
j 6=i
Zj
(
εi + µ
o
i
(
1− aj
ai
)
θ
)
dεi 6= 1n .
2.3.(ii).2. Criterion 2: Using the probability from the proof of 2.3.(ii).1 above,
∂Pi
∂s
= ∂
∂s
´
f (εi)
n−1∏
j 6=i
Zj
(
εi + µ
o
i
(
1− aj
ai
)
θ
)
dεi = 0. However,
∂Pi
∂θ
= µoi
(
1− aj
ai
)
(n− 1)
× ´ f (εi) f
(
εi + µ
o
i
(
1− aj
ai
)
θ
)
F
(
εi + µ
o
i
(
1− aj
ai
)
θ
)n−2
dεi and
∂Pi
∂θ
6= 0.
2.3.(iii) Using the evaluation rule ri = qi− θµoi does not produces a fair outcome:
Given φi = 1 and hi = −θµoi ,
2.3.(iii).3. Criterion 3: E
[
(εi)
2] = a2iσ2κ is not constant for all i.
2.3.(iii).1. Criterion 1: From equation (2.2.2),
Pi =
ˆ
f (εi)
n−1∏
j 6=i
Zj
(
εi + θµ
o
i − θµoj + s− s− θµoi + θµoj
)
dεi.
From equation (2.2.7), the effort terms cancel. The error terms εi and εj are different
distributions and Zj (εi) 6= Zk (εi) for all j 6= k and 2.3.(iii).3 above, hence
Pi =
´
f (εi)
n−1∏
j 6=i
Zj (εi) dεi 6= 1n .
2.3.(iii).2. Criterion 2: The marginal probability due to the shock
∂Pi
∂s
= ∂
∂s
´
f (εi)
n−1∏
j 6=i
Zj (εi) dεi = 0 and
∂Pi
∂θ
= ∂
∂θ
´
f (εi)
n−1∏
j 6=i
Zj (εi) dεi = 0 .
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B.8 Proof of Proposition 2.4
Proof. Individual payoffs from equation (2.2.10) for a fair and efficient tournament
for agent i are given by
Wi = ui + aiC (µ
o) + (1− Pi) Vφiθgo
Li = ui + aiC (µ
o)− Pi Vφiθgo
Expected profits are
E [Π] =
n∑
i=1
{
V µoi − 1n (Wi + (n− 1)Li)
}
=
n∑
i=1
{
V µoi − 1n
(
ui + aiC (µ
o) +
(
n−1
n
)
V
φiθgo
)
− (n−1
n
) (
ui + aiC (µ
o)− 1
n
V
φiθgo
)}
E [Π] =
n∑
i=1
{
V µoi − 1n
(
V
φiθgo
)
−
(
ui + aiC (µ
o)− 1
n
V
φiθgo
)}
E [Π] =
n∑
i=1
{V µoi − ui − aiC (µo)}
Actual profits when agent i wins,
Π|i wins = V µoi −
(
ui + aiC (µ
o) +
(
n−1
n
)
V
φiθgo
)
+
n−1∑
j=16=i
{
V µoj −
(
uj + ajC (µ
o)− 1
n
V
φjθgo
)}
Π|i wins =
n∑
j=1
{
V µoj − uj − ajC (µo)
}− (n−1
n
)
V
φiθgo
+
n−1∑
j=1
{
1
n
V
φjθgo
}
Π|i wins = E [Π]− Vφiθgo + 1n Vφiθgo +
n−1∑
j=1
{
1
n
V
φjθgo
}
Π|i wins = E [Π]− Vφiθgo +
n∑
j=1
{
1
n
V
φjθgo
}
Π|i wins = E [Π] + Vθgo
(
1
n
n∑
j=1
1
φj
− 1
φi
)
Given that 1
φj
= αj and α¯ =
1
n
n∑
j=1
αj, Π|i wins = E [Π] + Vθgo (α¯− αi) results.
The comparative static of profit with respect to αi is
∂Πi
∂αi
= − V
θgo
.
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Appendix C
Fairness and workplace incentives:
Evidence from a tournament
experiment with heterogeneous
agents
C.1 Contract Choice Tables
This subsection contains the results of the contract choice regressions at the pooled
level and the group level. Averaging at the pooled level and the group level, the
Percent Won should be 1/3 for all contracts in the following tables.
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Table C.1: Pooled Contract Choice for the Benchmark
Decision Decision Fairness Earnings Percent Win
Variable [0,1] (gradient) [0,1] (difference) (difference)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Choice was Contract A or Homogeneous 0.500 0.565 0.292*** 0.074 0.003
(0.121) (0.105) (0.069) (2.310) (0.069)
Choice was Contract B or Homogeneous 0.500 0.519 0.313*** 0.593 -0.003
(0.121) (0.103) (0.065) (0.628) (0.041)
R-sqr 0.500 0.615 0.547 0.004 0.000
dfres 35 35 35 35 35
BIC 59.4 48.3 16.4 249.2 4.9
N 36.0 36.0 36.0 36.0 36.0
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Significant values on Choice variables in columns 1, 2, and 3
indicate statistical difference from the midrange value, 0.50.
The pooled level results of the 36 subjects that switched groups between stages
played the homogeneous contract H in Group 0 as well as a different ability con-
tract in Group 1 are shown in Table C.1. Of the 36 subjects, 12 switched roles
between i0 (aM , σM) and i1 (aL, σM), and 12 switched roles between k0 (aM , σM) and
k1 (aH , σM). The other 12 retained the same ability and uncertainty parameters, but
switched between the two groups j0,1 (aM , σM). Half of these subjects had to choose
between Group 1 with no handicap in Contract A or Group 0 playing Contract H.
The other half had a choice to make between Group 1 with offset handicaps in Con-
tract B or Group 0 playing Contract H. In both cases, contract H was considered
more fair than either B or C.
The results that support the group level contract choice decisions in subsection
3.4.1.1 are shown in the next four tables beginning with TableC.2. Each table shows
the results from 5 regressions where the results of each regression continue in the
same column of each table. Each regression includes twelve dummy variables that
indicate contract choices made by each group. Errors are grouped at the subject level.
At the group level, there is no significant difference in average earnings between any
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contract even though the expected earnings are different for different types in contract
A. Averaging at the group level, the Percent Won should be 1/3 for all contracts in
the following tables.
The following four tables support the discussion on group level results
Table C.2: Contract Preferences, Group 0 and Group 1 Decisions
Decision Decision Fairness Earnings Percent Win
Variable [0,1] (gradient) [0,1] (difference) (difference)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Group 0 (Hetero Ability or Homogeneous):
Choice of Contract A or Homogeneous 0.500 0.565 0.292*** 0.074 0.003
(0.12) (0.11) (0.07) (2.31) (0.07)
Choice of Contract B or Homogeneous 0.500 0.519 0.313*** 0.593 -0.003
(0.12) (0.10) (0.06) (0.63) (0.04)
Group 1 (Heterogeneous Ability):
Choice of Contract A or B 0.389 0.389 0.403** -1.604 -0.008
(0.12) (0.11) (0.05) (2.04) (0.09)
R-sqr 0.530 0.600 0.852 0.037 0.000
dfres 215 215 215 215 215
BIC 372.6 307.1 -20.2 1589.7 88.4
N 216.0 216.0 216.0 216.0 216.0
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Significant values on choice variables in columns
1, 2, and 3 indicate statistical difference from the midrange value, 0.50.
Table C.3: Contract Preferences, Group 2 Decisions
Decision Decision Fairness Earnings Percent Won
Variable [0,1] (gradient) [0,1] (difference) (difference)
Group 2 (Heterogeneous Uncertainty) b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Choice of Contract A or B 0.611 0.602 0.576* 2.020 -0.006
(0.12) (0.09) (0.04) (1.47) (0.05)
Choice of Contract A or C 0.556 0.528 0.563 3.287 0.006
(0.12) (0.11) (0.05) (3.13) (0.03)
Choice of Contract B or C 0.556 0.500 0.507 0.340 0.000
(0.12) (0.10) (0.03) (1.30) (0.05)
R-sqr 0.530 0.600 0.852 0.037 0.000
dfres 215 215 215 215 215
BIC 372.6 307.1 -20.2 1589.7 88.4
N 216.0 216.0 216.0 216.0 216.0
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Significant values on choice variables in columns 1, 2, and
3 indicate statistical difference from the midrange value, 0.50.
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Table C.4: Contract Preferences, Group 3 Decisions
Decision Decision Fairness Earnings Percent Won
Variable [0,1] (gradient) [0,1] (difference) (difference)
Group 3 (Ability ∝ Uncertainty) b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Choice of Contract A or B 0.389 0.444 0.465 0.222 0.000
(0.12) (0.10) (0.04) (2.31) (0.07)
Choice of Contract A or C 0.444 0.417 0.451 1.387 -0.006
(0.12) (0.10) (0.05) (1.89) (0.09)
Choice of Contract B or C 0.611 0.620 0.542 0.181 -0.003
(0.12) (0.11) (0.04) (1.45) (0.06)
R-sqr 0.530 0.600 0.852 0.037 0.000
dfres 215 215 215 215 215
BIC 372.6 307.1 -20.2 1589.7 88.4
N 216.0 216.0 216.0 216.0 216.0
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Significant values on choice variables in columns 1, 2, and
3 indicate statistical difference from the midrange value, 0.50.
Table C.5: Contract Preferences, Group 4 Decisions
Decision Decision Fairness Earnings Percent Won
Variable [0,1] (gradient) [0,1] (difference) (difference)
Group 4 (Ability ∝ Precision) b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Choice of Contract A or B 0.556 0.565 0.479 1.837 -0.003
(0.12) (0.11) (0.04) (1.55) (0.08)
Choice of Contract A or C 0.611 0.593 0.500 2.743 -0.006
(0.12) (0.10) (0.06) (3.22) (0.05
Choice of Contract B or C 0.500 0.435 0.528 0.471 0.008
(0.12) (0.11) (0.03) (0.89) (0.04)
R-sqr 0.530 0.600 0.852 0.037 0.000
dfres 215 215 215 215 215
BIC 372.6 307.1 -20.2 1589.7 88.4
N 216.0 216.0 216.0 216.0 216.0
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Significant values on choice variables in columns 1, 2, and
3 indicate statistical difference from the midrange value, 0.50.
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C.2 Effort by Round
The following figures show the average effort for each period for each group in each
contract. Effort is averaged by round. The 20 paid rounds are shown.
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Figure C.1: Homogeneous group, average effort for each period.
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Figure C.2: Group 1- heterogeneous ability, Contract A, average effort for each period.
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Figure C.3: Group 1- heterogeneous ability, Contract B , average effort for each
period.
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Figure C.4: Group 2- heterogeneous uncertainty, Contract A, average effort for each
period.
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Figure C.5: Group 2- heterogeneous uncertainty, Contract B, average effort for each
period.
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Figure C.6: Group 2- heterogeneous uncertainty, Contract C, average effort for each
period.
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Figure C.7: Group 3- ability ∝ uncertainty, Contract A, average effort for each period.
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Figure C.8: Group 3- ability ∝ uncertainty, Contract B, average effort for each period.
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Figure C.9: Group 3- ability ∝ uncertainty, Contract C, average effort for each period.
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Figure C.10: Group 4 - ability ∝ precision, Contract A, average effort for each period.
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Figure C.11: Group 4 - ability ∝ precision, Contract B, average effort for each period.
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Figure C.12: Group 4 - ability ∝ precision, Contract C, average effort for each period.
154
C.3 Experiment Instructions
The instructions are found on the next page. The instructions were placed at each
terminal prior to the subjects entering the room. After all subjects were in the room
and sitting at their terminal, subjects were informed the instructions were to be read
out loud. The instructions were read while all subjects followed along. Subjects
were given several opportunities to ask questions while the instructions were read
and during the training segment of the experiment.
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Experiment Instructions
Introduction
This is an experiment in economic decision-making. Please follow the instructions
carefully. If you make good decisions you can earn a considerable amount of money.
At the end of the session, you will be paid your earnings in private and in cash. Please
do not communicate with other participants during the experiment unless instructed.
Importantly, please refrain from verbally reacting to events that occur.
You will be randomly matched into a group with two other players that are sitting
in the room. The identity of your group members will not be revealed to you. You
will remain in the same group for the entire experiment.
The experiment will last for many decision “rounds”. In each decision round, you
and your group members will independently choose a Decision Number. These choices
will be converted to Total Numbers. The person in your group with the highest Total
Number will receive a high fixed payment; the other two will receive a low fixed
payment. Your earnings for a round are equal to your fixed payment minus the cost
associated with your Decision Number.
All earnings are denominated in lab dollars. At the end of the experiment your
earnings in lab dollars will be converted to U.S. dollars at an exchange rate of 2500
to 1.
The Decision Setting
In this experiment you will perform a simple task. The computer will ask you to
choose a Decision Number, which will be your only choice in a round. This Decision
Number is a choice between 0 and 100. Tied to each Decision Number is a Decision
Cost: the higher the Decision Number chosen, the higher the cost. On your computer
you will see a table that provides information on this relationship. You will select a
Decision Number using a slider bar on your computer screen. When you are ready
to make your decision, please make sure to position the slider on the chosen Decision
Number, and then click the “SUBMIT DECISION” button.
After you have submitted your decision, the computer will draw a Random Num-
ber for you. Your Random Number can be a positive or negative value and will be
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added to your Decision Number. The range of possible values is centered on the
number zero (0). You will know the range of possible random numbers that will be
drawn for you. Know that each number in your random number range has an equal
chance of being selected.
Calculation of “Total Numbers”
Your Decision Number will be converted into a Total Number. This calculation
involves two adjustments using a multiplier and an offset. Specifically, the following
calculation is used:
Total Number = multiplier × (Decision Number + Random Number) +
offset
If you choose a higher Decision Number, you will have a higher Total Number,
on average. Since the Random Number is a draw from a range of possible numbers,
for any Decision Number you choose there will likewise be a range of possible Total
Numbers associated with it.
Earnings
After the Total Numbers for you and your group members have been calculated,
the computer will compare them. If your Total Number is the highest in the group,
you will receive a high fixed payment; otherwise you will receive a low fixed payment.
If there happens to be a tie for the highest Total Number, the computer will randomly
break the tie.
Your earnings for the decision round will be calculated as the difference between
the fixed payment you receive and your Decision Cost:
Round Earnings = (High or Low) Fixed Payment – Decision Cost
It is important to know that, although the Random Number can play a role in
determining whether you have the highest Total Number, it has no impact on your
Decision Cost.
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Example
At this time, please click to “continue” past the current computer screen. Once
you see the example decision screen, do NOT click “continue” until instructed to do
so. Now, please look closely at the decision screen. According to the Total Number
calculation near the top of your screen, notice that the multiplier is 2 and the offset
is 30. What does this mean?
• Since the multiplier is 2, this means that both the Decision Number and Random
Number are multiplied by 2 when calculating the Total Number.
• The offset is 30, such that 30 will be added-in automatically to determine your
Total Number. The offset does not depend on your Decision Number or the
Random Number.
For illustration, move your slider bar at the bottom of your screen to indicate
a Decision Number of 55 . Continuing with the example, notice that the Random
Number range, found near the bottom of your screen, is from -35 to 35. How does
this relate to your Total Number?
• On average, if you enter a Decision Number of 55, your Total Number equals
2 × (55 + 0) + 30 = 140. This is because the Random Number equals 0 on
average.
• With a Decision Number of 55, the highest possible Total Number is 2 × (55 +
35) + 30 = 210. This is because the highest possible Random Number in this
example is 35.
• With a Decision Number of 55, the lowest possible Total Number is 2 × (55 −
35) + 30 = 70. This is because the lowest possible Random Number in this
example is −35.
• As illustrated near the top of your screen, if you submitted a Decision Number
of 55, the range of possible Total Numbers would be 70 to 210, and is centered
on 140.
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Next, please click the “SUBMIT DECISION” decision. This will draw a Random
Number, and to the right of your screen you will see an example Total Number
calculation. You can click the button multiple times, and in each case you will notice
that the Total Number does in fact lie in the Total Number range illustrated near
the top of your screen. Please know that in actual decision rounds, if you click the
“SUBMIT DECISION” button this will submit your decision. You will not know the
Random Number draw until after your decision is submitted.
You will notice that the computer provides information on Decision Cost, and
displays what your earnings for the round will be for any selected Decision Number.
In this example, you will see that the high fixed payment is 3740 and the low fixed
payment is 1490. With a Decision Number of 55, the Decision Cost is 2711. Thus,
if you submitted this decision and had the highest Total Number in your group, you
would earn 3740 – 2711 = 1029. Otherwise you would earn 1490 – 2711 = –1221.
Notice that in this example, if you received the low fixed payment this would result in
negative earnings. This does mean that you would in fact lose money. Additionally,
if both the high fixed payment and low fixed payment amounts are negative, then you
are guaranteed to lose money if you submit the indicated Decision Number.
Please move your slider to a different Decision Number. If you increase the De-
cision Number, you will notice that this increases the Total Number on average, and
also increases your Decision Cost. The opposite is true as you decrease the Decision
Number. The Random Number range will not change, nor will the high or low fixed
payment as these amounts do not depend on your Decision Number.
Other Group Members
The other members of your group may face different conditions than you. In
particular, one or more of the following may be different: (1) the Decision Cost asso-
ciated with each Decision Number; (2) the random number range; (3) the multiplier;
(4) the offset; (5) the high and low fixed payment amounts.
Given the possible differences between the conditions faced by you and your group
members, and how Total Numbers are calculated, there are a few important things
to know:
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• Random Numbers will be determined separately for each group member. It is
very unlikely that you will have the same Random Number as any other group
member in a round.
• If your Decision Cost is higher than another group member’s Decision Cost for
any given Decision Number, then it will cost you more to achieve the same Total
Number, on average (assuming the multiplier and offset are the same).
• If you have a higher multiplier than another, you will have a higher Total Num-
ber if you both chose the same Decision Number, on average (assuming the
same offset)
• If you have a higher offset than another, you will have a higher Total Number if
you both chose the same Decision Number, on average (assuming the multiplier
is the same).
As you proceed to the decision rounds, on your decision screen you will be pro-
vided complete information about the conditions faced by your other two group mem-
bers. This will allow you to compare your relative situation. In addition, you have
the opportunity to speculate by hypothetically choosing Decision Numbers for the
other two members, and seeing the corresponding range of possible Total Numbers
that would result along with earnings outcomes. If you make hypothetical choices for
the other group members, this will have absolutely no effect on your earnings or the
choices made by the other group members! This is for your use only.
Results
After all participants submit their Decision Numbers for a round, you will see
a results screen. The results screen will show your Random Number, Total Number
and earnings for the round. You will also see Total Numbers of your other group
members, and who received the high fixed payment (who ranked 1st) and who received
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the low fixed payment (who ranked 2nd and 3rd). You will not know the Decision
Numbers or the Random Numbers for the other group members – only the Total
Numbers.
Summary
• You will be randomly matched with two other participants in this room for the
entire experiment. You will not know the identity of the other two participants.
• In each decision round you choose a Decision Number. The higher the Decision
Number you choose, the higher is your Decision Cost.
• Your Decision Number will be converted into a Total Number based on Random
Number, multiplier and an offset. The member of your group with the highest
Total Number receives the high fixed payment. Other members receive the low
fixed payment.
• Your earnings in a round are equal to the difference between the fixed payment
you receive and your decision cost.
Experiment Organization
The decision rounds are arranged into multiple stages. You will not know the
number of stages until the experiment ends. Within a stage, you will have the same
decision cost schedule, the same multiplier and offset, and the same random number
range from one round to the next. You will not know the number of rounds in a stage
until the stage is finished.
Your computer will alert you before a new stage begins. At the beginning of a
new stage, please look carefully at the information on your decision screen, as this is
likely to have changed.
The experiment begins with 2 training rounds. You will not have the opportunity
to earn money in these rounds. Aside from training rounds, your decision in each
round will determine your earnings: your earnings from the experiment will be the
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total of your earnings from each paid round. After the second training round, you
will have a final opportunity to ask questions.
Timers
Please know that there is a timer on the decision screen. If the timer goes
to zero before you click the “SUBMIT DECISION” button, the computer will record
whatever Decision Number you have indicated when the timer hits zero. The amount
of time given will decrease as the experiment progresses. This is just to help make
sure the experiment finishes as scheduled.
Please click “continue” to move past the example decision screen. Then, read the
instructions for the training rounds and then click “continue” to begin the first training
round.
162
C.4 In Game Role Surveys
The in game surveys are shown on the next page. The surveys were used in the
21stround of each stage to solicit which role(s) a subject would prefer to play if they
had the ability to choose. Additional data was collected as to what factors were most
important in determining the choice they made.
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Participant ID
You will know your ID at the end of the session. Please fill in the ID number at that
time.
Stage 1 Questions
Please look carefully at your decision screen, at the conditions you face as well as the
conditions faced by your “1st group member” and “2nd group member”.
1. If you had the ability to choose, which role would you play? (circle one)
my current role role of 1st group member role of 2nd group member
2. How important were the following factors when determining your choice above?
(circle a response to each)
3. What would be your second preferred role? (circle one)
my current role role of 1st group member role of 2nd group member
After you are finished, please submit your choice for this decision round on your
computer.
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Participant ID
You will know your ID at the end of the session. Please fill in the ID number at that
time.
Stage 2 Questions
Please look carefully at your decision screen, at the conditions you face as well as the
conditions faced by your “1st group member” and “2nd group member”.
1. If you had the ability to choose, which role would you play? (circle one)
my current role role of 1st group member role of 2nd group member
2. How important were the following factors when determining your choice above?
(circle a response to each)
3. What would be your second preferred role? (circle one)
my current role role of 1st group member role of 2nd group member
After you are finished, please submit your choice for this decision round on your
computer.
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C.5 Performance Notice
The performance notice is shown on the next page. The nature of the game did
allow subjects to severely hurt themselves by choosing very large decision numbers
that ultimately generated very large costs for them. This document was presented to
subjects that incurred large costs to make them aware their decisions are very costly.
A notice was given for any subject who incurred $10 or more in overall costs.
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Your Attention Please
We would like to bring to your attention that, with the exchange rate of 2500 lab
dollars to 1 U.S. dollar, you have lost over U.S. dollars so far in the experiment.
Please notice that when you submit a Decision Number you will receive either
the earnings indicated under the “High Fixed Payment” or the “Low Fixed Payment”
scenarios presented on your screen. When these indicate negative numbers this does
mean this amount will be subtracted from your earnings. If, based on your chosen
Decision Number, the amounts under both the“High Fixed Payment”and“Low Fixed
Payment” scenarios are negative, then you are guaranteed to lose money if you submit
this Decision Number. Choosing a lower Decision Number will decrease the possibility
of negative earnings.
The experiment will proceed for many additional rounds, and we want you to
have the opportunity to earn money (and not owe us money!). Therefore, we will add
U.S. dollars to your overall earnings to help offset your current losses.
This is a one-time action. Please continue with the experiment and good luck.
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C.6 Decision and Results Screen Snapshots
The snapshots of the decision screen and results screen are shown on the following
pages. Static games of complete information assume players have knowledge of the
strategic reaction functions of their opponents and are further able to deduce their
strategic solutions. Given the complex nature of the games in this experiment, a
novel decision screen was developed to provide subjects with tools to speculate on
the strategic behavior of their opponents. The decision screen incorporated novel
techniques to provide subjects with as much information as possible about their op-
ponents. First, subjects used slider-bars to choose their decision number between 0
and 100 (as opposed to typing a decision number into a text box field). This novel
approach has several advantages: It provided visual feedback cues as to where a sub-
ject’s decision number lies along the number line between 0 and 100. In Z-Tree, each
time a slider-bar is moved, the input is made available to the programing environ-
ment. This gave us the opportunity to calculate expected total numbers, costs, and
high and low earnings and provide instant feedback interactively on the screen.
Also, two extra slider-bars were provided to allow subjects the opportunity to“try-
out” different decision numbers from the perspective of the other group members, to
“see” what their opponents see and speculate as to what strategy their opponents
might choose. A subject could use the speculative slider bars to speculate how an
opponent’s decision number would translate into the expected total numbers, costs,
and high and low earnings for the opponent.
168
Figure C.13: Decision Screen Example
Figure C.14: Results Screen Example
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